

THE BEAST FROM THE  
ABYSS

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Book No.	

*ALSO BY*  
HERMANN RAUSCHNING

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GERMANY'S REVOLUTION OF DESTRUCTION  
HITLER'S AIMS IN WAR AND PEACE

# THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

BY

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15431

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
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“Who is like unto the beast? who is able  
to make war with him?”—*Revelation xiii, 4.*



# THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

## *Between Decks in the New "Mayflower"*

WE ARE on our way. The swirling currents of our time are sweeping us along. Or do we only imagine it? Are the times only rushing past us? Whither are we bound, between decks in this ship of ours, on the hard planks, in bad air, out of sight of the stars; the ocean depths below us, and danger droning above? We are in our shelters in this city, this country, between decks in a new *Mayflower*, and we are on a voyage away from all that was homely and familiar, exiled from comfort and security, and journeying to a new land, distant, unknown, perhaps inhospitable. This whole community of London, of England, is our ship, and we are making our pilgrimage to a new sort of life, to the country of a new age. Hope is with us, hope and confidence, and we can endure the dark voyage.

Hope—yes, we have indeed a hope. Visions accompany us on our way. We dream of the coming time, we meditate on it, we see it in indeterminate outlines already. We see it on a heroic scale; perhaps we are dreaming of a miracle. We are hoping, perhaps, to be able to leave the drabness and the harassing toilsomeness of life behind us for all time. We realize, perhaps, only the dangers and sufferings and gloom behind and around us, not the heavy labour ahead of us.

What is it that we are leaving? And whither are we bent? These are the questions of the present transition period, this period between the battles and in the midst of battle, this time of journeying, in which the current of a destiny beyond conceiving is carrying us away from the whole existence to which we have been accustomed.

I have turned out the light and am looking out of my window, past a tennis court. Thick clouds of smoke from the fire at the Docks are floating through the sky, in a reddish twilight.

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Searchlights dart across the sky, concentrating at a point, dispersing, and then switched off. The blazing stars of the parachute flares float in the semi-darkness and slowly sink to earth. An apocalyptic night! Above us the bombers drone as they circle. Explosions, now distant, now nearer, the whistle of bombs falling very close to us, and the shock of big explosions near by. I am going downstairs to join the others. It is the instinctive impulse—to get together in any emergency. Since the anti-aircraft guns added their faint or sharp bark to the bomb explosions it has been impossible to sleep.

Incendiaries have fallen on our roof, and a high-explosive bomb in our tennis court.

We have made ourselves comfortable down in the cellar. I have a table in the telephone box, and here I can write without the others being disturbed by my light. We have got used to one another. We lie on blankets and mattresses, with pillows and cloaks. There are the old couple, sleeping peacefully, huddled together as, no doubt, on any night for many years past. There are a younger pair, outwardly at peace, but somehow with an air of putting the best face on a bad business. A man is reading, under his coat, with a trunk for pillow. There is the old maiden lady: she seems to have hit upon a lucky spot, her own discovery, where surely nothing can ever reach her. The floor is a mass of pillows and blankets; the atmosphere is almost unendurable. From my table I look straight out at a little young woman's toes darting about as she wriggles and giggles. Perhaps the young couple have just got married—the man is in khaki; perhaps they are friends; young and happy and care-free, both of them. The young woman titters and chatters incessantly, taking no notice of the crashing of the bombs and the shaking of the building.

Our sleeping community has taken in a golden-haired, chubby-cheeked one-year-old. The baby, undisturbed by the many strangers round him, wriggles trustfully between his parents. They have come in from a neighbouring hotel that had to be evacuated because of a time-bomb. He drinks his bottle peacefully and goes to sleep. Our hotel cellar is packed with people. There are some French captains, with a gift, clearly born of long

experience, of making themselves comfortable in difficult circumstances. The floor trembles as in an earthquake. One of the women is alarmed and begins to sob. A heavy bomb has fallen in the neighbourhood. One of the Frenchmen soothes her—"c'est fini". Then there is sudden peace. The beast has drawn back into the darkness.

Everywhere people are living like this in the cellars of this vast city. They are living like this in the other cities, great and small. They are forming new communities, thrown together from all countries, and from all grades of society. Barriers are falling, prejudices fading. We are being melted together, are already taking a new shape—masters and servants in the same distress, and workers and employers.

Here are these thousands of Anderson shelters, tiny lifeboats in this ocean. There is little room in them. Round them the drone of the bombers and the bark of the guns continue. The little crews of these boats are entirely isolated in the vast ocean, alone in face of the destiny assigned them by an inconceivable power, a cosmic force hired by men. Is it purely chance, or fate, that determines whom it shall strike down? An old fear is being reawakened, a fear of immemorial age, the fear that ruled men's lives before history began, when man was emerging from the womb of the brute beast, when he first gave names to powers of good and evil and tried to understand the meaning of life. So far have we been thrown back, so many thousands of years. Some of us are seeking diversion in cards or whisky, others singing together, or discussing their work, or the future; to what end? All normal life has become irrelevant to our present need. Mankind is face to face once more with the dark, incomprehensible force of a new destiny. We have been shaken out of all the securities of a guarded and ordered life.

Here are these vast shelters, these gigantic cellars. All sorts of people have come together in them. But they do not form a community. People segregate, form circles, stake claims on particular spots. Pious and thoughtful people, in search of peace, come together. Elsewhere the card-players assemble, and the gay sparks. Families with their common cares keep together. Neighbourhoods and streets come to terms with each other. Here are

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all these underground stations. Thousands camp on platforms and in passages and on stairs and escalators, lying or crouching, with pillows and blankets, bringing food and work. Some plant themselves always in one spot, others wander from place to place. Some jealously defend their habitual resting-place against all intruders; others go from cellar to cellar, the new nomads. All are in search of the ideal, the absolutely safe shelter.

And, up above, this ancient city is being broken bit by bit into ruins. It is a slow process. The work of destruction is not easy. But every night the zone of nothingness grows in this stone creation. No one knows what will be the end of all this, or when it will come. But one thing is felt by everyone—that just as, long ago, the Pilgrim Fathers on board the *Mayflower* saw the old Continent disappear below the horizon, so in our day an age is disappearing. The whole world of yesterday and to-day, with all its accustomed things, is sinking. Never again shall we see it. It is vanishing for all time.

### *World Revolution*

How did this come upon us, how did it break over us in those bright days of an unforgettable summer? War seemed remote, unreal, impossible. We could enjoy life. Violence seemed but an evil dream. In that world we breathed an atmosphere of achievement and prosperity, splendour and gaiety. War was an evil and incredible dream.

How could all this happen? How could that man infect a whole people with his mania and force this yoke of destruction and enslavement on all the world? How was this possible? That is the question on everyone's lips.

Was not the reason that there no longer existed any solid social and political structure, anything that men could rely on? Had not the revolution actually begun, before it was recognized? Was it not already present in the midst of the apparent security of the Western countries—a new, malignant, unprecedented revolution?

The German renaissance had degenerated into the nihilistic Revolution of Destruction, and this had grown into a universal

movement of subversion, a world revolution. The social fabric changed, escaping from the control of the political leaders. The world-wide political order broke into fragments. New associations were formed, grew into coalitions, and broke up again. This was no longer war or its consequences: forces had been accumulated which were now tearing down the old bulwarks.

What remains amid this transformation? What can we save, and what must we let go? Where is any new solidity, anything that can be relied on better than this merely superficial organization, these new frontiers, these new institutions? But let us first consider the outward aspect of this revolution in our midst.

"Our whole European civilization has long been writhing under the torture of a tension that is growing from decade to decade and must end in a catastrophe. What I am here giving is the history of the next two centuries. I am describing what is inevitably, unalterably coming—the emergence of Nihilism." So wrote Nietzsche a generation ago. National Socialism is one of the political forms of this nihilism. It is not the only form, and not the last.

But what is nihilism? Nietzsche gave his answer: "The things of supreme value lose all value. No final goal remains; to 'why?' there is no answer." Everything was becoming problematical; men were in the throes of uncertainty.

### *The Invasion of Security*

Something had crept forward, feeling its way from the surface to the heart of men's lives with its myriad limbs. Those bright days with the radiance of summer and the scent of the falling leaves of autumn—the time was out of joint. The dry leaves rustled past one's feet; nobody had then thought of death and destruction.

Dæmonic powers had broken into this sheltered world of ours. We were experiencing once more the eternal fragility of that brighter world which we had piled upon the real one like the puffed clouds of a sultry summer day—mountains and strange shapes, visions of wonderland in golden ripeness, but nothing that

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afforded a foothold. Our humanity was still but a thin haze spread over untamed, untamable forces.

What had happened was more than the mere tactical over-coming, by means of a new technique, of what had seemed an impregnable rampart of material security. More had given way than the Maginot Line. The very idea of human security had become utopian again.

In those almost incredibly lovely summer days, an almost perfect chain of sun and warmth and blue sky, this new war came, an irrational four-dimensional thing of space-time, on a scale entirely beyond comparison with any of the wars of the past with their linear or surface movements. Into the midst of prosperity and security and a cloudless peace came death and destruction, a momentary war; and soon afterwards there was peace again, people sitting once more on the chairs in Hyde Park, women shopping, children playing, and "business as usual". The war had become remote, unreal, non-existent—only a theoretical danger, not actually felt.

What will be the effect of this form of war? Will it destroy all our inherited conceptions, based on a century and a half of civil security, and force us to accept all human organization as a fragile thing? Shall we have to accustom ourselves anew to the ancient differentiation between the eternal and the impermanent, and return to the ancient piety that prayed daily to God to turn that which was susceptible of change to good? Or must we really make the plunge now into the problems of producing an orderly system that will provide the maximum security for all against the blows of fate? Security not only for the possessing classes, with their anxiety over their possessions, but especially for the masses—security that is the root of any sort of Socialism; security that banishes all that the dark ages knew as fate; security against sickness, against passion, against death and the hereafter, against all supernatural powers of retribution or judgment. And security from the dæmons of the subconscious and of the past. Is not such security simply the victory of reason?

Not only the security of fortified lines was deceptive; deceptive also was the whole conception of civil security; for men themselves



become again and again the irrational destroyers of their own security.

Should not these weeks of severe trial give us a new sense of the fragility of the material guarantees of human security? This does not mean that it was useless to seek such guarantees—far from it. But after what we have suffered our efforts must be directed especially to making these explosions of destructive mania impossible in the future. Is even that enough? Have we not to realize that while the material guarantees against this are necessary, they are not in themselves sufficient?

This four-dimensional war not only threatens the civil guarantees won in the past century and a half; it raises the question whether the liberation of men from allegiance to a higher, absolute authority, gradually effected in the course of three and a half centuries of enlightenment, was right. It has revealed the limitations of an entirely earth-bound philosophy. For men are only humane when they do not make themselves and their aims the centre of their system, but subordinate it to that which is higher than man. Humanism is thus a first step toward dehumanization, because it makes man his own judge and himself the end and aim of life, recognizing no judgment of a transcendental authority.

What have these theological reflections to do with political ideas? But what will become of a democracy if the inviolacy of the laws that govern its functioning is broken down, if there no longer exist any generally accepted fundamental ethical principles? Are agreements possible with any man who recognizes only himself, his own life and vital claims, his will to power? What can induce him to recognize them as binding if he has no faith in a transcendental order in which men have their appointed place? This is the dilemma of any human order that is anthropocentric: it ends in total loss of liberty. It cannot postulate for practical purposes a thing of which it denies the spiritual reality, the brotherhood of man that is real only in God.

Enlightenment, reason, progress, the draining of the spiritual swamps in mankind, the organization of material security and of improved administration of justice: all these efforts at liberation

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from human burdens and anxieties are admirable works of man. But they turn from blessings into curses, from means of aid into means of domination, if they are exalted to absoluteness as human standards and invested with divine authority.

### *Prophets and Propagandists*

The Jews threw the prophet Jeremiah into the miry dungeon of Malchiah, the king's son, when he prophesied the fall of Jerusalem; "for this man," they cried, "seeketh not the welfare of this people, but the hurt". It is a ticklish thing to prophesy. How could it fail to be? If the foresight of coming evil were general, how could the evil come? I do not complain that some of my warnings of the scale of the revolution that was in progress were not taken seriously. Perhaps it was too incredible that that strange man Hitler, who had been carried to the top by the ferment among the German people, and who had been regarded as merely a gangster, the cork that always floats, should have planned down to the smallest detail eight or nine years ago what he is now carrying out. It would have implied a sureness of aim and a vastness of conceptions with which nobody was ready to credit the man. It was especially the convinced opponents of Hitler who refused to listen to apprehensions of anything on this scale, and who described as fantasies and as paid or unpaid propaganda the reports of schemes which, as we now know, he had prepared with uncanny precision.

It was not Ebedmelech the Ethiopian who pulled me, like the prophet Jeremiah, out of the mire in which I was stuck last winter when my *Hitler Speaks* appeared, but the revelation of the brutal truth by the actual fulfilment of Hitler's plans. The move against Scandinavia, the invasion of Holland, the disguised troops, the treachery and the bought puppet rulers, the fifth columns, and the resounding collapse of the old democracy of France, were brought about by the exact means which this man Hitler had indicated at Obersalzberg in 1932.

Is this to continue further? Will the turn come for Great Britain and the Balkans, Russia and the Near East? Africa and America and the Far East, each in its time, step by step? Will this world

revolution march on to the bitter end, to the entire destruction of the old order? Or will it yet be brought to a halt? Is there still a power that will withstand this Revolution of Nihilism? Can the democracies stop it?

Faith in the democracies has been somewhat compromised since the old dominance of democracy on the Continent has crumpled. Was not that collapse the most telling evidence of the justification for Hitler's contempt of the old political system? Did it not show that the new realities demanded new methods of political leadership? Had not democracy remained essentially the system of government by notabilities that it was at its birth, and could such a regime have any substance left in face of the rise of the masses, of the new industrial society, the new means of exercising power, and the new collective consciousness?

In such a situation do we still need to examine the reasons why this Germany became National Socialist; or to consider how it was that National Socialism came into existence at all? Had we not entirely inadequate conceptions of the whole subject? Where are the times when various experts were able to calculate to the day when this Nazism would be bound to collapse, either from lack of raw materials or shortage of labour, or through the new inflation and internal indebtedness, or through the insufficient supply of officers, or any of a host of other things? Those economic experts, those orthodox currency pundits, those experts on popular opinion, all went wrong. Against all probability, against the very nature of things, this phenomenon of Nazism continued and steadily grew in force; it subdued its own reluctant nation, overcame every element of tough resistance and repulsion, gnawed its way through all obstacles and restrictions, and gained strength from every sort of opposition. A triumph of will-power, indeed, for this man and his gutter-bred following.

Manifestly there was more at work in this than the simple will to *revanche* and pursuit of national consolidation. There were other elements at the back of Nazism besides German nationalist imperialism. Where did the movement obtain its power of infecting elements hostile to it? How did it manage to cripple the will and confuse the judgment and the feelings of such vast

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numbers of its opponents? These are questions of the utmost practical importance. The answer to them will show the errors and self-deceptions that contributed to the success of this nihilistic revolution, errors committed in some cases in the best of intentions and in good faith. It will show that behind the special case of Germany there is a general one, which endangers the whole world.

Why did we become Nazis—those of us who were not gangsters or *déclassés* or disgruntled or disappointed people, but patriots, people of intelligence, men of good will? I do not think I am mistaken in believing that the reply to this question is worth seeking, even now, in the midst of the furious tempest of present-day events. If this National Socialism was a form, perhaps a particularly violent form, of German nationalism; if the whole movement was genuinely out to serve Germany's national greatness, even at the expense of her neighbours, might there be some justification for the reproach that has been levelled against us not only in Germany but in this country, with a disdain not always concealed, that we were betraying our country, whose greatness, "right or wrong", was so manifestly at issue? I think the knowledge of the motives that led us to turn our back on Nazism in the midst of its career of unprecedented success should help to correct some current judgments of the character of the great conflict of ideas in which we are at present immersed.

I do not think I can absolve those of my comrades among the German *émigrés* who did not take part with me in the opposition to the Weimar democracy from the charge of assuming that the issues were much more simple than they really were. Our fate and theirs may seem very similar, but there is a fundamental difference. The difference is not only that we voluntarily turned our back on a regime to which we had mistakenly given our support, while they, in most cases, were forced into exile as representatives of the old, suppressed order. Of more importance is the difference in what now seems to be common to us all, the struggle against that which has taken political shape in Germany, and the desire for the renewal of democracy as an indispensable institution of European life.

It was no frivolous reason that led some of us to take up our

stand against the parliamentary form of democracy and the popular faith in progress and humanist pseudo-idealism; we did so because of the signs and the actual beginnings of this very Revolution of Nihilism, which had become visible in the Weimar Republic itself, long before National Socialism and independently of it.

### *Confusion*

Blue sky! I recall this whole summer and late spring as one unbroken spell of blue sky. Now the leaves are falling, prematurely yellow and shrivelled. It is only the beginning of September, but already it smells of autumn. This charming view over the Serpentine, and of the Victoria Tower, with the slender filigree of its scaffolding, in the background! We sit in the deck-chairs, reading, breathing, living. Then come the shrill sirens, little puffs of shrapnel high up in the sky, the thunder of the guns, squadrons of German aircraft above London, chased by Spitfires. A breath-taking battle has begun above our heads almost before we have taken in the astonishing spectacle. Columns of smoke tower up on the horizon—a fire in the City. That is meant for *us*—a blow against *us*. We are in the midst of death and destruction.

We have changed. I think we have all changed in these weeks and months, some unconsciously, others, perhaps, with horror and dismay. Is not the bundle of reactions that is the modern man being yet further atomized? Perhaps he has become just a creature of reactions. Will the great majority of us lose our last foothold and end by instinctively accepting anything that may guarantee us at last some grain of security?

How is it that this nihilism was not even noticed outside the country that gave it its name? There is some other reason than a merely typical reaction of Liberal optimism. Perhaps the explanation lies partly in the deep-rooted Anglo-Saxon belief in the non-existence of the spirit of evil—the belief that those idols Baal and Moloch are to this day what the Hebrews called them, *elilim*, “nothings”, and can only be endowed with life by men’s own fear or surrender. There is certainly a deeper truth in this

that can be revealed by any of the portentous philosophies that profess to stand beyond good and evil. But in order to be able to say to these Nothings that they are nought and can do nought, it is necessary to be as innocent as the Old Testament prophet of any participation in their service. Otherwise that attitude leads, as it has led in many of those Western politicians who still rely on an ill-founded Liberal optimism, to short-sightedness, facile thinking, and a good deal of priggishness.

But when we seek the explanation of this great revolution our thoughts fall into a singular confusion. The success of National Socialism is not that of a smart tactician over the slower minds of his victims. ("As the birds are caught in the snare, so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them"—*Ecclesiastes*, ix. 12.) We enter the field of misconceptions and temptations, which effect a tragic perversion of our best efforts.

A radical German thinker has declared that in the present age there is only one direction that can be pursued with success; all else is romanticism. This one direction is that of systematic mechanization, rationalization, and technicalization of life, making of it a single vast planned structure. Whatever else we attempt, our plans and objectives will be diverted in this direction; we may imagine that we are setting out elsewhere, but infallibly we veer round toward this goal. World revolution is our destiny. The more we imagine that we are working against it, the more certainly we are making for it. The political temptations and confusions of our time are the means by which we are driven in the very direction we are trying to avoid.

### *Revolution only Beginning*

This capitulation in France is strangely unreal, ghostly. All through these weeks of the dramatic development since the invasion of Holland, we waited and waited for an Allied attack in full force. It seemed as certain to come as had been the ups and downs of the past century and a half of French history. But nothing happened. There were no reserves for an attack at

the critical moment; there was no ardent gathering up of forces.

Is this the end of France as a Great Power? Is it the end of her history? Does it not amount, at all events, to a verdict on a political system that no longer kept pace with modern realities?

There had long been reason to fear that Germany would not be the only country in which the middle class collapsed, and with it the system of a democracy ruled by notabilities. It only needed a similar situation elsewhere for a similar capitulation to take place. But this spinelessness of the masses, which now include the middle class, is only one element in the problem. The view that the existing form of democracy has in reality abdicated already is not confined to Fascist circles. It is held also by intelligent groups of young people who have come under Socialist influence. These groups hold that the trend toward the elimination of the individual and the resultant decay of traditions are irresistible. They hold that the old forms of democracy are incompatible with this development for the simple reason that there is no longer any firm basis on which men can agree, and no ethical principles are any longer binding. Thus they see only one thing to be done, cautiously to give way to this tendency to total collectivization. Future developments can be controlled only by a small stratum of leaders, maintained by a system of special recruitment, and ruling by the manipulation of the forces of the State, masked by the means of mass suggestion. Any other course is doomed to sterility and failure.

One thing certainly is true, that the parliamentary form of democracy grows more and more difficult to work, and nations that are not thoroughly familiar with the methods of working it are virtually bound to fail with it. But does this necessarily mean that we have no way of escape from a new absolutism, and that the masses can be satisfied with the simple assurance that this is the freedom they desire? Does it mean that freedom can no longer be guaranteed, but only security?

Here lies the chief danger for the future—the danger of a universal spread of the Revolution, and of a concentration of all the revolutionary tendencies of a vast totalitarian absolutism. We are only at the outset of the world revolution, not at its end.

*The Revolution of Nihilism is Universal*

The Revolution is, above all, universal. It cannot be confined to Europe. It is the extreme phase of the great revolutionary process which has determined the history of the West for the last five centuries. Beyond it there is nothing, except retrogression. Not retrogression in the sense of reaction, of a return to mediæval conditions or restoration of old dynasties, but retrogression in the sense of the swing of the pendulum. The Revolution of Nihilism is the radical and final form of human tyranny, at the point at which it is converted into its own obverse, bondage and bestiality.

Perhaps this development was bound to come, because only this logical pushing to extremes could produce a revulsion. It needed this excess of logic to reveal the destructiveness that was implicit already in the French Revolution, and to show why the Communist revolution so long invoked was bound to take the form of Bolshevism. There are special reasons why it should have been in Germany that this experiment was carried to the extreme limit. Whether the whole world must pass through a phase of revolutionary nihilism, or whether it can be saved from it, is the issue over which this war is being fought; it is also the issue that makes necessary a careful consideration of the nature of the present universal crisis.

The danger of universal infection is great. No corner of the world, no nation, is free from the revolutionary germs. Curative measures depend on a clear diagnosis of the symptoms of the malady before it begins to take charge. The actual means of cure are to be found in the vast heritage of our unexhausted civilization. They will not be provided by any miracle-worker or magician.

*Revolutionary Infection*

The dynamite with which Hitler blasted himself a way into the will-centre of the democracies consists of a few simple ideas. He led the Socialist element astray with the slogan that this is a capitalist war and that the Socialist therefore has no interest in it: his time will come. He crippled the resolution of the possessing classes with the slogan that the war is bound to destroy all



property: if it is fought to an end nothing is more certain to come than the very thing that the war was to prevent, the Communism of universal pauperism. The masses will rule, and the end will inevitably be a dictatorship. To the mass of unpolitical people he suggested the ideas that alone interest them—"Why war?" "Enjoy life!" "Strength through joy!" "Happiness, peace, security!" Peace, he said, could be assured at once if the people had the decision, if the common sense of the man in the street could be imposed over the heads of the politicians. He, Hitler, was himself a man of the masses, and that was why he had won the heart of the man in the street. It was the *Bonzen*, the Labour bosses, who complicated things. Everywhere it was one and the same type that wormed the money out of the little man's pocket and made an end of the comfort of life.

There is another class to which Hitler turns—that of the adventurous, the restless, the men of excessive vitality. To these he comes with his tale of the obsolescence of the European order, the tiredness of a civilization that has outlived its day, the anæmia and decrepitude of respectable Christian society. The strong man must rule, the weak must serve. Did not Nietzsche say so, and has not that been the secret of every energetic, creative age? The new time demands new ideas and new commandments. What distinguishes men from each other, and States from each other, is not their language; it is their race that assigns them to the new ruling or serving class. The future belongs to the new European nobility, that of the strong, ruthless men of action, who will give its stamp to the new Greater Europe.

Of still more importance is another group to which Hitler turns—the progressives who advocate rational planning. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is true nevertheless that Hitler brings this group, too, within his zone of influence. The idea of Hitler as the man of a common-sense progress which there can simply be no stopping may sound somewhat bizarre. But is not Hitler really clearing obstacles out of his way for the purpose of a sensible international reordering of Europe or the world? What is the reason for this European system of countless petty States, these unending economic barriers, this artificial protectionism? Is there any sense

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in the national sovereignty of some dozens of national States, at a time when technical progress has made all areas dwindle? Will not life inexorably impose its claims? Is it not stupid and unhelpful to oppose the new age because of likes and dislikes, instead of coming forward to work for it?

For a century and a half everything of the nature of planning, ordering, centralization, standardization, concentration has been regarded as progress and modernism, in contrast with the backward, unorganized, traditional elements. How, then, could the notable efforts of National Socialism, its vast concentration and centralization, its planning and organizing, fail to impress all those who have themselves seen the world's inescapable future in the form of vast rationalized systems? Hitler's racial doctrine may be silly and contemptible, his policy nefarious, his methods of propaganda absurd; for all that, this man is marching on in the forefront of this irresistible trend of the times. Surely it would be well to come to terms with him instead of working against him and against the times. Unquestionably this argument is used in various quarters, and highly intelligent quarters at that.

This does not exhaust the various approaches made by Nazism in particular quarters. There are the psycho-analysts, who are impressed by the effort made by National Socialism to liberate itself from the dark side of civilization. There are those who are used to thinking entirely in biological terms, and are ready to recognize that only dynamism is in harmony with the laws of existence, and that every static order implies an exhaustion of vital forces.

It is ideas, and not simply facts, that play the decisive part in this struggle for a new order. The effective elements in the great conflict are not simply the figures of production, the preponderance in armaments, or the reserves of raw materials. It is ideas, the ideas here indicated, crippling resistance and spreading dissension, that have prevented prompt resistance to the Revolution and won it its partisans in every country in the world.

But how, it will be asked, can the Nazi Revolution be set alongside the great French Revolution, which owed its appeal to its ideas of liberty and equality? There is, certainly, no comparing

## TYPICAL WEAKNESS OF THE ANCIEN RÉGIME

the fundamental ideas of the two revolutions. But the two are alike in that the Revolution of Nihilism, like the Revolution of the Rights of Man, takes the form of an incessant process of innovation in opposition to an *Ancien Régime*. This is the card that is played, plausibly and impressively, in the way suited to each particular quarter approached. And it is this card that gives Hitler his undeniable advantage over his opponents. National Socialism, as the political power behind this revolution, comes forward, in a thousand propagandist disguises, always as the force of the New, of Youth, against the Old, the Sterile, the Stick-in-the-mud. The Nazi despots have never tired of pointing out that new world empires and a "new order" can be created and maintained only by means of new governing ideas. It is not the hundred million allies of Great Britain in all the nations of Europe that will in themselves determine the issue of the conflict; they will do so only if they are inspired by a great common idea of a world order that differs from that offered to them by National Socialism. That common idea must not be a mere alternative; it must carry the day by the conviction it inspires through its ethical superiority and its clear exposition. But it must be at least the equal of the Nazi idea in breadth and scope, a universal solution that can be set over against the Nazi aspiration to unbounded world dominion.

### *The Typical Weakness of the "Ancien Régime"*

Typical of the attitude of mind of the elements of the *ancien régime* to the new revolutionary elements is, above all, the doubt of their own powers and the exaggeration of the unknown aggressive powers of the revolutionaries. From this attitude of mind proceeds a policy of appeasement and attempted dissuasion, instead of meeting the revolutionary elements at the outset with strong and resolute resistance. The *ancien régime* is lacking in the instinct of self-preservation. It has lost the sure instinct of every living being as to the things that are serviceable or harmful. It is characteristic of the *ancien régime* at all times that it loses its sense of proportion. It boggles at trifles, and it does not see the actually effective forces that face it. It is easily bluffed. Consequently it usually does the

wrong thing in its moves against the new forces. It proceeds with revolting harshness where it would have been wiser to assimilate the new elements, and it allows itself to be induced to capitulate and to abandon vitally important rights where it should have offered stiff resistance. It is characteristic of a capitulating regime that it is irresolute and inconsistent in its decisions. It does not know where it stands or what it wants. The *ancien régime* prefers to do nothing rather than make a mistake. In it the readiness to shoulder responsibility fades away. It shifts suddenly from an unjustified optimism and light-heartedness to the darkest pessimism. The *ancien régime* is the breeding-ground for all sorts of rumours and all sorts of scandal-bearing. Behind the appearance of loyalty to the existing authorities there is unavowed scepticism. The ideas and judgments of the revolutionary elements continually seep into the minds of the *ancien régime*, gradually warping and perverting them. Finally the feeling becomes general that it is of no use to do anything; there is no resisting the trend of developments; it is useless to go on trying to counter a movement that proceeds from the logic of the situation. The only thing to be done is to seek personal immunity. So comes, in the end, capitulation, with every man for himself. Each person will act with such dignity and integrity as is in him, but each one must bow to the inescapable facts of the situation. Anyone who does not do so is either a fool who deserves what he gets, or a blunderer who must pay for his own mistakes. To offer deliberate resistance, in loyalty to convictions, is ridiculous. There are no convictions in the *ancien régime*. Abdicating powers have lost the instinctive sense of their own rightness, and have acquired in its place an amused scepticism of all human standards.

There has been a good deal in the attitude of the democratic Powers to Nazism, Fascism, and Bolshevism, that is reminiscent of the attitude of the *ancien régime* on the Continent to new revolutionary forces. I do not say that the democracies are abdicating powers, but I think it may be said with truth that for a long time they behaved as if they were.

The secret of Hitler's success against his opponents in Germany and of his political success against other countries lies in the subtle

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exploitation of the inferiority complex of an *ancien régime* faced with a revolutionary force. Nazism plays upon the whole gamut of the emotions produced by that complex, from indecision to total paralysis of the will and to the sense of the uselessness of resistance. Nazism is always the aggressor, and it always claims to be the representative of the new, the coming, the vital, against the old, the superseded, the fossilized. The rapid effectiveness of this technique was shown by the recent developments in France. The ideological currency of Nazism circulated in every quarter. Nazi phrases and Nazi ideas were bandied about and assimilated, and with them Nazi conceptions and judgments.

From "living space" to the "rights of young nations" and the "new world order", a stream of suggestive phrases coined by Nazism similarly penetrates the passive and undefended world of ideas of the democratic States, slowly but radically modifying their whole intellectual and political life. This process is much more complicated and insidious than the relatively innocent work of fifth columns and paid auxiliaries. Its disintegration of the will to self-defence of the nation thus attacked remains impalpable: nothing is done that is legally punishable. It is much more than mere defeatism; it is a complete transformation of the spirit of the nation attacked, a process which long remains invisible and then comes suddenly and startlingly into the open.

The hidden element in this process is the parasitic modification of the will to live, producing blindness to the victim's own interest—a blindness to mortal perils which is, perhaps, associated with the euphoria and credulous optimism so typical of the moribund.

These are perils which it is not too late to point out. But the only safety lies in a steady and fearless consideration of the true facts. All the mistakes which we made in Germany in our views of Nazism and our relations with it are being repeated in other countries. They are the result of failure to think things out, of a mistaken optimism, and of a complete misconception of the whole situation. They result above all from the application of ideas and standards which are current among us but have no relevance to the new conditions.

## THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

### *The Essence of this War*

The shops are crowded, the streets full of busy life; people seem to be engrossed in the affairs of the moment, with no thought for the news that is coming in from over there, across the Channel. They are not really so. This is the protective colouring for an attitude that remains perfectly sound and level-headed. This nation is standing up to its fate, preparing to face the entirely unknown and conceivably disastrous.

There is no sound of reproach, no suggestion of scapegoat-hunting. All sense the mortal danger. For two or three weeks the suppressed anxiety has been discernible. There was no flagging, no weakening of resolve, but deep concern; then, heads erect and shoulders squared, the inevitable was faced with stubborn, unprecedented energy.

It is a privilege to be able to live through these days in this country, in this city. The Continental feels the impact and influence of the healthy mentality of this nation. Here and here only has destiny been challenged and changed. We are to be witnesses of a response to the crisis that will affect the lives of generations to come.

But is it not evident that even now the true nature of this war is not realized? Is it a war? Is it not, in reality, simply this universal revolution? The military element is not the essential element; it is at most secondary: it is the means to an end. This is no war of 1914, no war of the type of any of the nineteenth-century wars or of the classic wars of Marlborough. Fascinating as its military aspect has been, that aspect has been merely spectacular, merely external; the real war is being carried on out of sight, and the public hears nothing about it. In this struggle the military activities have the function, certainly very important, of the pursuit that followed the old-style battles—the complete annihilation of the enemy forces after they have first been broken. “First broken”—that is the essential thing. The breaking of the forces of resistance in this war was the task of the preceding political struggle—of a campaign of revolutionary disintegration.

It is possible to make a stand against the pursuit following a lost battle. Past history has given many examples of this. A lost battle

can even be turned into a victory by making a stand in an apparently hopeless situation. But in the production of the preliminary break, Hitler has, beyond question, largely succeeded. He has won the first battle. This must be recognized, and it is necessary also to recognize that that battle took the form of the revolutionary breaking of political forces.

Hitler has achieved exactly what he indicated as his intention as long ago as 1932, before he seized power. But the essence of his achievement has nothing to do with parachute troops or fifth columns or Quislings. Those are its means, neither more nor less. The essential work is the systematic spread of a crippling perplexity and disunity throughout a nation, a task which can only succeed if there already exists a state of latent revolution affecting all the elements of public order and administration.

A healthy, sturdy democracy might suffer military defeat, but not such total destruction as France has suffered. The material forces brought to bear against it might be so overwhelming that resistance was impossible. But the essential question is how that material superiority was reached, why in a healthy nation the needed defence measures were not adopted. Hitler's part in the destruction of a nation's material strength lies in the exploitation of an already crippled will to live. Without the condition of latent revolution his political legerdemain would have been fruitless; without the crippling of a healthy will to resistance he would not have been able to build up so vast a war machine. The nations that have succumbed to his influence had the germ of decay already in them. Hitler knew how to impart virulence to the bacteria of disintegration, how to create the fever that hastens dissolution; but it was essential that the victims should be already infected and their resistance weakened.

Even for Hitler this revolutionary disintegration was originally no more than a military expedient. At first he certainly had nothing more in mind than the facilitation of military action, or the rendering of military action unnecessary, by political means. He was not originally the world-revolutionary that he is to-day. He and his generals started from Ludendorff's experience with Russia; they studied the experiment made by the German General

Staff in sending Lenin and Trozky to Russia, and on it they built a system and a doctrine—an extension of strategy.

But the unforeseen happened. The military expedient took charge. The revolutionary course by means of which the German people were to be subjected to a new military discipline followed its own laws. It did so because Germany was in a state of latent revolution, in which all the elements of the political order were being eaten away. It grew beyond the control of its inventors and promoters: the revolution gained the upper hand—took charge—and subjected the military and economic elements to its own control. All life was caught up in a mad process of transformation. On these two points the whole war turns: the revolution is its essence, and this revolutionary movement continues irresistibly because all countries are ready for it: they have themselves suffered a quasi-revolutionary disturbance of their economic, political, social, and spiritual existence.

### *The Limits of Military Efficacy*

Vast as were the requirements for the military conduct of this war, the military authorities were compelled to recognize that this alone could never win the war or even suffice for defence. The war may be militarily won only to be politically lost even more hopelessly than was the last war. Would this not be the case, for instance, if the characteristic elements of the nihilist revolution, of the new tyranny, found their way into the victor States and gave them their future form?

We are in the midst of a process of this sort. There is a double threat to the effectiveness of the military conduct of the war. The revolutionary core of the great twofold enterprise of this war is not sufficiently kept in mind or is overlooked entirely; and the revolution is being allowed to dictate the plan of action.

Nothing would be more mistaken than to propose to combat this world revolution with its own methods. That attempt was made in Germany and failed. It led only to the radicalization of the revolution. Nothing would be more useless than to copy the organization and methods of the totalitarian tyranny.



What is necessary is to realize the new conditions from which the revolutionary forces have drawn their temporary superiority, the new technical, political, economic, and, above all, psychological conditions—the state of men's minds and feelings—which the totalitarian forces have manipulated and exploited.

If there is no adequate power of military resistance, then all resistance is vain. But this time the political quill-drivers must not be allowed simply to throw away what the soldiers have won. The military leaders will achieve nothing more than the shadow of a victory if they do not realize that their work is no more than a part of a vast whole.

### *The Road to the New World*

Everything has become dreamlike. After these nights we get back only with difficulty into the atmosphere of everyday life. What is there of importance besides this one essential, resistance?

In the last war the man at the Front lived a life of his own, isolated from the everyday world. Peace and home and all the familiar things in life lay in shadow, dreamlike and utterly remote. He had nothing to do with them. To-day the supreme difficulty is the reconciling of civil and military needs. This task brings fresh problems every day, every hour.

This nation has a natural soundness of judgment. It refuses to anticipate, and in so doing it preserves its full power of resistance and capacity for recovery in the midst of danger. Its instincts are closer to realities, it is closer to nature, in spite of the superficially urban and industrial character of its civilization, than are we Continentals.

Gregariousness has brought heavy burdens, but they are healthy ones. It is astonishing how universally the people keep their heads. Not a trace of panic or nerves, or even mere discussion of all the destruction. I went home by taxi one night, through the blacked-out streets, with the guns blazing among the trees in the squares. As I counted, a bomb fell a hundred yards further on in the square. We are at the Front, sure enough.

Yet common sense will continue to fall short of the imaginative

grasp needed for a realization of actual developments. One is very liable to incur suspicion of defeatism if one points out the future phases of the Revolution that begin already to be discernible on the horizon. Hitler will make use of every conceivable weapon, especially when his star begins to sink. He will not resign himself to abdication, he will try to drag down the whole world in his downfall, perhaps to achieve his beloved Twilight of the Gods. Somehow he seems already to feel that there is only one thing left for him—to go down in history as the greatest destroyer of all time. This may even be the unconscious desire of his innermost soul, with its weariness and, in spite of all his successes, its morbid dislike of civilization.

No imagination can picture the horrors of destruction that are being prepared at this day in calculated frightfulness. The chemical works in Germany are feverishly at work on poison gases. Factories are producing those drops of gelatine in which living cultures of bacteria lie ready for the spread of epidemics. Under a really devilish scheme the ports and vessels of Great Britain are to be infected, so that quarantine regulations may bar every port to them and the blockade of Britain be made total. It is true that the British Isles cannot be infected and occupied at the same time. But if they cannot be occupied the attempt at infection may well be tried. Islands are just suited to this form of attack, islands and remote continents. It may be that these anthrax and dysentery and typhus bacilli, now being bred as domestic animals are bred in happier times, are destined for America.

All this, and any attack against the American continent, may still be regarded as fantastic. The Nazis may soon offer assurances and evidences of their friendly disinterestedness in the United States; and, in spite of the experience other States have had with assurances of this sort, there may still be many who will believe them, because it serves their purpose or gives least trouble to believe them. The only way to counter this facile optimism is to make clear the real character of the existing threat.

Hitler and his associates knew that the world was in process of an immense transformation. That transformation could be hastened or retarded. It might turn into a revolutionary catastrophe. A

vast and universal world revolution would offer Germany the opportunity of rising to world hegemony, and would offer in Germany to a group of ruthless realists the opportunity of establishing themselves in power.

At the outset Hitler was under the influence of the Pan-Germans and the *Völkischen*, the anti-Semitic racial fanatics. He believed that after Great Britain's would come Germany's turn of world dominion, as Britain had followed Spain. He saw the opportunity of achieving this dominion, an opportunity that would never return, in the creation of world-wide conditions of revolutionary crisis. He was convinced that nothing but this world revolution would bring Germany to leadership among the Powers. Consequently his task was to hasten this world revolution and to subsidize the destructive and subversive elements in all nations. In their early recognition of the advance of the world revolution, and in their capacity to utilize it, lay the great initial advantage of the Nazi leaders over other forces and personalities. Even German Nationalist politicians of long experience saw only "crises" and "silver streaks on the horizon"; only Hitler realized that there were other things at issue beyond export crises, raw material difficulties, or frontiers demanding revision. But Hitler had also realized other things, whether by his own discernment or with the aid of his friends—that a nation can become a true world Power only by gaining the mastery of the seas, which means the oceans and not what the Germans think of as seas, the Baltic or the North Sea. Hitler's mentality was that of an Austrian, a landsman who had lived many years before he ever saw the sea; he thought in continental terms. The sea to him is something alien and rather dismal; he does not love it as he does the mountains, and he has not become at home with it. Nevertheless he seized and held to the truth that a people that is to rule the world must command the oceans; and he realized also that a new world dominion could only be gained by the disintegration of an existing one.

*Britain's Temptation*

That must be borne in mind if Hitler's real attitude to Great Britain is to be appreciated. For at least the past ten years Hitler has been fully aware that Germany could only become the controlling power in the world if Britain's power could be destroyed. Hitler's proposals for an accommodation with Britain were nevertheless sincere in so far as he had no desire for war with her, to say nothing of the Empire. He regarded it as the cardinal error in the policy of the German Empire that it had allowed war to come between the "rising" and the "dying" world Power. War—so he and his intimates argued—had brought regeneration to Britain, retarding the process of dissolution instead of hastening it. Any new war would only further reinforce the British will to survive, bringing, perhaps, fresh regeneration instead of final destruction. A war with the Empire would, moreover, be militarily a risky adventure. The Empire was full of elements of strength which it was quite impossible to estimate in advance. Whatever happened, war was only possible with the United Kingdom and never with the whole Empire, which sooner or later would have the aid of the United States.

Hence, Hitler concluded, Great Britain must be destroyed from within. It must be tied to Nazi Germany by an alliance, and inwardly changed, corrupted, brought to decay. This was the meaning of the famous scheme of a "junior partnership" with Great Britain, the purpose of Hitler's expensive efforts to draw Britain into an alliance.

Is it fortunate for Great Britain that war came? I will not attempt to answer the question. But the future of Great Britain and the Commonwealth was never more gravely at stake than when there was a possibility of coming to terms with this present German system of world revolution. Hitler made the mistake of his life when for the sake of an appearance of triumph he gambled away a possible success—a success which, of course, would not have had the same theatrical effect. What it was that tempted him to take this course, against his better judgment, is not known. Perhaps Ribbentrop, who for all his shrewdness is a second-rate man of limited outlook, succeeded in persuading Hitler that there

was no need to take a long and roundabout way to destroy the Empire—England was too degenerate to dare to go to war.

There is a certain parallelism between Hitler's original purpose of breaking down British power from within and his tactics with the German Conservatives, with whom he concluded his pact in 1933. Within two years, in spite of this pact, he had driven them to the wall. It was a master stroke of duplicity; and he might have achieved a no less remarkable stroke, by gradually pushing Great Britain out of her strongholds, if that "junior partnership" scheme had succeeded.

But the war has by no means made an end of Hitler's attempts to conquer Britain from within. They are only now beginning in earnest, on fresh lines. "War of nerves" or "psychological war" is much too weak a term for them. Hitler's process of reasoning in working for the destruction of the national unity of an enemy is not difficult to follow. The masses in Great Britain, he will say to himself, are in no way different from those of any other industrial country. They demand security, which means peace; and comfort and amusement, which mean a better standard of existence. It is easy to prove to them that war must inevitably reduce their standard of living. The moment the purposelessness of their sacrifices and privations is made plain to them, they will lose all keenness. Enthusiasm easily fades, mass patriotism is the most volatile mood in the world. Men may make sacrifices for a short time if they are reminded every day of the reason. But if the time drags on, and the sacrifices threaten to be in vain, the morale of the masses anywhere will collapse. Such are the reflections, admitted with brutal candour, that have led to-day to the bombing of the great industrial cities of England. Any public, Hitler will add, that is not caught, like the German or the Italian, in the iron vice of totalitarian discipline, with its terrorism, will rebel in a situation in which it is losing all it has. In a democracy it can force the Government to capitulate. Even at a moment when certain victory is in sight, a Government can be robbed of it by a revolt of the masses.

It is not in Germany that revolt may be expected, it is the democracies themselves, Hitler will say, that will shortly experience

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it, where they are not virtually in the middle of a revolution already. Just as Germany introduced her war economy with all sorts of rationing—measures not long ago regarded with contempt in some quarters as signs of imminent collapse—but introduced them too late and on an inadequate scale, so it may be that the democracies will introduce the Nazi methods of national discipline. But they will never have the courage to proceed to the one system that can keep the masses under control even in a difficult situation, that of terror and the exaction of blind obedience. Thus, he will argue, the British people will sooner or later have had enough, like the French, and will listen to those who have long been working hard to make it clear that Nazism is not fighting against the peoples but only against the *ancien régime*. In this way, he, Hitler, will succeed in establishing the fact, of which the British and French democracies only talked, without bringing conviction to the German people, that what is at issue is a new order, not conquests in the old style.

For the rest, he will conclude, all the groups with whom he was until recently in such close contact still exist, and will still place faith in his promises and his assurances that Germany really wants nothing from Britain. The two States, he will say, the British Empire and Greater German Europe, can live at peace with one another. The two are, indeed, destined to reorder and rule the world. Why, then, need they fight when they are just mutually complementary? Why fight when France has seceded and the old order of sovereign national States in Europe is thus definitely at an end? For what aim in Europe is Britain still fighting? Can she not sigh with relief at the falling off of an incubus? What do these continental problems matter to the British Empire, that great World Power, with only one foot anywhere near the Continent? All these sailors and men of the Dominions, long accustomed to world-wide spaces, have long lost interest in this Continent and are ready to let it stew in its own juice. Go on fighting for it—why? Could not the war have been avoided if France had been abandoned to Germany as she has now abandoned herself? Is not this war pure folly, and will it not end in an utterly senseless state of things? Is it not better to make peace quickly, before exhaustion

becomes universal? Is not the war being carried on now simply for the sake of an order in which all the things for which men have lived will be entirely swept away? Will it ever be possible to get rid of all these emergency regulations? Is not this war hanging round men's necks for all time the very things they were out to prevent by any and every means—economic planning, unfreedom, totalitarianism, the all-powerful State, the all-powerful bureaucracy? And are they not losing irretrievably all the things they were supposed to be fighting for—freedom and independence, individual initiative, and the inviolacy of justice and right? Are they not being carried by the war into the midst of revolution, in which there will be no gainers, only losers?

We must be ready for specious arguments of this sort. The enemy will forge weapons out of the natural reactions of human anxieties and hopes, weapons which may be mortal if they are combated inefficiently or not at all. If months of military inaction come, with all the conditions of existence worsening and with life and safety under continual menace, the slogans will travel far which have already thrown down one people from its historic eminence. In this *émigrés* will certainly play no part whatever. But the slogans will travel like the flame on the fuse.

People talk stupidly of traitors and paid creatures. But the opportunity of the Hitlerist intrigue lies in the fact that at these times of crisis there is no general criterion of interest, honour, patriotism. Hitler makes use of the confusion between the real and the apparent vital interests of a class or a people. At all times and in all countries men are apt to identify their own interests with those of the community. At normal times there exists a controlling body of opinion that judges impartially of the general interest. But it is characteristic of the critical times of world-wide revolutionary change that this impartial element is absent. Hence the divisions and the crippling of wills which are the doom of the *ancien régime*.

It is along these lines that Hitler will certainly launch widespread activities. To manœuvre Britain out of her position of power will remain his main purpose. A political agreement between Britain and Germany should, of course, belong to the

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natural order of things. For that reason political efforts in this direction will always meet with approval in many quarters. A genuine agreement could, indeed, have guaranteed world peace for a long time to come. It is but a small step to the inference that the present German regime should not be allowed to be a hindrance to such an agreement. What is the difference between one German regime and another? They are not all attractive. They all contain difficult elements. Common sense demands that we should work upon things as they are and not wait for the things we should like to see. We must take the Germans as they are, and not fall into the same mistake as in 1918, when the victor Powers insisted on a democratic regime, which, as time went on, proved unable to prevent Germany's retrogression to the old unfreedom and authoritarianism. At present the path is blocked for such ideas by resentment at the action of France in concluding, after all that has happened, an agreement with Germany which, if it had been concluded earlier by Britain, might have preserved peace in Europe.

Was such a pact really a possibility at any time? I have been playing here the part, more or less, of the devil's advocate; it is important, therefore, that I should now say definitely that any agreement made before the war with the present German regime would have meant the certain destruction of the British Empire; and the same would be true of any agreement made at present. That destruction is the corner-stone of Hitler's political schemes.

It is astonishing how little imagination most politicians bring to the task of entering into their opponent's mind, though the very first requisite for effectively anticipating his decisions is the ability to put themselves in his place. If a thing has never happened before they tend to regard it as impossible; and if it is palpably in front of their very noses they will absolutely refuse to credit it because it is too simple and obvious. The elements of the coming political warfare are as plain as those which brought about the fall of France. The same trick works again and again: the personalities who are treading the path to destruction remain completely blind to the way they are being led, the way they are passing on ideas and phrases which have



been put into their minds and mouths by a subtle master of revolutionary technique. In their weakness they imagine that the ideas are their own.

### *The Testing of the United States*

Men's thinking is similarly too slow and too facile in all that regards the future of the American continent. Only the Anglo-Saxon world has the power to overcome the Revolution of Nihilism, setting against the absolutism of the totalitarian States with its principles of subjection and terrorism the idea of the rule of voluntarily associated communities. There are historic explanations of both systems. Freedom and democracy in England and the United States are not the same things as on the Continent, France included. The elements common to the two hemispheres in these respects, and the distinctions between them, were made clear long ago, when Tocqueville published his great inquiry into the system of the United States. Since Burke's great attack on the French Revolution it has never been forgotten that democratic liberties in England have little in common with the things France gained in 1789, amid sanguinary struggles and with the all too familiar means of terrorism—to lose them again, then reconquer them, and now sacrifice them once more.

Anglo-Saxon democracy is the product of a long and unbroken development. It grew out of ancient forms of communal freedom and self-government. In all this French democracy is its antithesis. French democracy was the result of a breach with tradition. The breach of historic continuity was never overcome. The French democracy was a radical fresh beginning. It was doctrinaire and rationalistic. With the idea of rational planning it introduced into the world one of the most seductive of political temptations. It was here that terrorism came into existence as a political expedient. It was here that the conception of the *tabula rasa* emerged, the idea of the destruction of all the existing institutions, which were the result of long and gradual growth, and the replacement of this irrational system, this product of historic development, by something radically new and logically thought out. With

Jacobinism and the cult of reason the French Revolution became the mother of all Continental revolutions down to those of Bolshevism and Nihilism, and the origin of a new absolutism which extends into the sphere of private life and the inmost thoughts of the individual.

The Anglo-Saxon idea of leadership is derived directly from the mediæval institutions for the self-administration of autonomous bodies and communities. From the old counties to the British Commonwealth and the North American Union there runs an unbroken stream of consistent development. Neither Great Britain nor America has had experience of what the State implies on the Continent. What the Reich meant to Germans before Bismarck, in contradistinction to the Prussian or Austrian State, has here lived on unchanged into the present, defying all tendencies to centralization, bureaucratization, and schematic development. The great strength of Anglo-Saxon public life, and its unexhausted power of regeneration, lies in the fact that its organs of self-government have not turned into a machinery of domination, but have simply been adapted to modern requirements. They may seem to contain elements of weakness, but these are in reality elements of strength. Only in such communities could the attempt be made to administer gigantic territories without reducing them to subjection, ruling them through the same free institutions which in the past seemed to be possible only for small areas, and training them in free co-operation with the mother country. Men have grown up in their service who had the gift of ruling with a light hand, despising tyranny but allowing no foothold to violence or chaos.

If any countries might seem immune from the temptations of totalitarianism, it would surely be the Anglo-Saxon countries; yet they are not. Why not?

This Anglo-Saxon world lies open to breaches, and has already suffered breaches down to its very foundations, because alien ideas and standards have found their way in, and because it seems to have lost its power of discrimination between the things that are of its own essence and those that are alien. There is, for instance, the idea of rational planning, which has strayed from the technical

world to which it belongs into social and political life; when it comes with its claim of superiority to all that has become historic, the same claim that is made by every revolution, it is itself revolutionary. Rational planning, as a principle, not merely a device, breaks with the past and destroys historic continuity; and where it establishes its hold it prepares the way for revolutionary forces.

Then there is the new phenomenon of the masses—vast amorphous, fluctuating groups, with no roots anywhere; the masses not only of the great cities but of the countryside, among farmers and colonists, in small towns, and in the centres of intellectual work. Where the typical mass character appears, all higher qualities disappear; their place is taken by primitive emotions, an overriding desire for security and the demand for happiness. The significance of this development of the masses, imperilling the continuance of all human civilization, has become thoroughly familiar to us all in the past twenty years. It is this, not Hitler's wicked attack, that is the mortal peril to our civilization. Hitler's attack could not have become dangerous without the facilities given it by the rise of the masses.

Here lie the opportunities for Hitler's assault on the United States. He may intend military action sooner or later, but his own characteristic conception is once more destruction from within. Where rational planning successfully asserts the claim to be a superior science of political leadership, the criterion is lost for the conditions and limitations imposed by existing circumstances. Where the masses thrust aside the local and historic elements of their environment, in the room thus made for it the will to radical upheaval grows apace.

Hitler thought he could see signs of a vast revolution before long in the United States. This gave him confidence, and he disregarded the warnings given him again and again by men like Fritz Thyssen, that American sympathy for the new Germany must be gained by all possible means, and that no breach must on any account be permitted to come. The arguments put forward by these politicians followed a simple chain of reasoning. If Germany could count on support or even toleration from the

United States, it would be relatively easy to gain Great Britain's approval as well. Both of these things were essential to achieving the recognition of justified and reasonable German claims without a war, which would inevitably be a world war.

Hitler refused to entertain these ideas: he did not regard the United States as a Power that mattered so vitally. He had no admiration for the States. His feelings were a mixture of thorough contempt and unwilling admission of the vitality and the technical capacity of the country. He despises above all the political system of the United States. He despises the life of the States in general, regarding it as puerile, undeveloped. Neither North nor South America is yet, he thinks, politically or socially mature; neither will achieve fixed political and social forms for a long time to come. In that continent anything may happen, and great historic events have still to come. Such elements of permanent stability as political life in America seems to reveal have no reality: they are figments that could be swept away at any time. It seems entirely possible that, perhaps by way of reaction against the liberalistic, individualistic freedom of the American States, a very sharp disciplining may be enforced and a centralized machinery of State imposed. Once political disorders start in the United States, anything may happen. There may be long-continued chaos, complete paralysis, and the disintegration of the artificial industrial system, the strength of which is only apparent. There may then come a new phase of the primitive colonial existence, which may even bring recovery to the country, giving it a new permanence through the return to agrarian conditions. Accordingly, he thinks, National Socialism must endeavour to obtain a firm foothold in the United States as soon as possible, in order to influence developments. National Socialism cannot be indifferent to the destiny of the American continent: there are no isolated territories in the world, however immense and economically self-sufficient. It will be possible to bring in the United States on the side of the young nations. This requires the fall of the present democratic regime.

Hitler has many times declared to those in his confidence that he has no fear of the United States as a Power, because he has the

means of launching on the American continent at any time a revolution on an unprecedented scale. Sooner or later America's hour will strike, and vast breakdowns and disorders will be the starting-point of a new future. When asked how this upheaval was possible he replied with a wealth of alleged facts, such as it was impossible for anyone in Germany really to know. He pointed to the continually increasing mass of the uprooted, and to the destruction of the old world of colonists with their very definite social and political ideas. There is a vast army, he said, of the disappointed in business, those who have gone under in the economic struggle, the class that has everywhere formed a reservoir for the new revolution. Then there is a special world of completely irresponsible youths, the world of adventurers and gangsters. There is a contingent of no small importance of individuals who take pleasure in atrocities and the infliction of torture. In the eyes of the Nazi *élite* this America was a world of almost naked brutality, in which the will to power and the readiness for the ruthless use of violence were disguised only by a thin film of conventions which could be broken through at any time. What a field for subversive propaganda, for the formation of revolutionary cadres! All those bootleggers and other relics of prohibition could be subsidized. There were countless creatures who were ready to do anything for money. The political "boss", carrying on a regular business in the disposal of votes, seemed closely related to Nazi party ideas.

And then, he would continue, all the national divisions, those contingents of European peoples, not fully Americanized in the second and scarcely in the third generation, but crowded in their ghettos in the great cities, accessible to every sort of propaganda; or those who remain in close contact with their home country, and thus have the divided allegiance which is the most dangerous of all things in these times. When even the peoples of countries with a long-established national tradition can be shaken in their allegiance to it and induced to throw off all their political beliefs like a tiresome cloak, what can be expected of these immigrants, who are as yet untouched by the political and social ideas of the New World?

Finally he would point to the absence in the States of any army ready for action, and of any strict discipline to counterbalance individualism and unbounded liberty. Corruption and venality seem to give access everywhere, even in the highest classes of society. The concentration on smart business cannot but neutralize inhibitions which in Germany and the European countries still exist and enable resistance to the revolutionary movement to be maintained for some time. There is also so much ambition in America, with the result that prominent men can be bought by providing them with the consciousness that they are patriots. In face of all the manifest evils and weaknesses, the cry "Awake, America!" will have its effect on these men. The prospect of saving America from disaster can be a temptation to patriots who are in despair or think they are.

In Germany Nazism won its path to victory with the element known as the "drifting sands" (*Triebssand*), the mass of unpolitical people who had been uprooted by war and inflation, who had lost everything, the small men with no hope left, clerks and officials more than workmen of the lower middle class or the proletarians. The mass of this economic and political, social and moral *Triebssand* was particularly great in America. And America was no longer the land of unlimited opportunities. The old elements of tension remained and new ones were being added to them: the race question, the negro question, the differences between northern and southern States, and between eastern and western. Hitler counted on important assistance from the race question. He believed that the differences that produced the Civil War had not by any means been reconciled. He counted on the creation of divisions, as in Germany, by the revival of old differences and rivalries. There seemed to him to be a possibility of returning to the older and better forms of American community, and so winning over that part of the nation that is sceptical of the virtues of the modern mass-democracy, and that looks back on the days of its forefathers as a romantic past of better and more solid qualities.

Above all there was the Jewish question. It seemed almost child's play to kindle anti-Semitism in America and to use it to set the revolutionary elements in motion, as had been done in

Germany, in view of the large Jewish populations in the cities and the Jewish penetration into the circles of the successful. Active anti-Semitism, in which Nazism has gradually attained a completely unprincipled routine of which Julius Streicher's paper is but one element, is the means by which the first effective propaganda groups are set up all over the world. We can already see the share anti-Semitism had in France, together with the campaign against freemasonry, in producing Hitler's success. So it was in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and in Austria. Everywhere anti-Semitism was the starting point of the process of sowing dissension, breaking up political unity, working on business jealousies, and preparing the way for a revolutionary attack on property.

It is not for me to judge of the rightness or wrongness of Hitler's ideas about the United States; I am concerned only to show the background of those ideas. Much of his talk was merely his reaction to the moment and of no great importance. Some of it reflected the ideas of his entourage, which he did not always reject. It remains a burning question for the whole world how the American people will react to the menace of the Nihilist Revolution. It would be an entire misjudgment of the menace to see it only in terms of air attacks, attempted invasion, or large-scale sabotage.

The danger of these things does exist. The technical possibilities will be so extended in the course of this war, and the political opportunities may be so good, that sooner or later there may conceivably be an occupation of America by the armed forces of another continent. But the real menace lies in revolutionary action, and of quite a different sort to that experienced or possible in Britain or France—a great revolutionary movement. Already the alien ideas, the slogans, of the Nihilist Revolution, which, like every revolution, comes forward as an instrument of liberation and of a new order, are having their effect on the masses. Here there can be no isolation; isolation was broken down long ago. In this respect the American continent stands already in the midst of the struggle, whatever its desires or doctrines. No declaration can release the American peoples from taking part in this struggle. To do nothing, to fail to fight against Nazism and its revolution, is to

decide in favour of the revolution, and of support for Nazi world dominion. This is so whatever opinion may be held of Hitler's view that the United States has only the choice between introducing a dictatorship similar to that of Nazism or delivering itself up to an indigenous form of Bolshevism.

Hitler's ideas should not be pooh-poohed, even if they are regarded as entirely mistaken. The present times are fatally susceptible to the influence of hysteria and suggestion, which are able to produce political results that may be regarded as no achievements at all but are none the less real. The phenomena of the collective subconsciousness of the masses are such that they should be carefully watched. Here in the subconscious mental processes lie the pseudo-creative powers of mass hysteria and mania, ready to bring suddenly into existence a world such as no rationally-minded person could believe to be possible. If America is the country whose citizens still seize their guns in defence of their freedom, instead of merely opening their cheque-books in order to purchase the favour of the new revolutionary powers by a respectable donation—then there is, indeed, no need to fear the outcome there of this Revolution of Nihilism. America has certainly in its great spaces a sort of potential buffer against revolutionary onslaughts. It may be that it will see only local attempts. But it is also possible that its vast spaces might serve as protection for *coups d'état* working on Trotzky's principle of the organization of cadres capable of the occupation of vital centres of power in a territory, before the public authorities can intervene. The material and moral resources of the United States are enormous, perhaps the greatest in the world; but they remain unorganized, in a form in which a unified defence is not possible. It may be that the best existing organization on American soil is possessed by the very group of the population which is not loyal to the existing regime. *Coups d'état* and revolutionary moves always owe their success to the victory of an organized minority over an unorganized majority.



*More About Hitler's Technique*

Hitler and his associates are continually occupied with all sorts of ideas and plans, which are liable to cut across one another. This is the explanation of many contradictory statements about Nazi intentions, some of which have been discovered in my reports and set down against me as evidence of untrustworthiness. In reality it is an inevitable element of Hitler's technique that there should be such cases of cross-purposes. Hitler acts in regard to the United States in the same way as he acted in regard to Germany before his seizure of power, and after it in regard to Austria: he allows various lines of activity, with varied aims and objectives, to proceed simultaneously. He gives plenary powers always to several men with varying policies. This is the outcome of a carefully considered technique, which facilitates camouflage. Hitler is able to play off one man's policy against another's, and to choose whom he will sacrifice. He can count on the various organizations fighting each other. Thus Hitler's phrases and slogans are no more than symptoms of his line of work, and may have no relevance to his ultimate aims.

The ideas of what Hitler would do if America were, after all, to offer active opposition to Nazism, are of necessity vague and contradictory, for another reason. His political technique is entirely empirical and experimental. He feels his way ahead from all sides by all sorts of intrigue, and in this way steadily comes to grips with the problems which seem to him to be of importance. He fills in his conceptions with actual details. He corrects and adapts his ideas, and in all this he is anything but a doctrinaire, although he holds to a particular course with remarkable determination, coming back constantly to it. For so unscrupulous a system as Nazism there are many ways of preventing the United States from taking any active part in war against Germany. Incontestably the slogans employed strike root. It would be worth while to make a thorough inquiry into the question how much of the stock of ideas of isolationism has come from the workshops of Nazi propaganda. This propaganda always attaches itself to existing ideas, working on them and cautiously remoulding them to produce the instrument that it considers serviceable. There is

no longer a Europe worth troubling about; one must think in continents; the United States are sufficient unto themselves; there is nothing left of any real democracy on the European continent—such as these are the cruder ideas worked on. The discussion becomes more dangerous when it is extended to particular economic interests: the subversive Nazi propaganda, put into coarse and violent language for the masses, is subtilized and rationalized in the approach to particular leading groups and personalities. The effective form is found for each channel of approach. Such activities are not to be countered by general protective measures: they evade them, and there is only one effective defence, a similarly individual and telling formulation of positive aims and ideas, in concrete detail and not merely in general terms.

The secret of Hitler's subversive effectiveness lies in a well-judged combination of tempting offers with reasonable remarks that inspire confidence, and with appeals to indisputable facts. It is impossible to overestimate the propagandist efficacy of the mention of a few Nazi ideas that have been carried into practice. There is no attempt to demonstrate that the world can be stood on its head for a change; what is demonstrated is that at many points the Nazi order rests on vital forces of to-day, and has thrown over the out-of-date ideas of orthodox economics and politics. There is a constant danger that the real achievements under the totalitarian systems may detract attention from the other work of the dictators which reveals their true nature. Thus, the organization for the provision of employment, or the unorthodox currency policy, has impressed various responsible circles among the opponents of Nazism. Social welfare arrangements and even enterprises in foreign policy have found defenders because they were based on vital requirements of modern life, and this justification has been dwelt on and the illegitimate use made of the experiments overlooked.

Hitler's phrases often sound reasonable and progressive and in line with sound popular tendencies: the phrase "new European order", conveying the idea of the ranging of the European nationalities within a common political framework, carries

conviction to any non-European. Mass propaganda appeals to the emotions, but individual propaganda works on the intelligence, endeavouring to convince by force of argument. It is strange how this latter type of propaganda can penetrate unobserved. Hitler has always clearly realized the distinction between the two types.

An element, for instance, that seemed to give Hitler an opportunity in the United States was the critical economic situation. Business and social resentments provide immense reservoirs for propaganda. How many American citizens, faced with their business troubles, care a rap for democracy any longer? How many have thrown overboard all general ideas except that of earning money by any and every means? After all other opportunities of business success have vanished there is still some hope of drawing profit from political opposition.

Hitler's main purpose is to upset the machinery that regulates the normal interplay of governing and opposition parties. He tries to sow dissension in each country between the political leaders, and to bring intolerance into existing political rivalries. He sets his hope on new leaders, drawn from different quarters from the existing ones and working with new political slogans and methods. An *élite*, or group of leaders, in process of attaining power can never withstand the temptation to throw over the existing political conventions in order to establish itself securely in power.

### *New Élites*

The dispossession of the old *élite*, the old group of leaders, is the first concern in Hitler's political strategy. In Germany President Hindenburg laid on him the duty of collaborating with the existing leaders and falling in with their methods; by a subtle combination of violence, corruption, legal persecution, and subornation, he pushed them aside within three years. He even succeeded in thrusting the corps of officers and the junkers out of their spheres of influence. The details of this unscrupulous internal struggle no longer matter; what matters is that he has adapted the methods employed to the *élites* of the States with which he is at war.

It cannot be said that he has entirely failed. Fifth columns are a small matter beside this breaking up of existing *élites* and the helping forward of new ones. The process does not imply an entire change of personalities, only the formation of new groups. This process, discreetly promoted, may aim at creating an alloy of new and existing groups. The essential thing is to upset the existing process of recruitment of the *élite*, attacking the reputation of its members and placing difficulties in their way. In Germany he had great success with prosecutions of the old leaders for alleged corruption; this device is not open to him in other countries. But by means of gossip and rumour and of unjust and one-sided criticism he can destroy confidence and shatter reputations. Associates in this sort of business are to be found in every country. He need not even pay them. All he need do is to set the work in motion with his arguments.

The general situation is helpful to him. The crisis in democracy disturbs the selection and training of the *élite*. New groups have developed outside the existing parties and corporate bodies in political, economic, and intellectual life. These do not consist only of the rising generation, which normally disturbs the balance of power between the groups of leaders; nor are they "outsiders" on the fringe of organized society, strong-willed individuals pursuing a lone path, who, if they can be useful, are co-opted in normal times. The essential feature of a revolution is that new types of individuals unite in forming new political and social groups, individuals who in normal times would never have had the opportunity of coming into public notice.

Two types especially make their way forward, by firing the imagination and the hopes of those masses who have lost security of existence—the utopians and doctrinaire intellectuals, and the cynical adventurers, the go-getters and men of the strong arm. It is an infallible sign of approaching crisis when such types, men who normally have no interest in public life, squeeze in through the gaps in the solidarity of the old political *élite* and claim a hearing, or demand the exclusive leadership.

Conversely, every system of government that has been forced into the position of an *ancien régime* makes the most striking

mistakes in its appointments to important offices. It is almost always characteristic of the *ancien régime* that its leaders are of inferior ability and energy and intuition. Reversed selection takes place of men without talent and frequently even without character. The result is the passing of all men of ability and character, even those belonging to the circles that normally form the *élite*, into opposition, where they demand the removal of the whole of the existing leaders and the abandonment of the existing system of recruitment.

The old *élite* are thus hard pressed from a quarter which normally would give them its loyal support. The opposition between a regime of "old men" and the upward-thrusting leaders of the masses, with their wealth of initiative, has given a fruitful impulse to public life in the ripest form of democracy, in England. Only in the young democracies, inexperienced in the working of democratic rule, as the German was—young and yet aged, sceptical, cynical—did this opposition develop into an explosive that destroyed the political order. In revolutionary times the development is different: even in the experienced democracies the idea grows among the ruling *élite* of defending themselves amid the growing difficulties and the pressure from the Opposition by creating a sort of irremovable leadership. To reduce troublesome opponents to silence, recourse is had not only to the pressure of the party machine but to the powers of the State.

This, however, introduces a succession of mistakes and blunders which will end with every group claiming to be placed irremovably in power. There ensues a sort of race for key positions out of which the holders "will refuse to be dislodged". If this course begins, the revolution is already in full swing. It can no longer be stopped. Then, however, a ruthless alien group with command of great intellectual and material resources will find it relatively easy to utilize the personal rivalries to gain power over the whole nation.

### *The Irremovability of the Modern Élite*

In the fact that modern political groups, once they have

attained power, are difficult to remove, lies the unconfessed anxiety or hope of all political parties in present-day democracies. This is a new element in political realities. The orderly alternation of leadership, with an occasional forced change, is no longer a matter of course in political life. This is accounted for by two facts. The modern means of propaganda and the rise of the masses continually increase the risk of failure to preserve the political leadership from capture by chance demagogic majorities, with the disastrous course these may take. On the other hand, the power of the modern State is so overwhelming that it is almost impossible to compel the group that wields this power to give it up at any time.

This places the political struggle on a very precarious footing. At any moment it may happen that the convention on which the play of political forces rests is broken by one party, with the result that the country is faced with what is euphemistically called an authoritarian regime but should really be called a modern absolutist tyranny. How long—such is the question on everyone's lips—can the modern political party and its leaders resist the temptation to misuse the power in the hands of the modern State, once it has this power under its control?

In the new leadership-State there no longer exist any means of replacing one set of leaders by another. This means that the groups who first secure full possession of the modern resources of power, and are resolved to use them, are simply beyond any possibility of dislodgment, and thus beyond the effective reach of any criticism; and not only that; it means also that an underground competition will take place to determine which group shall be the first to throw over the old rules of parliamentary democracy and to profit from political realities as they now are.

Any of these groups may quite honestly believe that it is acting not in its own interest but for the future of the nation, or for freedom, or for Socialism, or for whatever type of "new order" may be generally advocated. Men are ready to do for a general aim things which they certainly would not publicly do for their own benefit.

I do not think I am going too far in saying that reflections of this sort played a part in the *volte-face* of French policy. Similar fears

or hopes exist in all the countries which still maintain a democratic existence. It is feared or hoped that the plenary powers secured on account of war requirements, or the apparatus for the control of public opinion similarly secured, will not be given up; it is feared or hoped that a *coup* is being planned for some particular time, to place a particular group, as trustees for some class or classes, in possession of absolute power. Such ambitions or suspicions introduce a keen current of mutual distrust, poisoning political life; each side suspects the other of aiming at the conquest of power, and fears being thus thrown into the shade for an indefinite period.

Everywhere in this war a secret struggle for power is proceeding behind the scenes, and this struggle gives great opportunities to external influences. Even apart from that, the existence of this hidden struggle reveals the true situation as one of universal civil war, a universal revolution of which the military warfare is only one of the symptoms. It may be surmised that in this civil war the fronts cut across all nations, in an entirely different way from any at present supposed. It is a mistake to imagine that there are only the national fronts; these, in any case, will probably change more than once in the course of this war.

### *Russia and the Struggle for a Monopoly of Empire*

Not only democratic regimes can be broken up or dominated with the aid of rival *élites*; this means can be used also in dealing with the Soviet Union. It was on the face of it unlikely that Hitler would make no use in his relations with Russia of his most effective "secret weapon", and confine himself to military measures, even if certain particulars of his political preparations had not become known.

Political work cannot be carried on in Russia on the lines that promised success in dealing with the nations of western Europe. There is nothing to be gained by making use of discontented elements in Soviet Russia. The support of nationalist ambitions, such as was lent from Germany to the centres of agitation in the Ukraine, is too irrelevant to the main purpose to be of serious

subversive value. There is nothing at all to be gained from working with the dispossessed propertied classes. There are only two possibilities of gaining influence from without—by winning over the Soviet military forces and the young generation of the Soviet intelligentsia.

Whether any attempt was actually made by the Nazis in the first of these directions, and how far it was carried, does not greatly matter: in any case it had no success if it was made, and it is unlikely to be repeated. There remains the other direction, and there can be no doubt that Hitler is pursuing it.

It may seem almost a hopeless enterprise to attempt to win over sections of the Bolshevik *élite*, but it is not entirely so. This becomes understandable if we consider the intellectual development of the younger among the intelligent Soviet officials, particularly the technical officials. These are young men who have no knowledge of pre-revolutionary times; the only thing they believe in is the power of mechanism, and Bolshevik doctrines are to them of secondary importance, if not out of date. Among the younger technocracy and bureaucracy a class has grown up that believes only in rational planning, in an order in which all that is of irrational origin, all that smacks of the historical or the ideological, has been swept away; among these young men the ideas of nationalism and those of individual social morality or public spirit are regarded as equally threadbare.

It is possible that the results of Hitler's efforts to get into touch with that *élite* may be to draw Russia gradually into co-operation with Germany, and so to bring her under German influence. It will certainly be a long process, but it may end in success. The great difficulty for Hitler is that he cannot afford to wait. But it may well be that before the war he preferred this method of drawing Russia's vast territory within the field of his schemes and assimilating the younger Soviet leaders or making use of them as his instrument.

In any case, he will have to compel a decision as to Russia's future position. His great European realm cannot come into existence if the Slav union continues to exist alongside it as an independent political order. There is a general tendency to-day



to regard Russia as outside Europe, but that will not suit Hitler's plans.

It is not merely a question of the Ukraine. A glance at the atlas will make it clear that the geographical transitions between central and eastern Europe are as gradual and insensible as the ethnographical ones. Present conditions can yield no permanent equilibrium, with part of the Slav peoples in Hitler's Europe and part in the Soviet Union. The control of the Baltic and the no less important control of the Balkans will remain a bone of contention so long as an independent Soviet Union exists. Wherever Germany can lay claim to oil sources, Russia will be under a menace, for Germany will have no effective guarantee of her hold over them until they are permanently and beyond all challenge in her possession.

The teeming humanity of the east of Europe is also of importance to him, with its inexhaustible excess of births over western and central Europe. Militarily Hitler is a disciple of Ludendorff, for whom the destruction of the Russian "steam roller" was the greatest German achievement of the Great War: if proper advantage had been taken of it, it would have freed not only Germany but the world from a monstrous incubus: the peril the West knew as the Pan-German menace was overshadowed by the irresistibly approaching Pan-Slav and Pan-Asiatic menace. Such were the arguments also of the German publicists and generals who, like General Hoffmann, continued to hold, after the German defeat in 1918, that Germany must be given the opportunity to destroy the rising Soviet Union for the sake of European security and of a really lasting peace.

Russia belongs to Europe, and her Asiatic hinterland is a vast new territory for settlement by all the peoples of Europe; they should not allow the Mongols to keep them out of it. What prospects this scheme offers to all the restless adventurers of all the nations of the Continent, the men who do not want to enter the Anglo-Saxon world, or who cannot do so! What vast opportunities these countries will offer when they are no longer under Russian administration, but thrown open for the common use of all the nations of central and eastern Europe, and made available

for a vast resettlement! Such were the ideas of the political generals of the Great War, and are those now of the Nazi leaders and officials. Russia, they say, is not an ethnographic unit. She needs to be Europeanized by being split up into her ethnographic components, and ruled on new principles.

These ideas have been taken over by Hitler in a modified form, but essentially unchanged. There is a book by no less a man than Fridtjof Nansen on Siberia as the land of the future. Hitler has made use of the ideas of this book in his characteristic way. In his view the continent of Europe and the plains of northern Asia make up one vast territorial unit. Flushing to Vladivostok—this is not only the “elemental space” of German nationalist propagandists but also Hitler’s aim, and one which is not so remote from actual possibilities as it might seem to the unimaginative.

Why should it be impossible for a rational order to be imposed on that vast territory by a powerful will aided by the new technique of organized co-operation? Does not any large-scale systematization of the European economy demand the creation of a territorial unit on this scale, endowed with self-sufficiency in raw materials? I have listened to Hitler’s discussion of all that could be done with a land like Siberia under German sovereignty and German far-seeing administration—a new Canada, a new sort of America, with plenty of room for settlement, plenty of elbow-room; a country in which common-sense planning would block the way to the ravages of capitalist exploitation. Hitler spoke of Russia as an artificial creation which, quite apart from its Bolshevik system of rule, no longer had any justification for existence. In talk of this sort Hitler likes to attach his ideas to elements of past history or romance, like Rurik, the Nordic founder of the Russian Empire. The idea that this vast country can only be given a new political form by Nordic Germans is advanced for the edification of his entourage, but the essence of these ideas is intended seriously and should be taken seriously.

The idea of building up this mammoth realm, not through a fight to a finish with Russia but by means of an alliance, a symbiosis, is not unthinkable. Why should not the two unions, the German-European and the Soviet Russian, be able to build up a

great federation by forming a common central authority with unified administrative bodies? The difference in social and cultural level is an obstacle; the Bolshevik leaders would have reason to fear that they would be edged out of all important positions and reduced to a subordinate role. But there would be a temptation in this very difference for the technical leaders, who by associating themselves with the superior element would gain a place in it as time went on. It has often been stated—with how much foundation?—that Stalin wants to have the opportunity of making use of German intelligence and organizing ability for the permanent stabilization of Russia. If that were done, there would be nothing much in the way of such a process of unification of the great continental territory of Eurasia.

In any case, Hitler is bound to try to destroy Russia as an independent centre of power alongside his own European Greater Reich. The logic of developments will force him to make the attempt. Even with the power of the Gestapo and the armies of occupation, he cannot hold down the nations he has conquered for generations. If he wants to make Nazi dominion “permanent for a thousand years to come”, there is only one thing for him to do—the thing he has begun already, the concentration of all the means of the exercise of power, the monopolization of all the apparatus of power. Industry, including armaments production, is the first element in power; it must be monopolized. There must be no other industry than German in Europe. The same applies to raw materials, to the electricity supply, and to the means of transport. These vast monopolies, the instruments of total dominion, are being developed; and only with their aid can Nazism hope for permanent dominion over the vast territory of an empire embracing all Europe.

Can there exist alongside this system another which is building up the same monopolistic organization and which is substantially richer in human fertility, fertility of soil, sources of raw materials, and territorial extent? Plainly there is room only for one monopolistic empire in Eurasia. There must inevitably come either a decisive struggle for exclusive power between the two systems, or a close symbiosis. Within this system there can be no free play of

independent forces or autonomous bodies, but only the central tyranny in sole possession of all key-points and monopolies.

### *Partnership*

What will happen to the rest of the world if Hitler succeeds in conquering Britain? Canada will fall to the North American Union. What will happen to Australia and New Zealand? Hitler's statements on this point were few and contradictory. So far as it is now possible to reconstruct his opinion, he is undecided whether the continent will have to be abandoned to the Japanese, or could be made one of the German Dominions, and so preserved for the white race. This, he considers, could be done, if at all, only under German leadership and with German settlers. Hitler grew heated over the recovery of the former German island possessions in the Pacific, some of which are now Japanese mandated territories, and over the possession of New Guinea and of the Dutch East Indies. But he also expressed the opinion that all these colonial ambitions must be kept in the background, the main thing being to win the friendship and support of Japan. What might happen later it was impossible to foresee.

Hitler did not seem to be fully conversant with the problem, but his undeniable instinct for power told him that, like the British Empire, he must have bases everywhere. World dominion demands ubiquity. Presence everywhere, claims pressed everywhere, with never a declaration of disinterestedness—such were his maxims, often repeated, in foreign policy. Just as the upstart surreptitiously watches his rich neighbours in order to discover their style of living, so Hitler studied Britain's world power, for the sake of the tips he could get from it. The chief of these was that a people with world dominion must be able to grow nerves and muscles extending over every continent and every ocean. Hitler grasped this principle in spite of his natural tendency to think in terms only of the land.

Africa, however, belonged to a sphere of which Hitler had a plastic conception. He regarded the continent as irrevocably a part of Europe, just as South America is of the American continent.

In regard to Africa he worked long ago on ideas of a German-Italian partition of spheres of interest—whether sincerely or not need not now be considered. At first he was mainly interested in Central and South Africa. It was one of his pet ideas in colonial policy not only to regain German South-west and German East Africa, rounding them off with the Belgian, French, and Portuguese possessions, but especially to win for Germany the old Boer country and the old Cape Colony; in other words, South Africa. His ostensible dislike of colonial acquisitions was no more than a cloak put on to induce Great Britain to come over to his side in the first period of Germany's recovery. His main concern in Africa at that time was to secure a legitimate basis of operations, from which he could go on working in his own fashion—that is to say, by sowing confusion and dissension and thus undermining the political terrain.

In regard to South and Central America his views may be summarized in very few words: here especially his propaganda depended on racialism and the slogan of the right of the master race to rule over coloured peoples—the principle of the inequality of men. Recent revelations have shown, however, that this was merely a smoke-screen behind which the actual political intrigues were carried on. The aim here, as in Africa, was to gain a footing on the continent from which to carry on further operations. If a single State could be brought under German-inspired rule, it would certainly bring the whole continent into a ferment. How the intention of bringing the whole of South and Central America under Nazi influence could be reconciled with the declaration that this same territory was the sphere of dominion of Spanish-Italian interest was not a difficulty of any practical importance so long as joint revolutionary preparations were in progress.

Unlike Africa and America, the Far East was regarded by Hitler as only of indirect importance. It was a field for the making of difficulties for Britain, for weakening her and destroying her authority and spreading the belief that British world dominion was approaching its end. That is the line pursued by Nazi political activities—the line of the self-styled honest broker. The

political and scientific institutions founded by Hitler's experts are clearly working along this line with some success. Hitler repeatedly declared that in this field his policy is forced into inconsistencies: the white race cannot but lose prestige and dominion while Germany and Britain are at war, if war must come. But the rise of the German people to world dominion justifies any temporary sacrifice of the white race. The problems must be solved in turn; the lost territory and influence can always be recovered.

It is easy to show what Hitler wants in the Near and Middle East. This is the keypoint for the destruction of the British Empire; and it is the oil region. Finally, from here, in alliance with Italy, he can control the whole of Islam.

Partnership is Hitler's trick wherever he thinks he can absorb nations, or elements of them, without needing to proceed to conquest. He offered partnership to Poland; for a time he sought partnership with Soviet Russia. Italy is his partner, and sooner or later she will make the same discovery that Hitler's partners in Germany made in the first year of Nazi rule. Partnership is also a tactical means of sowing dissension within the peoples of Europe and of Islam. The restoration of the full sovereignty of all peoples and tribes under British or French rule sounds plausible and attractive. A Greater Arabia, the bringing of all Mohammedan peoples into a great Pan-Islamic Union, the full sovereignty of India—these are the slogans of Hitler's propaganda. As for his true aims, he has stated them with cynical candour to those in his confidence.

In spite of all the experiences of the past, there are still quarters in which Hitler's siren song is listened to, in which the illusion is nursed that the things that have happened to others cannot happen to these present listeners. Why not give friendship with Hitler a trial? It is a very familiar tune, first whistled in Germany. The secret of Hitler's success lies deep in men's souls. After all that has happened, he still succeeds in inducing his intended victims deliberately to put their heads into his noose. We have not yet seen the last of this credulity.

*The New Social Basis*

World dominion does not mean mere subjection. It implies a new social order in the world. The two things are intimately connected with each other. If the claim to world dominion is not to remain a phrase, a utopia, dominion must take an altogether special form. It looks logically out of the question that there can be a real intention to maintain permanent dominion over wide territories, but this leads many critics of Nazism to entertain the illusory hope that such dominion cannot become so very dreadful. Actually it is here that we discover the poisoned arrowhead within the bright feathers of a spectacular new world order.

It has been my lot to find almost personal offence taken at my report of Hitler's ideas of a new social order on the basis of a new slave class and a new master class. Why? Does the explanation lie in an unconfessed and perhaps even unrealized feeling that this idea of Hitler's has its seductions? Clearly there must have been something of this sort in the subconscious minds of the critics of my *Hitler Speaks*, and a consequent apprehension: such ideas ought not to be breathed, for they are in the air!

It is perfectly true that they are in the air. No other than Nietzsche, the writer so grotesquely overrated by the intellectual nobberly of German Liberalism, made almost a religion out of the right of the strong man over the weak. How strangely the fronts shift! The ideas blazoned on the banners of the intellectual progressives of the last fifty years, bringing a breath of spring into the stuffy world in which we Philistines lived, have now, when Hitler's sun has brought glorious summer, suddenly become criminal. They *are* a crime, inscribed on the new Tables of Commandments issued from a veritable Anti-Sinai. But it was not Hitler who launched this new doctrine of the victory of the man who is beyond good and evil over the common people. Nor was it Hitler who created the universal receptivity for such ideas: that existed long before he was heard of. He has merely profited, nothing else, from a universal revolutionizing of spiritual standards.

If there were nothing seductive in Hitler's assault on the civilized world, or if civilization had not long been passing through a period of self-destruction and grown weary of its

humane inhibitions, how could it all have actually worked?

I do not think that any part of Hitler's esoteric doctrine has created so much spiritual confusion as his evangel of the ruling race and its rights over every coloured race, over the weak. The weak were, indeed, no longer weak: in the form of the modern masses they had grown into the world's tyrants. And the strong individuality, the free and creative personality, had become dependent on the masses and himself in need of protection. The rise of the masses, the new political world power, necessarily postulated the master-man. Hitler's utilization of the masses for his own aims, and his profiting by the self-delusion of the forces that formed themselves into an opposition against the rise of the masses, are among the tricks that have brought him such successes. These successes will continue so long as a clear judgment is still unformed as to those elements in the opening of the new age of the masses which must simply be accepted and made the best of, and those which can be overcome and must be, because of their mortally dangerous nature—dangerous as Nazism itself, which, after all, is nothing but a typical phenomenon of this age of the masses.

Suffice it for the moment that Hitler has clearly succeeded, and probably will continue to succeed, in turning all heads that are filled with the biological reasons for the right of the stronger over the weaker, and in so gaining their secret sympathy. It is no answer to accuse anyone who speaks out about these things of making propaganda for Hitler. On the contrary, to speak out about them is the only way to get rid of the existing confusion of mind and to destroy the seductions of Nihilism. It was no mere coincidence that, many years ago, when I was a young man, a world-famous Berlin physician was so kind as to give me some first lessons in the conception of the *Herrenmensch*, the master-man, and that forty years later, in Paris, one of the leading French physicians gave me, to my astonishment, information of the very same sort, going on to claim that this was why Hitler is a great man.

It does not improve matters to accept the age of the masses as our inescapable destiny and to capitulate to it, or to react to it



y accepting the evangel of the pseudo-biologists with its cynical pseudo-logic of the right of the strong over the weak. So long as people rest content with that, Hitler will continue to profit by a confusion of minds that permits him to come out equally well on either side as a saviour. His ability to do so is shown by the grotesque perplexities we all share. Marxists of all sorts of shades express in private their concern at the fact that Hitler has said so many things which they themselves regard as essential, things which must be held on to in the future, whatever happens; while all the economists and politicians who take the line that a man is master in his own house breathe more freely at the prospect that an end is at last to be made of "the silly dreams of false humanitarianism". The fact that these two diametrically opposed schools of thought can both find support in Nazism not only shows the existing confusion and self-deception concerning our critical times, but shows that Nazism has in fact touched the vital spots in the crisis.

The only use Nazism makes at present of its recognition of the real issues of our time is to extend its influence in foreign policy. But in doing this it scatters the seed of the Nihilist Revolution on new soil. It may have attained practical military successes in France. The process of civil war continues, and new phases of the revolution are in preparation which it is quite impossible to foresee. What we can see already is the effect in foreign policy. The internal results, which may produce entirely new alignments, are unforeseeable.

### *Progress and Barbarism*

It is only necessary to give another name to the contrasted elements of the master-class and the subjugated slave-class in order to realize that this distinction has become virtually inescapable in the present crisis. The new social basis distinguishes between a free *élite* and masses held in discipline by means of compulsion and terror. It is hard to have to write anything against such a man as Sigmund Freud in view of the ill-treatment this friend of humanity has suffered; yet he has certainly been intimately

associated with all the subversive tendencies of our time, and has thus become one of the principal abettors of the triumph of Nihilism. Freud expresses his astonishment that "progress has concluded an alliance with barbarism". He praises the venture-someness of Soviet Russia, where a hundred million of the oppressed are being raised to a higher level of existence, "in taking from them the stupefying drug of religion", and not only that but, in its wisdom, giving them a reasonable measure of sexual liberty. "But at the same time they were subjected to the most ruthless compulsion and robbed of all freedom of thought." Freud continues: "We feel it a relief from an oppressive care when in the case of the German people we find that the relapse into almost prehistoric barbarism can take place without association with any progressive idea." In spite of this relief, Freud finds it odd that "to-day the conservative democracies have become the protectors of the progress of civilization, and that, of all strange things, it is the institutions of the Catholic Church that are combating the spread" of the relapse into barbarism—"the Church which in the past was the enemy of freedom of thought and of progress toward the recognition of truth".

I do not think I am going too far in saying that in this admission of relief at the German relapse into barbarism and this astonishment at finding the Catholic Church a centre of freedom of thought we come to the crucial point in the great historic crisis in which we are involved. But the great scholar shows a strange incapacity to draw the true conclusion from his deep concern at the association of barbarism with progress. Perhaps he is here himself the subject of one of those neurotic inhibitions which he has so often analysed.

Is it not something very like compulsion neurosis to regard the essence of civilization as consisting of continual progress and that progress as consisting of a continual *liberation from something*, in any case from some compulsion or inhibition? Is not civilization in reality a system of restrictions, ties, regulations, to which the individual has to adapt his life? Is not the essence of civilization its creation of general obligations, and is not the question of the value or lack of value of these obligations, and of their modification

and adjustment, quite independent of that of the need for such obligations and restrictions in order to maintain civilization?

The man who feels that he is free of all restrictions needs to be placed under total restraint. That particular freedom is the inference drawn from a progress of the sort that consists of the abolition of all principles of regulation and restriction. Anyone who regards religion as a human neurosis, requiring treatment in the same way as any other neurotic obsession, should not be surprised if in its place a secular doctrine is declared binding on all men and the right claimed to impose it by the most ruthless compulsion. Instruction on all these things is to be found in the works of one of the greatest analysts of men's souls before Freud—Dostoyevsky. It would save men from feeling relief at the fact that barbarism had broken into Germany at least without any progressive idea.

Why should the lack of any association of barbarism with progress bring relief? I think I can reconstruct the process of thought. The fact that the incursion of barbarism in Germany was not "associated with a progressive idea" provides a roundabout justification for violence in any State of the future, any Leviathan-State. Compulsion, it may be argued, is inevitable in the present period of transition from the late capitalist era to that of Communism. If violence and compulsion are not used—of course only in the transition period—for the sake of progress and of the new ordering of society, they would inevitably become an instrument used for its own sake by real men of violence, and the final state of society would be a total barbarism out of which men would only be able to fight their way with infinite effort; the barbaric measures are, on the contrary, necessary in the transition stage and have no relevance to the new and free civilization. It is not, this line of argument suggests, the machinery of violence in National Socialism that is reprehensible; on the contrary, since the war, which is likely to be of long duration, will probably mean the early end of the epoch of capitalist civilization, it is advisable to preserve any available element of the machinery of total control, in order to employ it at the critical moment in the opposite direction, that of the advance of civilization.

It is no longer compulsion and terrorism and ruthless oppression, according to this argument, that are to be abhorred, but their application in the interests of the policy of simple brute force.

This is the crucial issue, and it is worth while to think these things out to the logical conclusion while there is yet time. Up to now we have been living in a transition period, in which every State and every political group has had allies and opponents, whose sympathy or opposition was not as real as it seemed. We are approaching the time when there will come a clarification of the real fronts and opposing ideas. This war cannot be fought out merely as a struggle for predominance between the interests of rival nations. The essential thing, so soon as the existence of the nations attacked has been safeguarded, is a general realization of what the forces of the "conservative democracy" are, and what it is that entitles them to come forward not only as the protectors of the advance of civilization but as its actual instruments.

For the very conclusion which we must logically draw to-day from our experience of the relapse into barbarism unassociated with the ideas of progress, the conclusion that everything must be avoided that would lead once more to the system of totalitarian compulsion, is rejected in important political quarters, perhaps with the Macchiavellian reflection, admitted or not, that compulsion has to be used anyhow, and that it should therefore at least be used for good ends.

The interpreters of the new civilization reckon in thousands of years, just as Nazism does. They set against those thousands the few bitter decades of transition. But we have had experience of the bitterness of the present, and the thousands of years to come are not yet a reality. The conclusion we ourselves draw is not that of these interpreters. If the elements of the spiritual self-disciplining of the masses are to be interpreted away, if the masses are to be degraded to the condition of herds of brute beasts, if they are told that all ethical standards are mere camouflage for the protection of the interests of the propertied classes, then our conclusion is that there will be nothing left to do but to keep the masses for all time behind the bars of a system of totalitarian compulsion.

There may then remain a class of "free men" in existence above

these masses, as the representatives of a sort of *Kulturersatz*, a dear and nasty substitute for civilization. But whether the existence of this new class-State, this society ruled by a tiny minority, has any advantage to offer over the current capitalist system, may indeed be doubted.

If, however, as cannot fail to be the case, civilization and high moral standards are only possible when they have grown out of the moral sense and sense of responsibility of the individual, and if freedom to share in political responsibility and in political decisions can only be granted on the basis of universally applicable ethical principles, then only one line of action is possible. The temptation to make use of all-powerful machinery of compulsion must be resisted, even if it could achieve or facilitate a nominal progress. Rather renounce any such alleged progress than expose ourselves to the mortal perils of a system of compulsion.

There is yet another conclusion to be drawn. Progress cannot consist in anything that destroys the very foundation of civilization, spiritual liberty and moral responsibility. The essence of progress is not liberation from the experience and the standards of the past but their revision to meet the needs of the present. Culture and civilization are not synonymous only with progress: they comprise also the forces of preservation; they imply also the continuity of the age-long ascent of man.

### *Praise of Compromise*

The situation is growing tenser, manifestly, with one air-raid warning after another. To-day the preparations for the German landing were supposed to be completed. Will the landing really be attempted? The two bombs that hit our hotel last night were of small calibre. In my room the window-panes were not even cracked. This morning the great time-bomb in the square near us went off. The hotel shook to its foundations. A flood of water rushed along the streets. The B.B.C. has just announced that 185 German planes were shot down yesterday. Buckingham Palace has been hit again. A bomber fell near Victoria Station, shot to pieces. Rain and fog. Is that helpful to Hitler's enterprise?

we ask ourselves. Is his dæmon working again for him? (Abraxas is the name of the god beyond good and evil.) The Channel is reported to be calm.

Later there were a few more unpleasant moments. Five or six bombs dropped in the neighbourhood. No explosion was heard. Were they time-bombs, and would the district have to be evacuated? Fortunately they were not. It was a quiet night for us, but a bad one in other districts. It is appalling to go day by day along the familiar streets and to see every day further evidence of destruction. To-day a number of big shops and many smaller ones were destroyed in side streets. These desert patches are constantly growing in number; if we count them they amount already to a whole town.

How long is this to go on? In the morning, after the short sleep in the early hours, when the anti-aircraft guns had ceased firing, the light came as a gift; time stood still; it was once more what it was to the early Christians, but a single hour, the pause between the ages, the abolition of time. This was our day of grace, our breathing space.

It is astonishing how deeply the characteristic elements of old traditions are embedded in the various districts of this city. It is a world capital which has not been forced into uniformity, not made into a vast centralizing mechanism, but has remained a community built up out of many individual boroughs of quite different character. It may be that this fact is playing an important part in this Battle of London. The ideal system of our super-rationalizers, a single gasworks, a single electricity works, a single street-cleansing department, has in addition to many other weaknesses special disadvantages at the present time. But this city and county are made up of a whole system of independent communities, none of them too vast for individual survey, and all retaining the personal initiative of small communal groupings.

"It is the genuine produce of the ancient rustic, manly, home-bred sense of the country," said Burke, writing of this country of England. What is it that makes it so strong that it can weather this apocalyptic storm and remain unchanged? It is the stout tissue of a history that has never known a radical breach or a

doctrinaire new start, but only a continuous growth. It is the deep roots of a social life that has never entirely shed the simplicity of old-time patriarchalism. Here the union of "blood and soil", which in other countries is no more than a propagandist slogan, the deep-rooted loyalty to family and homestead, is a reality that is taken for granted. Here immemorial elements of strength have been preserved for the nation to draw upon in time of peril. Here, in spite of the striking contrast of dazzling riches and bitter poverty, there has been no complete rift in the community. Firm granite blocks of mediævalism stand forth, with all the strength of character of that period, in the midst of the present.

It is true that anyone who comes late in life into this country has the feeling of being, in some respects, carried back half a century. Many elements of Victorianism are still active or at least dormant. This war will sweep them all away, but without a breach, without replacing them by the new ideal of some radical upheaval. What was called in Germany the force of tradition was little else than a cover for social privileges; here it is a vital and formative element. Consequently the new England will grow out of the old without losing its essential character. This is the secret of the British strength and capacity for rejuvenation.

Hitler sees only this *ancien régime*, this last phase of a vanishing age, this Victorianism. He does not see the eternal youth of this people, slow-going and perhaps even dull in appearance, but in reality of a well-preserved and continually renewed vitality, resembling that of the countryman, so little understood by the city-dweller. In spite of his cities the Englishman has retained a substantial element of the farmer's mentality, the sound instincts, the capacity for waiting, the dislike of frequent tinkering, the slow but careful thought.

We Germans were not alone on the Continent in being denied the advantage of inheriting and developing the historic forms of a political life of our own, and adapting them without a break, to new times. Our history has been one of intermittent pulsations. We stagger from breach to breach. But in this country of Great Britain, amid the constant adaptation of political and social life to changing realities, there has at all times remained an

unchanging central element. This has been no chance gift of fortune, but the outcome of an uncommon, perhaps a unique, talent for moderation and self-restraint.

We Germans, and not only we, have never appreciated the crucial importance of political compromise in the life of a democracy. To the German, compromise implies lack of conviction, weakness, absence of principle. He sees in it nothing but a give and take between interests. That is why we Germans talk of it as a *Kuhhandel*, a "deal" and probably a shady one—or as shirking a decision. In Great Britain compromise is the outcome of the practical recognition, deeply ethical and Christian in origin, that no man can be solely and entirely in the right, that no more than an approximation to the right is possible, and that this is achieved in a compromise between many personal views of what is right. Compromise proceeds from the moral conviction that the individual person or party can never be in possession of absolute truth in regard to the things of this world.

We Continentals, whatever our antecedents and our mentality, always feel that we are in possession of the sole and exclusive truth. We alone are right, we and those who think with us. Those who are not with us are either stupid or malevolent. Thus our political life breeds from the very outset political arrogance, intolerance, and dogmatism.

"All government," says Burke, "indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter." It is a great and ageless saying.

But this essential and indispensable element of democracy seems to-day in danger even in this country. Not, it is true, in such danger as it was in France before the collapse. The danger of going astray lies in a sort of *shifting of phase* of the great crisis in Britain as compared with the Continent. Certain trends of development in the nineteenth century in the public life of the Continent must still seem in England to be an improvement worth seeking, whereas on the Continent they have already shown their perilousness as roads to absolutism. Certain policies of centralization and rationalization must still be regarded in England as progressive and as improvements. Among these are the concen-



ration of certain economic enterprises and the advantages of the administrative mechanism of the Continent. Thus there is a plain risk of the infiltration of Continental ideas and methods. For it is difficult to keep these efforts at centralization and rationalization within bounds. It might be that the very thing would come to be regarded as progressive and worthy of imitation which, on the Continent, has so plainly revealed itself as a mistaken tendency, a subversive policy.

It is true that peace in the future is inconceivable without a systematic regulation of many sections of economic and social life. It is impossible to object to non-doctrinaire planning of this sort, based simply on practical needs. But there is knocking now at the door of British public life, which hitherto has remained healthy, the theory of comprehensive rational planning. If the country succumbs to this temptation, then, indeed, the war will have been fought in vain, and the very thing would then happen which the Nazi leaders have been predicting for years—their ideas and systems would be imposed by the logic of events, even against the will of the democracies. The thing that is to be feared is that the Continental style of radical doctrinaire thought may infect Great Britain. This nation is only able to anticipate danger when it grows serious. Consequently there are periods in which it seems inferior to other nations. To some approaching dangers it is blind. On the other hand, its instincts react infallibly and instantly to the impact of realities.

### *The New Reality*

The thing that might lead to the abandonment of the method of political compromise, as the essence of the democratic order, in this country too, is a change in the realities *around* us and *in* us.

What change has there been? A threefold one. The technical revolution has so transformed the material basis of our life that the political and social systems of an earlier time are no longer fitted for it: it has so increased the resources of the ruling power that an entirely new situation has been created both for those who wield them and those who are subjected to them. A new

element has made its appearance in human society, the masses who are liberated from all traditionalist associations. Finally, our outlook on life has so changed that we seem to be living, in mind and feeling, in another world.

With remarkable suddenness the Western mental vision has become clouded. A mental change is proceeding, a change mysteriously compelling, under which whole systems of ideas simply disappear entirely. Fundamental principles of the past are simply forgotten, an entirely new language is spoken, a new world of thought has appeared on the horizon. The change is not just that which comes in every man as he grows older, and sees young people growing up around him with new interests and concerns, so that his world is gradually changing. In the past twenty, perhaps the past thirty years, the world has passed into a new phase, and the development is proceeding rapidly. No man can escape from the change.

The new element is at the same time of immemorial age. It is the dæmon of destruction, which had been banned from our normal life by civilization. It is the craving, suddenly grown to immense urgency, to throw off domestication and all civilized restrictions. It has not the slightest affinity to the Rousseau school of romantic pursuit of the primitive; it is a discomfort amid culture, a hatred of civilization, as in all revolutions, but in an immensely cruder and more violent form. Be not deceived: this urge to return to the primitive is felt not only by the Germans. Among the masses everywhere there is the same strong desire to throw off the burdens and obligations of a higher humanity.

This slave revolt of primitivism, this Calibanism, may also reach us in the guise of virility. The modern cult of the heroic is in reality nothing but weakness, incapacity, fear of exertion, flight from responsibility. Divested of this affectation of virility, weakness is the second aspect of the soul of the new time, revealing itself in the demand for security at all costs, a demand proceeding from an exaggerated fear of the perils of life. Everything must be sacrificed, every obligation of humanity disregarded, in order to gain security. The readiness to serve anyone, man or devil, who will guarantee security, is an aspect of a state of mind that is not

confined to the masses. This is it that brings men of every degree of culture, the propertied man and the professor, the clergyman and the officer, the aristocrat and the clerk, down to a common level with the great mass of the hunted and dispossessed lower middle class and the working class, casting all inherited conceptions and principles to the winds in order to capitulate to the sorcerer who promises security.

What irony, when the miracle-working sorcerers of security thereupon turn into prophets of the dangerous life, and lead their safety-seeking clientèle into the frightful insecurity of bombarded cities!

A century ago far-seeing men in all countries prophesied the rise of the amorphous masses and saw in it the climax of a crisis and the destruction of all organic social systems. In France Alexis de Tocqueville, in Switzerland Jacob Burckhardt, had described the process in advance. Prussia, in Radowitz, friend of Frederick William IV, had a far-seeing prophet of the age of the masses.

What is the meaning of this phenomenon? It is not the emancipation of a fourth or fifth estate, not the proletarian revolution that would lead to Communism and so to a new, classless social order: what has come is something that can bring no new assets to the world, but desires only to consume some of those that exist and throw out the rest as useless ballast. Communism, in its proposal to establish a new social order and a new economic system, and in so far as it represents enlightenment and rationalism, even atheism and anti-Christianity, in so far as it stands for economic planning, State Socialism, and State control of men's lives, is either still on this side of the rise of the masses, and the final expression and completion of the ideas that rose with the capitalist system, or is a defence against the rise of the masses; it is not that rise itself. Soviet Russia is not ruled by the masses but by a rather different type of new bourgeoisie and officialdom. But behind the Bolshevik system, as behind the democratic and every other social order and system of rule of our age, is the menace of this true revolution, of the anarchy of the masses. It means the destruction, the razing to the ground, of every achievement of civilization; the destruction of all differentiations, all social and

political orders and orders of rank: it is the victory of primitivism and of the cult of imbecility over all the things of the mind and all creative activity. It lies at the back of all our efforts; it is reality, no political fiction, no condition deliberately worked for by parties or regime. It seems to be the inescapable destiny of this age; and it seems that to-day, as Tocqueville foresaw, there can no longer be any question of preventing it, but only of keeping it as far as possible under some sort of control, so that it shall be no more destructive than can be helped.

This is a question that goes far beyond all the issues of everyday politics, a question that concerns our destiny. There is no nation for which it would not be of fateful significance. Perhaps attention has been directed in the past mainly to the psychological state of the masses, to their particular type of emotional excitability and intellectual lethargy and susceptibility to the force of suggestion. But the changes in the characteristics of the masses are of no less importance. The masses are no longer a nation. They are alike, and react alike, in all nations. They are a non-national element. It is no longer possible to base national policy or national defence on them. They are amorphous, and resist all formative influences. They are no longer a class. This is what the political Left has failed to realize. The masses are incapable of maintaining civilization, they only consume it. They are culture-blind. The thing that distinguishes present from past conditions is that all forms of social existence are dissolving into the structureless state of the masses, that all civilization is moving towards a universal mass-community. The modern masses are no longer the element of failure and distress sinking within the social structure; they are becoming the sole form of society and the ruling element.

The third and principal agent of transformation is the technical revolution. This factor too raises the question whether our destiny as a technical epoch was inescapable; whether there was only one thing that we could do, unreservedly and uncompromisingly to accept and promote the technical character of our civilization, without romantic thoughts of the past, without sentiment or resentment. If planning is already the order of the day, and a new type of humanity is being produced, is not the right course to

carry the process to the end and to make a radical break with all traditions? Should we not simply accept the logical implications of our situation, and make man the servant of his creation, the machine?

What is the machine? Is it a means of human welfare; or is it not also the most effective instrument of the concentration of human power? Is it not true that technical progress has implied domination and subjection, instead of that which the believer in progress imagines it to be, the service of human convenience and enjoyment? If technical progress is made into a religion, it will turn from an instrument of human welfare into a thing pursued for its own sake, and in this way its essential nature, that of a means of increase of power, will become effective as a political force. The world of ideas of the technologist is above all else rational; he sets himself the aim of the organic construction of man's world, the rationalization of all life. This requires a new concentrated and centralized utilization of all technical resources. Thus technical progress creates a new world, that of the consistent pursuit of total rationalization.

This seems to indicate the only direction along which the changed world can be given its due form. In this world of the machine there are no longer qualities, only functions. Historical development is replaced by rational building, political conviction by the assigned task. In the midst of this machine world is the general planning department, with authority to assign functions without appeal. This is the final and extreme phase of an intellectual movement which began with the "Enlightenment" and with rationalism. It means the re-ordering of human society in a system of exact relations.

Was it possible for our existing forms of political and social life to withstand this change? Ought not new ones to have been sought, new regulative ideas conceived? In any case, this revolution of reality sets limits to the serviceability of our old standards of judgment. Existing oppositions have become pointless, new associations and new oppositions have been formed. These transformations could not but be accompanied by errors and self-deception. Things that might have been of assistance were thrust

aside, and weapons were seized that belonged to the arsenal of the opponents. It is the mark of a crisis of this sort, that everyone is fighting on the wrong front, perhaps combating the very thing that he wants to secure and securing what he is out to combat. At such times there are no clearly defined fronts.

Does this mean that the great ideas and principles of Western civilization have had their day and must now be discarded? Or should we not take refuge in these very principles, and suppress the revolution at its height? No historic process can be undone. The old has not had its day; but the new cannot be entirely extirpated. The technical revolution, the rise of the masses, and the unmasking of all Western standards cannot be made not to have happened. We have to go on beyond them, we cannot get back before them. There is no reversing history. Those who try to go back unfailingly destroy the very thing they want to achieve. But there is a third course, which does not lead to radical revolution and yet does not seek to return to the past. That is the course along which the genuine forces of the New come into play, to be mingled with the remaining principles of the historic past into a new unity.

### *The Road to Barbarism*

We are waiting—but for what? Something impending, something sinister, is in the air. To-day's calm is full of tension. It is a warm autumn day. I am in the quiet, secluded sunk garden in Kensington Gardens, with its continual succession of blooms. Looking up from the leaf-strewn paths, one sees only tree-tops, and one is far from all cities and all wars. The skies are tempestuous, with heavy clouds, some of them sharply outlined storm clouds. Patches of sunlight and shade pursue each other. A few yards from the seat which I have used throughout this summer for writing, there is a time-bomb. Beyond it is a great bomb crater, and another a few yards from the refreshment room. There are boughs shot down. I am sitting for a while in the sun. The world holds its breath: the beast from the abyss is lurking, waiting to pounce.

The signs of destruction are increasing. But on the surface life has scarcely changed. In spite of warnings the streets are full; no one takes any notice of the air raids. Here and there a street is roped off. From time to time there is the explosion of a time-bomb. But business goes on, and there is no sign of weariness among the people. Wherever one goes one may see moving and impressive pictures. On a mantelpiece in an upper storey of a house reduced to rubble there stand still a little collection of family photographs; souvenirs hang on the wall. Fragments of rooms and of furniture are suspended in the sunlight above the abyss.

Men must pay the full price for historic change; nothing comes as a gift to them. We have just been considering here whether these appalling events could have been avoided; it was an idle speculation. Perhaps they could have been, and certainly in this form; but where were the statesmen, and not only they but the political groupings, with the foresight and the influence to do what was needed in time?

Is the blending of new and old amid which we are still living, is this new European unit and are these new social and economic structures, which are now becoming irrevocably a part of it, conceivable without these incursions of a ruthless force? How is this new world centre, which we see coming steadily within sight in the form of a great British-American union of States, to be made a reality? There will be a new Mediterranean between Great Britain and America, the Atlantic basin, and round it the future great empire of peace will come into existence, the Pax Atlantica.

The question what Hitler will do, whether he will attack, whether he will prefer not to, pales into insignificance beside the great, the crucial question: will there be strength enough to see to it that this war shall end in a really "glorious" victory, in the sense that this time the things that are needful will be done? Not only new buildings, not only a longer week-end, not only the removal of social privileges, not only the punishment of the guilty, not only the relief of the worst distress, the worst hunger, but a really great peace.

All this at present is far off, on the further shore for which our

*Mayflower* is bound. Here around us we have the present reality of a new barbarism, of destruction so appalling as men have never before achieved in the wildest of frenzy.

But we fail to realize the appalling nature of this barbarism if we see at the back of it only the repulsive face of that one man, with his odd forelock, and his associates. Nor is it merely the outcome of the eternal Teutonic destructiveness. These commanding officers who to-day are sending out young German airmen with orders to shoot down women and children are merely the linesmen on the Barbarian Railway; they did not themselves invent this barbarism. It grew out of the midst of our civilization, long before these men.

It rose with the rise of the masses, with their new animal nature, beyond good and evil. It arose with the ideological unmasking of all human ideas and standards in that process, once so glorious, of spiritual liberation and human progress. It grew on the testing-grounds of the machine age and in the exact work of applied science. This barbarism is the inevitable consequence of changed realities. It is the true face of the great revolution, a revolution that is not merely a metaphor but a reality.

It is necessary to recognize the existence of this revolution, and to distinguish its superficial aspects from its real nature. It is difficult in this maltreated city, among this heroically patient population, to preserve the collectedness needed for an inquiry into the deep-lying causes and the ramifications of the revolution.

### *The Unseen Revolution*

The practical politician or statesman usually seizes on the most obvious motives and explanations. To be led on to consider more distant perspectives and profounder causes is to gain a long-sightedness that brings short-sightedness in regard to the important tasks of the day. But behind the practical judgment there lurks another temptation, no less strong—to regard problems as simpler than they are in reality.

To see in this revolution nothing much beyond this man Hitler's attacks on the peace of the world and, perhaps, elements



a general economic crisis, is to give our revolution too harmless character. There is a striking resemblance in this to the lack of understanding a hundred and fifty years ago of the French revolution and its technique. In the memorable twenty-five years of the British opposition to that revolution, a clearer understanding gradually dawned, leading in the end to Castlereagh's acceptance of one of the most pregnant of the principles of the revolution, his recognition of the fact that the war against Napoleon was no longer a war of the Cabinets but of the peoples. At that time the idea of a peoples' war was as suspect in the eyes of official politicians as the present-day idea of a world revolution.

Transferring this example to the present, we might expect from the leading statesmen of this country the recognition that what is now in progress is no longer a war between two empires for hegemony in Europe, or a war of self-defence of one Power against the aggression of another, but a universal civil war, proceeding in every nation and on every continent.

Moral indignation about the Revolution will be of no more service than blindness to it. It is an incursion of irrational elements into our civilized world, and it is therefore of necessity barbaric and destructive. It is the consequence of a development which must continue to its final stage. Anti-humanism, barbarism, exists already in the instrument of human progress, the machine. Progress and barbarism are more closely connected than Sigmund Freud imagined. They are interrelated of necessity.

A naïve view of technical progress sees in it only the triumph of the human will and reason over Nature. It fails to realize the change it brings in man himself, his own subjection to the machine. The machine has changed human consciousness. It has created new automatisms in men's souls. It is the source of a deep emotional disturbance. In such a situation, with a universally weakened and excitable mentality, the popular pastime of exposing all ideologies and ethical standards has destroyed essential spiritual inhibitions and delivered men into bondage to their reactions to chance excitations and impulses. A favourable soil is created for a particular misuse of instinctive forces of society, a misuse which has euphemistically been christened Propaganda.

Between the forces of external and internal change, both producing a transformation in human character, the new masses arose. It only needed the coming of economic crises and political uncertainties for the whole fiction of middle-class security to collapse and the masses to be thrown helplessly upon themselves and their fear for their livelihood.

In this upheaval the community ceased to be a reality. "The community (*Volk*) is no longer a reality, there are only the masses," the cynical but keen-witted Carl Schmitt, formerly leading counsel for the National Socialists, used to say. The community as an organism became a romantic memory. A policy based on its existence was doomed to collapse.

Was not that the case of France?

### *The French Tragedy*

The charming serenity of a Couperin suite brightens the smoky lounge of the hotel. The French broadcasting of the De Gaulle group is surely the best thing that has yet been done in the way of wireless cultural activity. The unity and yet variety of the programme, its brightness and its high level, make it always effective without descending to the rapid and the vulgar. The whole wealth and clarity of the French spirit, its gaiety and its wittiness, stream forth from all these broadcasts.

But what is happening to this "resistance to oppression", to these great ideas of liberty, equality, human rights and human progress, which are the inmost soul of these broadcasts? They surely still live, and will never again disappear from the very marrow of human history. How foolish to propose to "reverse" the French Revolution! What nonsense to try to make an end politically of the universal rights of man, to throw them to the scrap-heap! If this were the plan of the new French Government, the whole thing would be a farce. But is it really proposed? It is easy to profess allegiance to the ideas we all hold, but the problem is to provide institutional safeguards for them at the present time and *for* the present time.

It was after Munich that I had a talk with a couple of highly

intelligent Frenchmen, loyal Catholics, distinguished members of the judiciary—one of them was going with me to see Cardinal Verdier—about the inevitability of war with Nazism. Both of them were deeply concerned at the prospect. Their judgment of Munich was not quite so harsh as that of Bernanos, who called the agreement "*une farce macabre*", "a gruesome farce, a sort of miscarriage following the violation of France by gutter-snipes as he slept in the corner of a wood". But they, too, spoke with despair of France's slumber, of the inevitable downfall of the nation. For me it was a sort of reflection of the feelings we had in Germany in the years before the Nazi revolution—the urgent need for overcoming lethargy and remedying a wrong political system. It could not but rouse apprehension to find that in almost every nation on the Continent the same need was being felt for a new integration of the people—a "reconciliation and reintegration of the people under the signs and in the spirit of the France of the past", as Bernanos put it for France.

To fail to realize the full dimensions of the tragedy of France is to forgo one of the means of a real understanding of our destiny. It was neither intrigues nor merely a corrupt class, nor a blow struck by an ambitious group or by aged and feeble-minded reactionaries, that produced the desperate and tragically mistaken idea of coming to terms with Nazism. The whole truth is that all classes of the French people went on strike. They refused to go on fighting. They had had enough, once for all, of these campaigns. They meant to go on living, even, if it must be so, without honour, in the hope of at least being able to remain themselves. Is this a withdrawal from history, a fall to the state of fellaheen such as Hitler foresaw for France years before the collapse? A nation that loses the faith in greatness, that retains only the old man's resigned contentment with what is still possible and his complete scepticism of great emotions and sacrifices, and confines itself to the enjoyment in moderation of the good things of life, ceases to be a Power with any part in the building of history. The retirement from great political tasks and concentration on the defence of the country's own possessions, implied in the formulation of French policy since Munich, was the beginning of a logical

course which ended in smug acceptance of a situation in which, even without the millions of French colonists, and with the enemy still in occupation of the country, France imagines that she can live on in her immortal spirit.

A nation thus resigned is guided by other beacons than *gloire*, or *liberté* or *égalité*, or the *patrie*. Is there not in operation here the changed consciousness of which I wrote just now, the submergence of a whole system of ideas, the vanishing of the idea of the nation, of social obligations, amid the rise of the masses? Masses who were no longer ready to fight or to make sacrifices because they had grown too shrewd and sceptical to believe in the reality of great phrases and ideals, and a political *élite* who were concerned for their positions in the political life of the country and therefore failed to do what was needful—such was France before the catastrophe, a country of intrigue and nothing else, a hermit crab that had housed itself in the shell of another animal, as though in armour too big for it; a country that could do nothing with the historic traditions and obligations of the *Grande Nation* but spin fine phrases about them. This catastrophe came not only because the nation was exhausted, not only because France “could no longer endure to see weeping”, not only because of the universal hedonism; it became evident that the nation’s genius had deserted it.

Before the collapse, as to-day, the Catholic generals formed only a façade before a no longer existing France. But if we ask why they did not act earlier, the tragic confusion into which the nation had fallen is revealed. If the generals had taken any real action, the result would have been just what Hitler had been trying to secure in his political warfare—a split in the nation. There would still have been strength enough in the nation for an insurrection, a political revolt against necessary reforms. There would have been political disturbances; but there would have been no great national uprising. The time was not ripe for this before the war. There would have been no national rising, either at the instance of the forces of the Right or of those of the Left. That was why the Blum experiment came to grief in its turn. There was nothing more to be done than wait and hope

for a miracle, silently picturing the course many far-seeing politicians would have liked to pursue.

The real causes of this tragedy place the character of this second world war in its true light, as a civil war. I can see the identical motive which drove German patriots into the arms of the Nazis. There was the same desperate determination in France as earlier in Germany to wrest from its mistaken course a nation that was stumbling blindly in self-deception and false security, and to bring it renewed life from the elements of its history and tradition. That desperate determination and that tragic confusion have once more brought unfreedom and self-destruction.

Here is a French newspaper writing in much the same terms as when we were filled with ideas of a new ordering of the State, before the Nazi revolution. "The State will liberate itself from many tasks for which it has not the needed competence," it writes, and it refers to "the cells of France, the families, professions, regions", which "will achieve the beneficent work of far-reaching decentralization". An official speech contained the statement that France "was a politically, economically, and socially exhausted State". From another statement a few passages may be quoted which correspond exactly with what, ten years earlier, was our judgment of the Weimar Republic. A "total transformation" is necessary; the way has been prepared for it "in the course of twenty years of insecurity, discontent, and veiled revolt". "For a long time," the statement continues, "a number of Frenchmen, most of them young, outside the parties, which filled them with disgust, have held aloof from all public life with its corruption, dreaming of a political and moral transformation of their country." As regards the future of Europe, "great mistakes have to be made good; economic life must be carried on on the basis of orderly co-operation; this co-operation, free from all ideology, will take the place of the exclusively political form of European equilibrium".

The feeling that we were at the end of an epoch was widespread before the war among very varied elements of the French intellectuals. There were Catholics who saw this end in terms of the final phase of the great process of secularization that culminated

in the French Revolution. There was only one way out, an official who, outside education, had no interest in politics said to me in 1938—a complete and fundamental change in French education, turning away from intellectualism and the existing teachers' training schools; only this could save the country from collapse. It was necessary, he said, to turn away from Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclopædists to Pascal and Descartes. Guidance must be sought not in the eighteenth but in the seventeenth century. I may sum up the views expressed to me in a number of political discussions in the fateful winter of 1938-39 as revealing the anxiety of a class of despairing patriots who had remained in the background about the condition of France: with her unstable and spiritually enervated masses, so unwilling to work and so unready for sacrifice, she was no longer capable of any heroic resistance. Every effort must be made to gain time, even at the cost of temporary humiliation, in order to train up a new France and save her from spiritual and physical death. For—so ran these men's argument—the nation was no longer even biologically in a state to stand heavy sacrifices of her blood. The flight from the land and the dwindling of the birth-rate must be stopped before the nation could face the losses of a new Great War.

I do not think it is just or politically wise to condemn men who saw this French disaster coming, and who endeavoured to evade it in order to gain time; or to set them on the same level as political desperadoes who seize every opportunity of profiting at other people's expense and of pushing themselves into the foreground. The tragic dilemma is that measures which could have brought regeneration before the collapse were impossible owing to the difficulties of the situation before the war, while, if they are resorted to now amid the despair of national defeat, their only effect may be to conceal the full measure of its disaster from the nation, or at least to turn its attention from it. This, together with the association with subversive political elements and with the victorious enemy, now in occupation of the country, would compromise for the future the indispensable positive elements of genuine reconstruction. This is one of the greatest perplexities of this period, so rich in self-deception and in errors.

*Forces of Retrogression*

Those who regard themselves as the forces of progress are in truth forces of retrogression. That is the paradoxical element in our crisis. There is no escaping from this connexion between progress and the modern barbarism. This does not only apply to our external, political life; in our spiritual crisis we also find ourselves in the midst of a reversal of a long-continued human development. The faith in a single moral God was the strength of solitary great men thousands of years before our era. With that faith they faced the masses who worshipped the dæmonic forces of nature and hoped to placate them by means of magic rites. Far into the dark background of our human history goes this chain of men of spiritual strength, to whom mankind owes its advance in so far as it accepted their spiritual teaching, abandoned the altars of Baal and the sacrifices in high places, and served God in the spirit and in truth.

This bright flame is now challenged by fires of another type. It is the mission and task of leading spirits of our modern Occident to liberate themselves from all faith in any spiritual and moral centre of the universe, and to glorify this as a spiritual achievement. As the new prophets of the god of race, of the tribe, of coupling, of the procreative power of nature, they oppose the God who is Spirit with the glorification of perdition. These Western lands are being thrust back through thousands of years into the old struggle of Israel against idolatry, against the young heifer of Baal, to-day named biologism, and against Moloch, who is still the god of power, and who blesses dominion in return for human sacrifices. Humanity is once more in the wilderness, trembling amid the horrors and the anguish of life, returning to magic rites, and bending the knee to men of violence who parade before them the illusion of security.

What is it that has induced us in our late generation to see spiritual greatness in such a process of perdition, instead of in those legislators of a higher humanity who, like the "man Moses", brought against the belief in magic and against superstitious fears the great message of the one God, to whom burnt offerings are not

acceptable? It is an immense step back to see spiritual greatness in perdition. Perhaps these modern magicians and shamans had to come, in order to open our eyes as to our true condition?

People are horrified to-day at the complete lack of principle of men of intellect, the venality of science, the Byzantinism of scholars and artists. In reality all this was in preparation long ago, was there already—these new sophisms, this capacity for justifying everything and serving everyone who pays. Intellect had ceased to take itself seriously long before the Nazis came into power. Behind the portentous gravity of professional science and a noisy protest of principle was concealed a complete cynicism that mocked itself and was ready to enter the service of whatever powers there be.

But it is not a sign of strength to throw off the obligations of a higher humanity with the air of a superman who is free to ignore them, and either to enjoy earthly comforts or unrepentingly to follow the instincts of a blond or brown or any other-coloured beast. Behind all these rodomontades of pseudo-heroism is revealed not strength but the weakness of slack and morbid minds. It is the shirking of the difficult tasks of civilization, the "discomfort in civilization", the inertia and laziness which, long ago, the mediæval Church included among the mortal sins.

It has long been the task of a type of *littérateur* who poses as the intellectual administrator of progress to make barbarism pass for progress. The liberal "Enlightenment", which sees in religion only an illusion, a swamp of terrors and primitive feelings, the draining of which is the prime task of the education of the human race, is pained to find, with Freud, that the great majority of mortals are incapable of rising above the childish level of a religious view of life. But the closeness of intellectual progress of this sort to the source of modern barbarism is shown by the inferences so great an enlightener as Freud draws from the fact of the harshness of life. We could not live, he says, without palliatives, and he mentions three—the diversions that take our mind off our poverty; satisfaction with substitutes; and intoxicants.

Here we find ourselves at once in the very midst of all those regimes which, like Nazism, profit by the susceptibility to influence



and the intellectual debility of the uprooted masses, in order to become their political masters—diversions, substituted satisfactions, and intoxicants.

It is the elements of the Enlightenment, the elements of intellectual progress, that have placed the weapons of obscurantism in the hands of modern tyrannies. It is the misuse of progress that leads to barbarism. But is not "progress" itself a misused term? Does not Liberalism lead to its own destruction when it follows its principles to their logical conclusion? This paradox leads to a new quarter of the political labyrinth.

The proud assault on nature, the subjection of natural forces to the will of man, the subordination of life to the control of science—this aim of the Enlightenment and of progress does not bring us to an order from which, as men hope, pain is banned and in which pleasure is the governing principle; the humanist road leads straight back to bestiality. To-day the Enlightenment is returning to the darkness out of which it came. If each of us moderns behaves in certain respects like a paranoiac who sets before himself a picture of the world as he would like it in place of the reality of a world he cannot endure; if human religions must be regarded as means of diversion for the masses, we arrive at complete Nihilism, at a chaos out of which we can emerge only through the system of compulsion of a new absolutism, a modern tyranny.

Who will deny that the Enlightenment has engraved indelible marks on humanity? The idea of man as a reasoning being, and the idea of the uniqueness of the individual, first made it possible to establish a universal human standard, independent of birth and social position. They thus established clear standards of right and wrong, good and evil, reasonable and unreasonable. But reason itself has been challenged in our day by enlightenment. The extension of ethnographic knowledge has made an end of the universal rule of reason. That intellectual movement, that liberation, will remain one of the great lines of development of the human race, and it is impossible to wish that it had not taken place, even though it has led to the present state of total confusion. It is absurd to try to reverse the movement, as some men in

Germany and France would like to do. What needs to be done is to find the limits within which enlightenment and rationalism are salutary and beneficent. It is not enlightenment itself that has to be combated, but its misuse by a reason that has "taken charge" and therefore, left to itself, would be at the mercy of every external attack.

We ourselves were all moved by the splendour of humanism only shortly before the incursion of the modern barbarism. In our younger days we still experienced the thrill of our freedom to explore all the wealth of an immeasurable intellectual heritage. Later, when we began to be concerned about the intellectual Sack of Rome, it was once more the call of a humanism warmed by youthful enthusiasm that challenged us, because its standard-bearers felt that they had it in their power to rescue the world from barbarism. But had they? Were they not afflicted with the same weakness which had led to the capitulation of the intellect to the instincts? Why was humanism impotent in the presence of all the attacks of the rising Nihilism? Why did its representatives capitulate one after another and come to terms with progressive barbarism?

The aim and the justification of humanism is the ennobling of man. But what is it in man that it loves? Man as he is? An ideal picture of him? What is the purpose of this love of humanity? It aims at well-being and harmony. It aims at extirpating evil; it refuses to recognize evil. What a strange view of humanity, what a suppression of the truth! "Man is good," that dictum of Rousseau's, that message proclaimed by the French Revolution and by the Enlightenment everywhere, is untrue. Man is not good. It is this optimistic picture of man that makes humanism weak. Man has two elements—the creative powers of a spirit that strains from the dark after the light, as Goethe said, and also the urge to perdition, to destruction and self-destruction. Whatever modern interpretation may be given to this second side of humanity, "discomfort amid civilization", "the night side of civilization", it is just as accurate to keep to the old Christian distinction and call it Evil.

We are taught to distinguish between an "adventist humanism",

the last flowering of the ancient world before Christianity, and a "decayed" humanism, self-centred, postulating the only standard and meaning of life in man himself.

Is there such a being as what is called the autonomous man? Is not the term a denial of the deepest and most fruitful development of the human spirit, leading from the Jewish prophets through the ancient humanism to Christianity? Humanism is empty without the Christian spirit. Humanism is irresponsible without Christian seriousness. Humanism is weak without the ethical powers of Christianity.

In attacking humanism we are not moved by the reasons for which Pareto condemns it, or Nazism and Fascism; our reason is not that it is a sign of the weakness that comes over men when they are decadent and their instincts are no longer reliable. Our reason is that man is unable by his own strength to overcome the destructive element in his nature, the element of evil.

To use that word, "Evil", and to take evil as a reality, is to fall under suspicion, in both hemispheres, of being narrow and reactionary. But evil is a reality. It is not to be conjured away from our lives. The humanism that relies on the goodness in human nature creates thereby its own correlative, the cynicism, or, in euphemistic language, realism, that relies on the eternally incorrigible creatureliness of man the animal. Thus, instead of a universal criterion that unites all men, there is a contradiction which upsets every order, since one interpretation of life remains an intellectual luxury, a decorative tag for the speech-maker, and the other governs men's actual relations. It is humanism that throws open the path to power for cynicism; and cynicism provides the plausible motives for capitulation to force, bowing to necessity, acceptance of things as they are—which always means flight into safety.

Humanism provides no rescue from the menaces with which humanity is surrounded. Consequently it offers only one way out, through subjection to a visible power. Only this provides security, since the faith in an invisible, spiritual authority has been rejected. The alternative to this flight into security is the flight into adventure, into the soporific of activity. This

is the flight ahead, the forward pressure, overcoming fear by aggression.

The true forces of retrogression are not to be found in the political direction in which they are usually sought, in the circles of a privileged class, amid the narrowness of reactionaries who would order life back into older and outlived forms; in the eternal human desire to possess privileges. This form of social retrogressiveness, that of a class consciousness, is innocent in comparison with these other forces of retrogression, which aim at thrusting higher forms of human life back into the primitive, irresponsible, bestial.

### *The Double Aspect of Socialism*

Home leave, peace, rest, fresh air. Here in the country one first realizes the pressure of these past weeks, the accumulated weariness. There is a sharp, brisk air out here. As one reaches this venerable old country seat one is met by the atmosphere of a great past. In the park, with the busts of old Romans on the garden walls, with swans in the little stream, in the quiet of this ancient, smiling village, the war has vanished. The beast has crept behind the hedge. A great world, a world of the intellect, with all the wealth of a ripened life, here spreads its luxuriance.

We step out on to the terrace at night. The horizon sends up tongues of flame. Distant droning and booming. There lies the front, the great capital. The front, just as clear-cut as in the last war; but this time the metropolis itself is the front.

Then the beast comes over us here; through the peace of the night comes this buzzing drone of aircraft above us. One sleeps none the less soundly in these wonderful beds, with an embroidered sky above us and old paintings on the walls. The mysterious life of old houses speaks in the night with its sombre voice. One knows that one has been drawn into the circle of a great tradition.

It is the moderation, the keeping within bounds, the wise avoidance of extremes, that gives this British life its elasticity. Here, in the very midst of the reflections of these weeks about the

paradoxical interrelation between progress and barbarism, the question how to escape from this vicious circle finds its answer.

It is not only compromise that has kept political life here in health. The reason why in this country men are capable of genuine compromise is to be found in the instinctive setting of bounds to all life, in the dislike of following out one's thoughts to the very end. Just as the individual can rarely be entirely in the right, so it is rarely possible in human affairs to carry principles and trains of ideas to the extreme limit. Here lies the explanation of the continued sanity of British life in this intellectual crisis. Britain is virtually free from doctrines and theories. The good work of Liberalism turns to self-destruction, Socialism turns from a great process of just equalization into tyranny, only when these indispensable elements of Western life are pursued to the extreme limit at which they become their own antithesis. If the regulative ideas of our life are pursued to their logical conclusion, if they are regarded as absolute, they turn into fatal nonsense. An idea becomes absolute when it is elevated into a doctrine, when a system is created out of it and it is proclaimed as an aim to be followed or a right to be maintained uncompromisingly and without question, when it is made more than simply an expedient taught by experience and an instrument of an order that is continually changing. There lie the roots of our unhappy German destiny. It is this incurable habit of pursuing everything to its logical conclusion and of making a system out of it, that brings us again and again to intellectual and political shipwreck.

Scarcely anything could be better calculated to inspire us with confidence in the future of this England than the fact that here Socialism itself is not doctrinaire, that it has remained free from Marxism, a practical, entirely open-minded party of social reform.

Does doctrinaire Marxism belong to the past as a factor in practical politics? This would mean that the Socialist parties of the Continent, and the labour organizations that use the language of Marxism, must find not only a new terminology but new methods of political propaganda. Hitler has not shrunk from the admission that he owes many of his methods and his political judgments to Marxism, but has had the courage to carry out

things that political Marxism, at least in Germany, only advocated but never ventured to attempt. It was a rather cruel and an unjust statement, and the official representatives of the exiled German Marxists have taken offence at my bare mention of it.

Many things in the present social order are antiquated, and much needs to be swept away. But one of the most antiquated collections of lumber is the Continental doctrinalism, born of unhistoric rationalist conceptions, which is beginning to find a footing outside the Continent. The world of the nineteenth century has gone. This means beyond question that the vestiges of feudal systems and the remnants of the Victorian age have to be got rid of, no less than those of the age of William II. But there are other things, too, that belong to the nineteenth century—that baseless belief in material progress, the pseudo-humanist optimism, the obsession of rationalism, and the facile creed of this-worldliness. Both Hegel and Marx belong to the nineteenth century, both the democratic individualism of the national States and the absolutism of Greater Prussia—and the belief in the possibility of changing human nature by changing institutions, of making man different from what he is, a dual being with all the eternal inadequacies that implies, a being of which the actual vital element is its state of variance with itself.

Nazism has certainly taken over all the nationalist and militarist elements of which our so-called reactionary nationalism made political use in past decades, and has carried them to the furthest extreme. But it is not that that makes it so dangerous; it is not as a new form of Pan-Germanism or Prussian militarism that it has so far proved irresistible. It developed its great destructive political powers out of the fact of the weakness of the systems opposing it, and by the utilization of resources and methods which had been developed and prepared not in the nationalist but in the Socialist, Marxist field. These resources are calculated to wreak infinite destruction, but never to build a new world.

Here lies the task which we seem to fail to understand—that of discovering a new order, which will confer new institutional organs on the imperishable elements of our historic growth, ele-

ments now ripened into a democratic form of existence, but will do so without borrowing those forms from the mortal enemy, totalitarian tyranny.

Does progress, progress in a rational and realistic sense, lie in the direction of an all-embracing rationalized system, a universal collectivity? Is that the future goal? Is it not rather the exact opposite of this, an active collaboration of many independent elements, none of which is competent to take over total control? But does not this mean that all these absolutist doctrines and gospels of a historic or other materialism, and all ideas of rational planning, belong to one side, while on the other side is everything that is associated with freedom, democracy, a multiplicity of powers, initiative, the moral responsibility of the individual, the preservation of private spiritual and moral independence, and the advance and continuance of civilization and of the culture of the West? This raises questions that show that middle and working class can no longer remain in opposite camps but must be partners in a common front.

The German Social Democracy has a dual stamp. It is not right to reproach it for having been too democratic in the years before the great crisis to seize or maintain power by illegal means. This was the stamp of one side of the Social Democracy, its sense of responsibility and its truly democratic character, which made it set bounds to its own struggle for power and to subordinate its activities to ideas of impartial justice. The Social Democratic leaders, who kept here within due bounds, should, therefore, not be attacked but thanked for making a new labour movement possible in the future and maintaining the moral basis for it—a basis from which it will gain a special importance and prominence in the coming peace.

But there is another aspect of the old Social Democracy. It was from this other side that one root of modern totalitarianism grew. Here was the soil on which all those poisonous growths flourished which have nothing to do with a labour movement and the aim of a juster social order—the Godless movement, systematic historic materialism, rationalism, the emancipation of flesh and spirit; and also all those ideas of total compulsion, dictatorship, planning,

levelling, collectivization, down to a faith held by command and a science based on arbitrary premises. As if the science of our orthodox Marxists, with its axiom of historic materialism, was any less of an *ad hoc* doctrine and, as an "ideological superstructure", any less deliberately made subject to particular social premises, than the "*artbedingt*" science, the science trimmed to order, of the Nazis! As if all the things that have been grotesquely perverted into the irrational doctrines of Nazi racialism had not their complete prototypes in the rationalist field! The Social Democratic party's sports unions and cultural associations, its literature with the characteristic party slang, its troops to maintain order, its marching and flag-waving and rites, themselves set the example for the brown battalions and all the organizations of National Socialism.

That is the second aspect of the Social Democracy, great as that movement on behalf of the working classes certainly was. No one will question the immense educative work and the great positive achievements of the Social Democratic movement. If the German worker belonged to one of the best and most reliable types in the modern Germany, thanks are due solely to the tireless work of several generations of unknown Socialist teachers and leaders. But this admirable work was paralysed by the doctrine and practice of a collectivization which only required a new coefficient in order to be turned into the ruling force of to-day, the revolutionary movement of Nihilism.

Thus the future labour movement will have to make up its mind: for which of these ends will it work? For this latter, which has imposed itself on the essence of the movement as an alien element, or for the former, the training of responsible personalities on the basis of our Western culture? To continue to retain both courses of development would cripple the Social Democracy as a creative force in the State and in history. Social Democracy would not be a factor in the future establishment of justice and harmony, but a permanent focus of latent revolutionary destruction. It is essential to get away from this duality, and to decide in favour of the law with which this continent of ours began its historic life two thousand years ago.



A great labour movement will be the central political and social achievement in the reordering of Europe, and the foundation on which permanent peace must rest. But this becomes impossible if Socialism holds fast to the idea of a radical reordering of society, since this can be effected only by means of a form of modern tyranny. If, on the other hand, the Socialist purpose is to reconcile the statutory rights of property and of private enterprise with the facts of the new concentration of the means of production and with social service, then it should not be difficult for a true traditionalism to effect a lasting agreement with Socialism.

Doctrinaire Socialism can never be translated into reality without tyranny. The dictatorship which, according to Socialist doctrine, is to be a dictatorship for training only, is bound to be the permanent form of a Socialist society.

"There is no Socialism that can be realized except by authoritarian means," says Pirot. "In our age authority is exercised by the State within the framework of the nation." It will be objected that we have to advance beyond the form of the national State to a true internationalism; and that the system of the State within the national framework is the very thing that has to be altered. This is certainly the opinion of the most recent representatives of Socialism, in so far as they have recognized the impracticability of their doctrine on the basis of the national State. Things that are impossible within the individual nation and national State might be possible in a Socialist Europe or a really universal State.

The Socialists are unquestionably right in their opinion that no new order, whether Socialist or economic or even political, is attainable within the individual national States. The ending of the system of the State within the framework of a nation is, therefore, one of the tasks of the future. But what is to take its place? The super-State, the centralized general State, the international State of social services, with all the temptations of power for an all-powerful *élite*?

*The Acceptance of Revolution*

A new speech of Churchill's, of the ancient cast, and revealing his characteristic mastery in saying in the simplest words and sentences of the classic stamp the very thing which lies unexpressed in our souls, and which yet none of us could clothe in words. Is it going too far to say that we feel in him the breath of Shakespeare's utterance, the utterance that can fire the enthusiasm alike of the man in the street and the highly cultured spirit?

This nation has no need of mass-suggestion or of stimulation into a mass psychosis in order to withstand the severest trials. There could be no better sign than these speeches of the soundness of its life or of the fact that in it the process of mass-formation has been kept within limits. One may regard these speeches as a sort of positive pole over against the negative pole of propaganda, in the narrowest sense—the malevolent, subversive demagogy of mass-seduction, a demagogy which is in the deepest sense destructive exploitation, destroying spiritual forces and thus inevitably revenging itself disastrously sooner or later on the nation that succumbs to it. These speeches of Churchill's show that in spite of the rise of the masses there is a language that addresses a nation with intuitive sureness, without intoxicating it and without making it susceptible to suggestion by such means as the totalitarian shamans, with their magic drums, must employ in order to gain the faith of the masses. It is the language of health instead of that of decadence and insanity. It is a manly language instead of a crafty woman's hysterical screams. It is the language of a clear conscience instead of a long-winded self-interpretation that ill conceals from itself the sense of coming disaster.

One feels the certainty that the decision of the future of this century lies here. It is a moral decision. In this moral decision everyone shares through the way he supports these trials. There are many small indications from which the picture of a regeneration and reformation of life can be put together. Gentle women who perform incredible feats of helpful courage and endurance; children singing in the midst of destruction and the shock of

collapsing homes; men who amid mortal peril go about coolly and without haste helping, saving, clearing. Groups of unfortunate people who have lost their homes, waiting with admirable patience in the streets at shelter entrances. Business men stoically carrying on though they have just been bombed out of their offices, and at once gathering up the broken threads and continuing their work.

There are many personally witnessed details that give life to the picture. There is scarcely anyone left who has not been close to mortal danger or saved by a special bit of good fortune. There are families who have been bombed out of their homes more than once. There are families who have lost everything. One hears the story of many personal experiences of death and destruction, wrecked property and wrecked hopes. But over all there is that trait of indestructible humour, of stout hearts that meet danger with a joke instead of rhetoric or cursing.

If there is any place in the world from which these trials are to be mastered, it is this city, this country. Here are the real resources with which Nihilism can be overcome. For it will not be possible to bring the war and the revolution to an end by means of a new League of Nations Covenant; the foundations of a higher world order must be laid while the war is actually in progress. They cannot be invented in the void, anticipated in an academic programme. The development of a new order must take place in practical life. Thus it is indispensable that there shall be a sound and strong heart for the new order, that it shall become a real and solid fact in some place.

Is the fact recognized that a universal revolution is in progress, that behind the military and political aggression of the so-called young nations, and the rise of the totalitarian regimes, genuinely revolutionary forces are at work, which the old elements of order have not simply to counter but to admit into their midst? On the understanding of the nature of the Revolution, and on the readiness to assimilate its fruitful elements, will depend the future and the possibility of a great peace.

Thus we have not only to ask how much of the visible revolutionizing must be regarded as final and irrevocable, since it could be reversed only at the cost of further universal loss and injury;

we have to ask also how much of the revolutionary tendencies from which the totalitarian regimes have so far profited corresponds to changed realities and must, therefore, be accepted as positive elements and added to the historic traditions of the West. We have to ask what elements of the revolution should be furthered as healthy elements of genuine progress, and what have to be fought as subversive tendencies of revolutionary Nihilism or as doctrinaire utopianism.

Can this distinction be drawn with certainty to-day?

In the confusion of the indispensable social, economic, and political reforms with doctrinaire utopianism, which demands a final and permanent world order, lies the danger ahead of us. To oppose the idea of a rationally planned order is to run at once into suspicion of being a reactionary. Doctrinaires of all shades are even ready to accept a lowered standard of existence for the masses, and a universal loss of freedom, if only their scheme of rational planning is carried out, whereas the sound and natural proceeding would be to introduce planning only where it is necessary for the attainment of the desirable higher state of economic security and social justice, and this only when planning alone can secure this. Social reforms and the limitation or removal of special privileges are necessary. But this requires only legislative reform, not a new system created out of the rational elements of a doctrine and the irrational elements of a social myth.

There are, after all, only two ways out of chaos. Either we must carry the technical revolution and the rise of the masses to their logical conclusion, in which case a rationalized order involving compulsion becomes inevitable; or we must form from the great Western tradition, from the historic elements which up to now have determined the destiny of the European nations, an order which is in harmony with the new trends in real life, but which is still in the line of development of past traditions.

Is there a third course? In addition to a radical and a traditionalist solution, is there a social-revolutionary one? The only possible answer is No. There is none. That third solution would lead us inescapably downward to the radical and totalitarian solution, arriving at the same ultimate stage as in all past

compulsory solutions. The social or Socialist ideas, on the other hand, are part of the Western tradition, and are fitted to form the basis of its regeneration. But on one condition—that they make no claim to exclusiveness. That means a great change. It must be feared that political Socialism is not ready even to-day to abandon its claim to be the exclusive order of the future, and to take its place as one of the elements of the Western tradition. But the elements that have hitherto described themselves as traditionalist may make the same claim to exclusiveness. What is needed is a new and broader conception of the Western tradition.

In past historic crises Britain has shown a special capacity for going half-way to meet the revolutionary elements and in this way avoiding constitutional or social disasters. It has been Great Britain's achievement to carry out reforms in sufficient time to divert the current of revolution into the bed of evolution. Beyond all question this capacity is closely associated with the undiminished strength and soundness of British public life. It looks as if this gift of judicious admission of new elements has not been lost. *The Times* recognizes that there were elements in the Nazi regime and its economic policy which took due account of a new world situation, while the old orthodox ideas were proving no longer adequate. It writes of the great changes in economic conditions. Such changes, it says, call for the modification and bringing up to date of established ideas, a modification which may have to be as drastic as that imposed on military conceptions by the coming of tanks and aircraft. The obstinate clinging to methods and doctrines which were sound fifty years ago may cost us dear. *The Times* writes of economic and social changes, of the acceptance of revolutionizing methods of provision of employment, of the creation of a British co-operative trading organization, and of seeing that investment shall serve national ends and not merely private profit; restrictions and sacrifices must be shared in accordance with social justice. In some fields competition must be eliminated by the creation of monopolies. Such a readiness for compromise is not in the least a capitulation in face of the difficulties of war-time; the British democracy, as *The Times* writes, is

equal to the setting up of a new order based on reciprocal responsibility.

Mr. Churchill defines this in his lapidary manner as the reconciliation of democracy with tradition that has taken place in Great Britain. He, too, accepts the necessity of a rightly organized economic system and social order, but on the basis of freedom of thought and speech and with the safeguards of free elections and a free Parliament. This is the readiness for a synthesis of new elements with elements of the old which must not be sacrificed.

The Trades Union Congress has declared that it is called upon to build up the national life anew after the war. The social and economic institutions must guarantee the satisfaction of the elementary needs of every human being. Food, clothing, and shelter must be accessible to all.

Clearly as this reveals the readiness for necessary reforms, for changes which will prevent a catastrophic breach with the existing elements of public order, it is essential that we shall also clearly realize that adequate reforms must not be confused with small payments on account to the new age. The longer the visible revolution continues, and the further the removal of elements of the old political and economic order proceeds, the more clearly will the scale be revealed of the revolution whose positive virtues should be incorporated in the new order. The reforms will deal not only with economic and political problems but with those of national and State policy. The acuteness of political problems cannot be relieved by economic means, and social cannot take the place of political reorganization.

The reforms do not, however, include the typical means of revolutionizing, the means of domination and of the influencing of the masses. If revolution is to be canalized into evolution and the positive elements in revolution accepted, the distinction becomes necessary between the things that belong to these means of domination and to destructive tendencies, and the things that are positive. At this point self-deception and doctrinaire unteachableness show themselves, and lead to the fatal errors and blunders of our time.

There must be no camouflaging and smuggling in of the

revolution, such as happened in Germany without our realizing it; nor must there be what I might term an operation for the abortion of the revolution, such as was also attempted in Germany by the reactionaries. These people saw the genuine revolutionary elements, but did not propose to admit them but to destroy them. Their method of abortion was by the staging of an artificial revolution which in Germany was called the "national rising" (*nationale Aufbruch*), and which it was hoped would exhaust, divert, or discipline the revolutionary elements, and would then end the whole movement with a reactionary settlement.

As for the smuggling in of the radical revolution by way of initial reform, this is the general method adopted by the revolutionary elements for gaining access to key positions, in order later to carry through what the Nazis called the second phase of the revolution, and what in other revolutions was the typical process of radicalization of the leaders in power. The danger still remains that the Revolution, kept away from the front door by timely reforms, may get in through the kitchen door. It lies less in the revolutionary demands than in the method of their realization. And here there is a danger even for the healthy political life of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Everything depends on whether the representatives of the revolutionary elements hold to their claim for the exclusive validity of their ideas and demands, or whether they are ready to recognize the right of others, a right of the minority, a right of opposition. Whether, in other words, they are prepared to respect the law of life of democracies—compromise and negotiation. Everything will depend on whether they do this or cling to the out-of-date conception of a social revolution and the utopian picture of an ideal society.

In the field of foreign policy, the return to the system of small fully sovereign national States is no longer possible. Nationalism will always be an element in European life, but it no longer has any place in determining the form of the State. Not only economic life but the legal forms of the life of the community demand larger territorial units. The forms of these, and the forms of the internal order of the State, have to be determined. Here lies one of the tasks in the preparation of peace—here, and not in the

demarcation of the frontiers of new national democratic States by means of new peace treaties.

Nazism is now laying a sort of foundation for a Europe in which nationalism will no longer exclusively determine the shape of communities. In this it is the administrator of a genuine form of revolutionary renewal. It has stated the problems of the future order; but it has not found their solution. The universal European order will grow through free co-operation, not through compulsion and domination. It is for this reason that Great Britain is destined to leadership, because she, alone of all the world Powers, has developed for a vast empire a new method of rule in place of domination. In Mr. Churchill's phrase, she has united Empire and Freedom.

In a certain measure Nazism has had the function of liquidating an old order. In still greater measure it has had the function of reducing a set of doctrines manifestly to absurdity. It would be an unfortunate misconception of the permanent achievement of this tremendous experiment to regard it as no more than the unseating of old elements of order and the demolition of a social structure. Something of this sort is, no doubt, the idea which certain circles have of the broad historic significance of Nazism. My own view of its historic function, at least in Germany, is that it was to liberate the Western form of human civilization from the deformations that had taken place in the course of intellectual and technical revolutionizing. This it achieved by making it clear whither this unfaltering progress, this technicalization and mass-formation, this social upheaval, this utopian system of planning, even this national aspiration and these imperialist ambitions, with their political accompaniments and their spiritual and moral consequences, must necessarily lead. The function of Nazism has been to show the Western world what these changes look like, and so to restore, for all who are capable of forming a judgment, their determination to preserve and maintain their individuality.

### *The New Absolutism*

Those who are living through the present time with a realization



of the background of our historic development are struck, even more than by the similarity with the Napoleonic wars and the struggle over the meaning of the French Revolution and the limits to be set to it, by the resemblance of the present issues and their solutions to those of the seventeenth century. There is a similar struggle to-day over absolutism, a struggle against the last great autonomous elements, against the indirect powers, against all that ranks by itself, to that of the age of the Baroque.

It is a struggle marked by unexampled confusion. In the foreground, under all sorts of camouflage and self-deception, the most bitter contest is proceeding to decide who shall be the holder of the new sovereign power, who shall get absolute power in his hands. There is the struggle over the content of the new absolutism, and over the question whether it shall be the political elements of Right or Left who shall be the future irremovable ruling group. Whichever side gains the upper hand, it will make little difference to the character of the new absolutism, which will follow its own laws of existence. The rival pretenders to the crown are in agreement that absolutism is necessary and inevitable.

In the background another struggle is proceeding, for an escape from both of these alternatives, an escape from the blind alley that ends in absolutism. It is a struggle against the new absolutism itself. This struggle is being carried on with inadequate forces and inadequate comprehension. Reactionary circles confuse their desire to become themselves the sovereigns in the new absolutism with the struggle against the new tyranny. Liberal circles, advocates of democratic liberty, justice, and humanity, fail to realize that in their practical politics they lend support to the tendencies of a Left-wing absolutism. Socialist circles imagine that their aspiration for a new and juster social order can only be attained by means of a system of political and economic planning, which can only function if it becomes itself the new absolutism. There are also religious circles who aspire to the recovery of the Christian theocracy which in its time was salutary and effective, but in doing so they would similarly be compelled to have recourse to a mechanism of rule which would be nothing but a new form of absolutism. There is the bright-coloured palette of the romantics

of all sorts, who would like to recall the old Holy Roman Empire or set up utopias of every conceivable type.

But is not the whole struggle against the new absolutism itself utopian? It cannot be denied that whatever is done in the field of practical politics tends steadily in the direction of a new absolutism. This is a parallel phenomenon to that of the unceasing technicalization of our life. The State itself is a technical apparatus, and society itself needs for its regulation machinery that does its work through rational functions. This development is at the same time the reaction to the phenomenon of the modern masses. It might be said that the new absolutism is not an arbitrary invention of ambitious potentates, any more than it was in the seventeenth century, but the inevitable result of the decay of autonomous elements of authority. The new absolute power is coming into existence in the void left by the dying out of old organic elements of rule.

Obvious though it may seem that the future logically belongs, in the social and political and constitutional fields as elsewhere, to technical machinery which works with absolute precision, it does not necessarily follow that there can be no escape from the new absolutism. On the contrary, it is here that the great tasks of our day lie: without a limitation of the competence of governmental machinery and of a centralist absolutism, the whole struggle for democracy and personal liberty is just playing with words. This great war becomes, then, nothing but a duel between rival groups of Powers. It is no longer a fight for freedom. Without that limitation the freedoms of the British Commonwealth and the United States are but antique curiosities, carried down by specially favouring conditions into a changed world, like a mediæval building in the midst of modern functional structures.

But how can the destructive influences of technical advance and the rise of great mass collectivities be combated except by rationalized machinery and an absolutist order? Of what does the new institutional safeguard of freedom and self-government consist in an age of frenzied mass demand for security? Security is provided only by the new absolutist society, the new totalitarian collectivity.

That is the arch-temptation of our time—the outlet offered from all our present difficulties into a new absolutism, which is represented as the sole means of guarantee of at least superficial order. Absolutism, not totalitarianism. The association of modern absolutism with the seventeenth century is not merely fortuitous. Modern absolutism is the resuscitation and continuation of the ideas of the seventeenth century. The decisive advance lies not only in the efficacy of the modern technical resources of power, which make any resistance simply impossible; it lies especially in the necessary extension of the sphere of public authority over the “inner world”, over personal faith and opinion and the private life. It is essential to realize that the removal or retention of the elements of a private inner world and a liberty of thought and conscience does not lie in the choice of the future legislators but is bound up of necessity with the nature of the modern form of absolutism. The history of the nineteenth century has shown that the past division into two spheres, private and public, which made the old monarchist absolutism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still tolerable, is no longer possible because it would make the State or the absolute order of society illusory. It was through this division that the liberalistic State came into existence in the nineteenth century, and out of this Liberal State grew all the problems which occupied the attention of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, making the State the plaything of groups of interests and of the new masses. Now the trend is back to absolutism, after making a sort of detour through the guarantee of a sphere free from absolutism. If absolutism is to-day becoming a reality, if we must accept it, it is only in the form of total absolutism, in which there is neither an inner nor a private sphere, but only a tyranny characterized by compulsion, terror, and collectivization of all life.

We meet the temptation of the new absolutism along the most various roads—by way of the necessity for a State system that will work, of the indispensability of a bureaucracy, of the ideas of universal control of the economic system and of social planning. It is more than a mere jest that exchange control and concentration camps only gradually become distinguishable from one

another. The State measures of the control of consumption and the planning of production are only effectual in a system that is prepared to proceed to the most rigorous penalties in order to compel obedience. The ruling groups have not a free choice of methods of maintaining their system of rule. Each system has its own appropriate methods of realization and maintenance, and in a system of centralized total planning the means of extreme compulsion cannot be dispensed with.

Incontestably, whether the temptation to absolutism is felt or not, many things must be undertaken in that direction at present because there is no alternative. The conduct of war, above all, with its claim on the whole life of a nation, is no longer possible without absolutist elements of compulsion. But even apart from war, the economic crisis and the necessity of social reconstruction present problems of which the solution is inconceivable without the aid of special powers and great centralist machinery, problems which inescapably involve the tendency to synthesis in an absolutist, all-embracing apparatus of power.

The superficial aspect of Nazi activities must not deceive us into imagining that all life in Germany is controlled by mass demagogy, that the general condition is one of exaltation, that the irrational factor in life is glorified. In all practical activities plans and work are carried on by severely rational methods. The reality in present-day Germany is a vast centralized mechanism. The immediate purpose may be the conduct of the war and the immediate form total mobilization, but the reality is a total planning, a political, economic, and social planning, far more effective in practice than anything the Soviet Union has achieved.

It is an error to conceive the total mobilization of all elements of society according to a general plan as simply preparation for war. The essential thing is not the purpose but the actual fact of the mobilization of all latent energies, the forcing into conformity of every individual element, and the adjustment of every field of life to a general plan. If the elements of demagogy and of the hysterical were eliminated, there would still remain the system of a totally mechanized world of men. What would distinguish it from a political planning for the common weal? Only

the fictions of subjective promptings. The reality would still be of the same harsh and deliberate ruthlessness.

The danger that faces the whole of the civilized world lies in the fact that it must mobilize all its forces in order to emerge from this world crisis, and that the apparatus of control of this mobilization may "take charge" and work for its own ends, subjecting all life to its control. All administrative machinery has the tendency to become a law unto itself, to work for ends of its own devising, and most of all will machinery furnished with the unlimited power of absolutism tend to do so.

None of these questions, which concerned us on a smaller scale in Germany ten years ago, has yet lost its importance. They are coming now within the field of vision of the great Western democracies. Is not, for example, the competitive economic system so completely upset and compromised that nothing can take its place but universal planning, a control of production and consumption independent of the mechanism of the market, a rationing system, as we call it to-day, the rationed supply consisting not of the total of the millions of individual wants but of a quantity fixed according to a programme which is determined by non-economic considerations? We imagined ten years ago that a line could be taken along which the advantages of a planned economy could be united with those of the system of free competition. What actually happened was first a revelation of the weaknesses of both systems, and then the victory of total planning.

We placed our trust in the elements of self-government, and imagined that we could attain an order in which the organizations of trade and industry and the social services would develop into independent corporations. We imagined that we should be able to extend this element of autonomy to the institutions of intellectual life and to create a sort of plural State. But was self-government any longer possible in this age of mechanization? Is not one of the most characteristic traits of our new reality that autonomous bodies are simply "traffic hindrances"?

Bureaucratization is regarded to-day as the inevitable consequence of our machine age. But the worst feature of bureau-

cratization is the elimination of personal responsibility. This paralyses the great achievements which have been secured by the transference of the principles of machine work to administration. The dangerous element in all administrative organizations is the shifting of responsibility. This leaves room for the temptation for things to be done for which no individual would venture to incur responsibility. The department, in its anonymity, becomes ready to countenance the most amoral action. The opportunity of taking refuge behind the administrative machine has enabled terrorism to grow to great proportions in all totalitarian countries. Thus the road to absolutism is also difficult to avoid along the bureaucratic path, just as it is along the paths of economic and social planning.

### *Throwing Down the Packs*

Back again in London, in this heart of the world. It is a return to a familiar atmosphere. The "all clear" had just been sounded, and a new air-raid warning came while we were still passing along the aerodrome in the car. We saw airmen getting ready to start, and one landing. Past new mass-destruction. As I turned into my street I held my breath; was our house still standing? On my way through the familiar streets I was struck by the amount of rebuilding in progress in the midst of the new destruction. Shops had opened again in spite of boarded windows. There was no capitulation.

One felt the tension once more, felt oneself drawn into this steely life, this great testing that lends significance to small things, amid the blood and effort of tortured but resolutely energetic creativeness. We have lost the very idea of security. We are now simply the prey of uncertainty—to-day, as in the legendary past, with death eternally at our side.

Bonfires of leaves in Kensington Gardens. The smoke trails through the almost bare trees, with its acrid, healthy smell. We can still sit here and there in the sun in deck-chairs. At dusk, back between decks in the *Mayflower*, among the familiar faces. Humanity is on trek, on the great trek, as Smuts said.

But how will our ship get through, between the Scylla and Charybdis of chaos and tyranny?

Men on the march, with a long and difficult journey ahead of them, are tempted in their weariness to throw down their packs. Drop everything and make an entirely fresh start—that is the feeling that threatens to come over everyone who is passing through these trials. I think the weariness and disgust with civilization that are among the deeper elements underlying the new barbarism can be more accurately diagnosed than as the result merely of the teaching of unscrupulous demagogues. It is not only the doctrinaires who throw down the whole pack of traditions, in order to spin their radical utopias like a spider's web across the abyss; whole nations are beginning to feel civilization a heavy burden, and are refusing to go on carrying the pack of their age-long history.

One thing in the pack is democracy. Some want to be rid of it because it hampers their fresh start in life; others because it does not afford them adequate protection against the chaos that is breaking over them. Among both of these groupings there are those who openly admit their aversion to democracy, and those who consider that it is best to keep up at least the fiction of democracy, for the good of men's souls.

At bottom most of the defenders of democracy, in so far as they were really dealing with political realities and not merely debating or writing articles, were not by any means convinced of late of the possibility of maintaining intact the fragile and sublime forms of democratic life against the onslaught of the masses and of the new radicalism. They looked round, therefore, for opportunities of borrowing from their opponents' stock of political ideas and from their methods. In their inmost hearts they were themselves desperately anxious to throw off the whole irksome burden of the difficulties of democratism, in order to be able to deal promptly and as the case required with the urgent problems of politics, unhampered by the party struggle.

It has become a favourite attitude to adopt the political teachings of a cynical realism. All the more necessary is it to declare with the utmost energy that that is not the course that

will pay. The democratic form of our social and political life must not be abandoned. It is of the very essence of our civilization. The choice has to be made between two courses. One is to try to deduce from the principles that have been evolved in the history of democracy new forms of political leadership and control and new institutional safeguards of freedom and justice. In that case the temptation must at all times be resisted to work through demagogic influencing of the masses, terroristic intimidation of the masses, or any of the methods of State absolutism. The other course, the only alternative, would be to proceed to the systematic creation of a Fascist or Nazi form of the totalitarian State. It seems to me that the essential instructiveness of the German experience lies in the fact that the study of it is the only possible way of arriving at a clear realization of the conditions of the renewal and maintenance of the imperishable elements of democracy. It may be that as that realization is approached it will be discovered that some of the noisiest defenders of democracy and of human progress have not by any means been true friends of them.

### *Between Chaos and Tyranny*

"Can they remain Liberal parliamentary democracies if they want to carry on war with efficacy?" wrote Halévy pessimistically in *L'Ere des Tyrannies*. But it is an expedient legally available to democratism to provide itself in times of acute emergency with a higher degree of efficacy through setting up a temporary dictatorship.

Few things have done so much harm as the confusion of mind concerning the possibility within the framework of a constitutional State, and the temporary necessity, of the concentration of responsibility in a dictatorship, and the various forms of modern tyranny and absolutism this involves. This confusion of ideas is not only understandable, it is frequently promoted, of set purpose, for demagogic ends, in order to divert men's attention and to mask unadmitted aims. The obliteration thus effected, not only of nuances but of differences that matter very seriously, is promoted



by the political obscurantism favoured by demagoguery of all sorts. The bringing of the various experiments made, for instance, by Salazar in Portugal, Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Metaxas in Greece, and Dollfuss in Austria, under the comprehensive term of Fascism, and their placing on a similar footing with Nazism, is an example of the tendency of doctrinaires to think in terms of schematic generalizations, deliberately ignoring realities because they decline to fit in with their doctrine.

A democracy can certainly retain the essential elements of democratic life while setting up a dictatorship. When the transitory emergency conditions that called for this have passed, the return can be made without difficulty to the normal forms of democracy. But in spite of a surface preservation of democratic forms, institutions may be developed in the midst of the democratic system which lead inevitably to a form of modern absolutism and tyranny. From these it is difficult or impossible to emerge.

I do not wish to suggest that confusion of this sort is always deliberately produced. But the facile criteria adopted, for instance, by some of the *émigrés* from various countries have the effect of discrediting the valuable attempts at the regeneration of democracy, while they win adherents for measures which actually belong to the arsenal of tyranny.

It is difficult to form a just judgment of the attempts made to adapt democracy to the new conditions of existence in such countries as Portugal, Austria, Greece, or the Poland of Pilsudski. Are they attempts at the admittance of the Revolution? are they examples of the important and honourable union of tradition and revolution? Or do they not also contain elements of its insincere reception? are they not examples of a putting off of real decisions or of the production of an abortion of the Revolution?

Only a close investigation could provide an answer. But no one is entitled to question the fact that in these cases a real effort was made to cope with the critical problem of the new order which is indispensable for the future. It would be demagoguery to refuse out of prejudice to admit that a regeneration of democracy in general, within certain limits, is needed.

In considering all these tentative experiments, we must not look

to see whence their methods have been drawn, or to what school of political philosophy they belong; we must simply ask whether they are of service and succeed in overcoming the political difficulties. We ought, after all, to be capable of ignoring ideological origins and the systems of doctrine to which particular ideas belong, and, instead, to be able to make use impartially of everything that is of practical assistance. If we proceed along these lines, we shall discover on closer inspection that various expedients may be equally justly attributed to a Neo-Liberalism as a Neo-Corporativism or Neo-Socialism.

It became clear during the grave German crisis before the Nazi upheaval that the various systems of economic and political doctrine had become unserviceable, and that problems must be considered with much less dogmatism and more sense of realities than the older generation in office had shown. It seemed that the time had come for throwing all these principles overboard as unneeded ballast, and seeking a practical solution for each problem on its own merits. It has to be admitted that this unorthodox attitude towards all the phenomena of the crisis had its dangers. Was there any compass left, or any means of making for port? In any case, this absence of doctrine was the soil on which in Germany, it must be admitted, the Nazi slogans of "resolute action" struck root.

This attitude should, at all events, have advantages over persistent adherence to old doctrines and systems, and the acceptance only of that which was in harmony with them. Under this policy there will never be a real admittance of revolutionary forces, which must of necessity be a recasting of old systems of ideas and a knitting of new bonds.

How much of these experiments in Portugal, Greece, Poland, Austria, Turkey, can be adopted? What cannot be adopted is the attempt, intelligible in weak States shaken by inner disturbances, to promote a political regeneration with the aid of the army. This idea was entertained in Poland, and in Germany until the Nazis had edged the Reichswehr out of every seat of power. The stern discipline, and the fact that in the army the State existed in its last real embodiment, as a power, and as a solid body of

united will, were elements that made it tempting to employ the military forces in the civil sphere. In Germany, moreover, the army was the bulwark of a certain political continuity, the last remaining element of an almost destroyed traditionalism.

The defectiveness of this conception lies not only in the temptation to use it to develop the State into a sort of military encampment, and to bring policies of military imperialism into the foreground, but above all in the State control of the whole life of the community, in centralization and standardization by means of a quasi-military discipline, which must involve the sacrifice of civil liberties and of the democratic character of the State.

An attempt in the opposite direction, to create a moral authority, to base the social order on the Christian faith and the Church, certainly touches the weak point in modern States and communities. But can an ethical basis that has been lost be restored by decree? Can the Christian life be enforced by authoritarian measures? Would not this bring the temptation to use terrorism, with the best of motives, for that spiritual end? That would imply complete failure in the actual aim of re-Christianization and of the restoration of a common faith really held from conviction. At best the result would be a new form of clericalism. Christianity by command, a forced Christianization, if pushed to extreme limits, would work little better than the enforcement of professed beliefs under the existing totalitarian regimes.

A State built up on the guild system, a corporative State, offers no better way out of our difficulties. Autonomous bodies, so long as they do not turn into organs of a centralist State, and thus into instruments for its domination of the economic and social spheres, but remain genuine autonomous bodies as of old, may well form extensions of the existing democratic organs. But the corporative system in the form in which it has thus far been established is the exact reverse of this, a subjection of the last autonomous spheres in the life of the community to the State, for their utilization in the service of a new absolutism.

The error in all these experiments is to be seen in the fact that they aim mainly at setting up a central power, instead of a centre of superior authority with the simple function of conciliation

between rival interests and between the various autonomous authorities. The experimental systems in all the countries mentioned do little more than transfer competence to the State, gradually making it the all-powerful and exclusive organ of rule. This can only lead to the new absolutism and in the end to a new form of modern tyranny; though it may be admitted that some of these States are far from being of this character and have succeeded in preserving an elastic equilibrium between the most various tendencies.

The purpose of these experiments was to discover a middle course between chaos and tyranny. This ought to aim at the creation of a stronger authority, standing above party, for the maintenance of the essential virtue of democracy, political compromise and the conciliation of interests, and for the prevention of the dictatorship of the majority. Thus, after all, these experiments align themselves in essentials with the democracies. In practice, however, they have frequently succumbed to the temptation to use totalitarian methods.

### *Inadequacy of Means*

It leads nowhere to see only the dark side of the political experiments which led ultimately in Germany to Nazism and in the countries mentioned to novel forms of the union of authority with democracy. Our destiny depends at present not only on the rightness or wrongness of our aims, but still more on the rightness or wrongness of the means we employ. We quarrel over aims and almost create a civil war over our political picture of the future. But often we employ for these different aims identical means and methods. We are surprised to find that, whatever our political starting-point, we reach only one thing—further destruction of the existing order, but no lasting elements of a new one. We interpret this as a sort of fatality that drives us always in the same direction. We all fail to attain our aims, and find ourselves in the end all in the same morass, whatever our starting-point and objective.

The secret of the midway transformation, which Nazism has not been alone in undergoing, lies in the inadequacy of the methods

by which we pursue our aims. In Germany Conservative elements imagined that they could use Nazism as a means of attaining a new traditionalist order, but what they did attain was the entire opposite of this. This does not prove the inescapability of the destiny imposed on us by the new mass-character of the community; it is simply the result of a misuse of means.

It is impossible to attain increased freedom by means of total compulsion; it is impossible to form the masses into a new traditionalist order by organizing a mass-revolution; it is impossible to get rid of the Cæsarian mass-democracy by making it the actual form of rule. And it will be impossible to introduce an order of increased justice by first committing a great and universal injustice.

All cynicism, all unscrupulousness in regard to means, is subversive in effect. The means "take charge", gain an independent existence, and rush into the very paths it was intended to avoid. There comes that curious automatism of development which is so notable a characteristic of modern history. Thus it is a fatal mistake to suppose that we are dependent on our opponents' means and compelled to adopt them. It is true that in a competition in unscrupulousness the most unscrupulous will set the pace at first. But there is the other weapon, the only one of decisive importance, against unscrupulousness in regard to means, namely, the different sort of means that are adequate for the particular purpose. I think we might have saved ourselves from a great deal of misfortune by what I might call the suiting of the means to the end.

To force a solution by material means, instead of patiently building up from within, to use compulsion for the attainment of an outward order instead of pursuing the difficult path of slow education, has continually been the method employed by people who wanted to get something done and were torn with impatience at the slow progress they were making.

Our age has an advantage over earlier times in the effectiveness of the modern means of compulsion and of the psychological tricks of mass-leadership. The effectiveness of organized machinery of rule guarantees an almost absolute success. Those who are ruling

at present, if they have power in their hands, no longer need to regard the masses as an incalculable factor, an unknown. The masses are no longer a danger but a pliable material which will take any desired shape in the hands of the expert kneader. This is the tempting fact. It is almost impossible for the masses to break out any longer as an uncontrolled natural force. Their force can be canalized, and actually used with profit. It can be used for any purpose a ruling group may determine. It is an explosive force which, used in a suitable machine, drives forward the vehicle of any political ambition with unexampled speed. How vast a simplification, compared with the difficult manipulation of public opinion in the democracies! What a simplification in comparison with the absolute regimes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries! Only one thing is needed—the determination to use the means that enable the masses to be thus misled. These means are well known. They do not consist only of terrorism and violence; they include all the methods of excitement of the masses, of suggestion and intoxication, which modern propaganda has taught, and which have given to the soul of the modern community its new collective character.

Are we not, indeed, even compelled to use these methods, however degrading? Does not the modern state of mass-community virtually compel it? Is it not the case that if we, who are convinced that we are trying to do the best for the nation and for the future social order, do not ourselves employ these means and methods, others will do so? Men without scruple, gangsters, men whose only concern is with their own egoistic purpose? Must we not act as quickly as we can, to get ahead of these gangsters? The time is short. We are in enormous peril, for if we do nothing, if the masses are once thrown thus into subjection, if a new ruling group once gets firmly established and in possession of material power, there is no longer any possibility of freedom of action, and the way we must all go will be mapped out irrevocably. The masses are completely impotent in face of the modern means of domination, and any opposition element is equally impotent. The thing that has happened is irrevocable and beyond modification.

That is the ghastly feature of our situation. The mechanism of

self-adjustment provided by the alternating government majorities in the parliamentary system is no longer functioning. Where it still exists, it rests only on a general tacit agreement not to employ the decisive resources of material power and of the control of the masses. How long will it be possible for this self-denial to be kept up? Will not the faculty of moral resistance weaken with every sharpening of the crisis, and the suspicion continually grow that others—parliamentary opponents, the military forces, industrial and other groups—will seize the final and supreme opportunity?

And, men will ask themselves, is not the seizure of power in the interest of the masses? The vicious element, they will say, lies only in the misuse of the new methods of control and of psychological misleading of the masses, misuse for the purpose of bringing the masses into subjection, regardless of any general aims, merely for the sake of power itself. If, on the contrary, power is seized in the interest of the masses, in a sort of trusteeship for them, for their own benefit, where, then, is any vicious element? The maintenance of democracy, in so far as it remains possible at all, seems to demand such action.

It is necessary, they will conclude, in the name of democracy and progress to take courage to put democracy more or less out of action, and to establish a new procedure which will at least enable the modern material elements of power to be used on behalf of progress and not of barbarism. The age of the masses has irrevocably come. Anyone who still dreams of returning to older forms of political and social life is a romantic. The new fact created by the modern industrial community with its mass formations calls for the methods and means of control and propaganda which the totalitarian States have thus far rightly developed but misapplied.

So men may argue, and so they do. It is even the most intelligent who do so, those who have recognized the character of the new age from one side. Nevertheless they are wrong. It is this very line of argument that is the beginning of a fatal course which must lead to suicidal action of the same type as the "national rising" in Germany. Any social rising, or movement so designed, is fated to fall victim in due course to such methods as Nazism was compelled to adopt; even a Socialist revolution would be unable to dispense





elements, however, made the same claims when it was a question of the realization of their own aims of bringing happiness to humanity and a lasting social order.

Here the interconnexion between Hegel and Marx works itself out once more. Lenin himself echoes the Hegelian dictum that the morally evil is the element (the catalyzer) that releases new creative developments, that it amounts to the "creative negation". Our age must pass through the creative negation before it can build again—with such reflections do men soothe their consciences.

But, says Thomas Aquinas, "even for good ends we must pursue right paths, not wrong ones".

### *The Political Temptations of Our Time*

The political temptations of the present time lie not only in the misuse of means, in the exploitation of the masses and their psychological weaknesses, not only in the craftiness of politicians; there is also the temptation of the short cut.

The typical short cut is the prevention of a revolution by anticipating its results. This is not the same thing as canalization into genuinely evolutionary processes. Prevention by anticipation is only possible through measures of compulsion. Changes are produced by the use of force which could only endure if they were the result of voluntary action. These forced results lack the very thing which a genuinely evolutionary solution such as true compromise, that is to say, the renunciation of the entire fulfilment of one's own desires, can produce. The good intention of shortening the crisis and avoiding expensive indirect methods is nullified by the destruction caused by the use of compulsion.

Such compulsion cannot be used once and then dispensed with, on the principle of getting the people into the saddle, after which they can ride unaided. The use of force for any purpose inevitably involves its further use in order to establish and round off the achievement. It is one of the most fatal delusions that these short cuts need only to be taken once and for a moment.

Here a second temptation usually follows. The ease with which

certain *coups* succeed at the outset tempts men to employ the forces set in motion for further initiatives which could never be attempted in the customary political channels. Once men have broken free of the fetters of conventions and control and tradition, the temptation is strong to follow up the first employment of force by a constructive effort, by rational planning.

It is the despotism of reason that here comes into play. It was Robespierre who coined the phrase that liberty is the despotism of reason. But reason is despotism in a much more comprehensive sense. It is the despotism of political and economic planning, and of the staffs engaged in it, which set out to achieve the absolutely impossible; the despotism of official departments, whose frictionless functioning brings self-delusion as to the possible and needful and thus tempts to misuse, because they seem to be doing productive work even where in reality they are destroying.

Irresistible is the temptation that lies in the actual possession of power. It is a fatal error to blame only the holders of power when it is compromised, and to imagine that in other hands the result might have been good. Power in the exclusive possession of any individual or of any irremovable group corrupts at all times, and produces the same results as under the regimes that with cynical candour claim that power is the only regulative element in the life of the community.

The political temptation of the present time which sums up all others is the *temptation of Leviathan*.

In the old editions of Hobbes's *Leviathan* there is the well-known picture of the human god, the mortal god, the multiple man, Leviathan—a man consisting of countless men. Did this mean simply the State, the absolute State which was then a novelty? Why did Hobbes conjure up the old magic name of Leviathan, the beast of the abyss, who returns in the Apocalypse?

Leviathan is the man-made, anti-divine, autocratic, purely human, purely this-worldly, rationalist order. It is the order of Lucifer, the goal of the ages, the end of history, the future society and the future State, claiming to be a final world-order. The temptation of Leviathan is the temptation of the new absolutism. Men, said Proudhon, are led inescapably by the simple develop-

ment of the idea of a world order to the conclusion that the ideal of the community is absolutism. In vain would the excuse be made thereafter that this absolutism was only to be transitory.

Leviathan is the rule of the machine, the machine grown absolute, the machine that is not only, as Ernst Jünger said, "the most definitely anti-Christian power that has yet appeared", but is leading men out of their past organic relations with their environment into an entirely new, artificial creation. Leviathan is rational planning, it is the god that satisfies the craving for material security. It provides the diversion, the substitute-satisfaction, the intoxication, without which the anxiety of the masses as to their existence threatens to become more than can be borne. The service of this god is the organization of enthusiasm and the banishment of the individual self. The sacrifices that are acceptable to it are collectivized thinking, the State control of all life, and the pleasures that bring subjection. Thus, behind the amusement element in such factors of assimilation as wireless and film and the service of the machine, a new discipline arises to destroy human personality by diverting men's thoughts from themselves. Leviathan is the universal world machine of which men are the servants, themselves no more than serviceable or defective material, and as interchangeable as sparking plugs.

### *Leviathan*

Leviathan is the State which, through the concentration of power, becomes the *deus mortalis*, the mortal god, which alone can provide real security for its citizens. But it was clear to Hobbes that this State must enforce the peace it provides by terror. Leviathan provides its measure of earthly security at the cost of subjection, and subjection not only of the bodies and the lives of its subjects but of their minds and souls.

The restoration of the union of temporal and spiritual powers in the widest sense of the term—this has been the unceasing process of historic development in which all the Continental countries have participated since the Middle Ages. It has been the long process of overcoming the mediæval plural order, and of incorporating the

indirect powers, the autonomous corporations, the sphere of self-administration and of individual rights, in a central, uniform mechanism of administration. It has been a process of "*Gleichschaltung*", bringing into uniformity. What Nazism effected under this term was the last and most logical and consistent form of an elemental tendency which has been in progress since the seventeenth century. The State has become once more what it was in pagan times, the deified unification of all human relations.

It has been a general tendency of development—the State has formed itself into its most effective and logical shape. This tendency to systematic completion as a total, absolute machinery of rule, with a precise technique and procedure in the exercise of power, lies in the nature of the State as developed in the seventeenth century. All that Bolshevism and Fascism are doing through their conception of the State is to develop the totality of the exercise of power in a new way under the new conditions determined by technical progress and the rise of the masses. This development is taking place of necessity wherever a modern machinery of power is formed to exercise according to a general plan the central leadership by a social group of every expression of life. Hence every form of total mobilization, every system of preparation for war, and every system of political and economic planning on a grand scale, is exposed to the risk of developing into a form of the new absolute State or an absolutist community or a partial absolutism. The characteristic final result of this development is the identity of absolute State and totalitarian community.

All great centralizing machinery of State and society in the service of total mobilization for war or for any other purpose, however good the motives and aims of its control, must end in the absolutism of the modern Leviathan. The perilousness of the situation consists in the fact that vast organized systems of leadership, in spite of all that may be said against them, are far superior to the historic traditionalist orders on account of the clear and rational division and co-ordination of work, which saves time, labour, and personnel. The results that can thus be achieved appear of such importance that restrictions of the individual sphere have to be accepted for their sake. This, however, brings

the sphere of individual rights dangerously into conflict with the sphere of the alleged general interest.

Exception has been taken in many quarters to the German assignment of special prerogatives to the State, together with the theory that the principles of private morality are not applicable to the State. As to this, one argument is obvious: why should the amorality permitted to the State not be equally permissible for other social institutions? This, of course, would render every sort of public legality and good faith illusory. But here again we have a logical development that lies in the nature of the thing itself. Moreover, Hobbes recognizes the distinctions between "public reason" and "private reason". The really dangerous development is, however, that in which this distinction no longer exists, because a "private reason" is no longer admitted, a private sphere is no longer tolerated; in other words, considerations of State expediency govern private matters and are no longer permitted to be overridden by considerations of private morality. This is precisely the situation at the present day.

Modern State and social absolutism of necessity inhibits a private, inner sphere of the individual existence. It may not prohibit the free expression of opinion; but it virtually extirpates it by means of the new technique of propaganda and mass-suggestion. The right of the individual to a private sphere of existence is not contested, but he is caught in such a network of public duties and claims, activities and amusements, that this right ceases in practice to exist.

The older absolute State was essentially a police State. It was concerned only for public peace, safety, and order. The new absolute State wants infinitely more. In order to create and maintain its new rational order, it must train up a new type of humanity. It must "plan" a new officialdom. It can permit no fields free of supervision in the life of the State and the community. Public right is a matter of custom. It thus plans custom, and with custom man himself. It not only does not create personalities, it will not tolerate them. For personalities are always "hindrances to traffic" and defects in the material of an exact process. Accordingly it creates types. It robs man of his

"immortal soul". It is of necessity anti-Christian, it is anti-Christ.

Is the security provided by the mortal god Leviathan worth these sacrifices? Is it worth the price of terror and unfreedom? It is the need of a collective security, social and political, that to-day as three hundred years ago brings absolutism.

### *Leviathan's Seduction*

Men do not only obey from fear of evil, they also need a hope. Leviathan rules by means of political seduction. He seduces with the guarantee of a security that removes fear, and with the promise of an earthly paradise. He lures men with the prospect of a secularized millennium, with the picture of an ideal society or of eternal peace and a just order. In the building up of the new absolutism, the factor of fear plays an important part. It works through the permanent state of crisis with its growing material cares and the fear for their livelihood of masses who no longer find consolation in the transcendental. Condorcet, in his *Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique*, painted as long ago as 1793 the human aim that sums up all political and social issues, the aim that is flourished as a peace aim now, and was as a Socialist upheaval before the Nazi seizure of power, and exists still, confessed or not, in "Strength through Joy" with its motto of "Enjoy life". By way of this aim of humanity, security, long life, comfort, hygiene, draining of the swamps of the subconscious and destruction of the vestiges of a mythical age of primitive fear, psychoanalysis instead of religion, canalization of instincts, de-mythicalization of sexual love, covering up of death as an obscenity, complete this-worldliness—by way of this seduction the Socialist and Rationalist wing of our civilization comes again and again within the field of force of Leviathan. Only the absolute State, in which the community and the State are one and there is no sort of freedom, no freedom even of secret thought and feeling, can provide perfect security and an earthly paradise based on reason.

Whether this is demanded as by Condorcet or by Ley with his "Strength through Joy" or—at a distance, of course—as "social services", it is essentially the same thing, a hope, a diversion, a

myth. The seduction appeals not only to the fancy of the masses but to the reason of the intellectuals. Leviathan's bribe is the logic of his order, the common sense and efficacy of his principles.

Even the State of the seventeenth century was no longer the expression of a pre-existing natural order reflected more or less in every form of State; it was an artificial, a rational creation of man. The form of the State is determined by the rational element of suitability in conjunction with the determining factor of power. It is no longer founded on a "contract", but is the expression of a quantum of material power, which it manipulates by means of a rational technique. It is the rationality of its existence that lends it indisputable superiority over the traditional forms of a historic State.

The modern "heroic" man is attracted by this Leviathan in an entirely different way. For him it is the infallible machine of subjection. By means of it he keeps the masses in dependence. Leviathan, too, needs a governing *élite*, superior to fear as a motive of submission and to earthly happiness as a motive of conduct. This is impressively shown in Dostoyevsky's *Grand Inquisitor*. If all are to demand the same happiness in the earthly paradise, and want to go shopping in the Little Joy Stores, there will be no one to do the hard work of governing, without which the Leviathan State cannot exist. This new ruling class governs by giving the masses what they want, security and the earthly paradise. In this gift to the masses right and left wings of utopians and supporters of the modern tyranny are at one. The thing that distinguishes them is that the former make that their aim and the latter their means.

If one allows free play to all these ideas of a rational world order, as a possible lasting achievement, then it might be that, in spite of everything, the path Hitler took, and not the one Marx foresaw, was the rational and right one. I think the criticism of National Socialism must be carried much further than it has yet been; and it must include the hundred years of Marxism, and the new State absolutism. Hitler was right in going beyond Marxism in founding his vast absolute State. To expropriate the world of national States, to embody them in a gigantic collective State in the course

of a series of revolutionary wars, and then, when in possession of indisputable power, to carry out the internal social and economic reconstruction on a unified rational plan, is more effectual and more likely to be successful than the reverse process of beginning with a social revolution.

Nothing places greater obstacles in the way of arriving at a clear judgment concerning this great historic crisis than the insincerity, not entirely unconscious, of the political leaders of all shades of opinion, who continually admit only part of their aims. The sign under which revolutions begin is that of unclear fronts and self-delusion as to one's true aims. No doubt the overwhelming majority of those who to-day are fighting against the powers of nihilistic destruction are right-feeling and are sacrificing their lives in clear recognition of the mortal danger that threatens the future of humanity. But is that enough? Not even the incontestable sanity of a people like the British, its common sense, its sense of proportion and of limitations, is sufficient in itself for battling with these temptations and mental confusions.

### *Athalie*

Chance brought Racine's *Athalie* into my hands. I read it in our shelter, among the sleeping French captains. I read the tragedy with growing excitement. It offers some sort of clue to these questions that give us no rest. Across the centuries one perceives how closely all these things hang together in our wonderful Europe. The play is a plain rejection of the monistic absolutism of the seventeenth-century State. It is a judgment on a world order that saw its centre in itself alone. All human order is plural—that is the underlying moral. Monism is a falling away from the divine in man, and must end in tyranny.

Who is the equal of the beast from the abyss, "who is able to make war with him?"—so runs the question in the Apocalypse. To reply "a mixed government" would sound like a jest. But it is perhaps the briefest and most practical answer.

There is justice in the objections that have been raised against the irresponsible rule of "indirect powers". The criticisms made



of plural forms of State are justified. Wherever it is felt that a strong State is needed, in order to find a way out of the conflicts of interests and the difficulties of crisis and latent mass-revolution, the one means of regeneration of public life is seen in the removal of indirect powers. We ourselves have clung to this error. We imagined that there was no harm in the inconsistency of advocating on the one hand a strong monistic State and on the other a great free commonwealth, consisting of autonomous member communities, a new “Holy Empire”.

The tendency to the new absolutism shows itself just as much in the work connected with the setting up of a social State as in the well-considered efforts to take politics and government out of the arena of clashing private interests and to place them under disinterested control.

This line of thought, too, brings us back to the seventeenth century. As that century tried to escape from theological disputations into a field in which the impartial settlement of practical issues could be found, so we are trying to emerge from the jungle of political fictions into a policy of practical work, which may be carried on apart from all doctrines and with a measure of tolerance for all sorts of solutions.

The parties as indirect powers not only complicated the process of administration and disturbed the working of its perfected mechanism; this pluralism of parties, together with the social and economic pluralisms, was interweaved with an antiquated territorial pluralism. How in such circumstances could a State continue to exist and an impartial solution of public issues be guaranteed? The parties and the other indirect powers were hindrances to the perfection of the mechanism of administration. They were the sources of danger in the effort to accomplish urgent work, and thus contributed to the worsening of the crisis.

Halévy relates, in *L'Ere des Tyrannies*, how Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb told him that the future of the great nations would be in the hands of their administrations, with government by civil servants and order maintained by the police. In face of the increasingly technical character of politics and administration, with the “machine” ruling, the work of parties was nothing but a useless

expenditure of time and energy. Here again we come to the "mortal god", Leviathan. He knows nothing of indirect powers, only the one indivisible power and responsibility, administered by a great exclusive hierarchy. In the effort to achieve this "practical solution" representatives of the most various political tendencies find themselves in agreement with the bureaucracy that plans a new absolutism as a "neutral State".

The demand for impartiality, for dealing with each case on its merits, is intelligible and just. For each problem there exists the best solution, which is only to be found with the aid of a knowledge of the circumstances, not in the play of party politics and of the conciliation of interests. This brings us logically to the administration State, to bureaucratic rule, to State technocracy. But where it is not desired to replace the indirect authorities entirely and at a stroke by the absolute State, the expedient is chosen of replacing at least the multiplicity of parties by a single party. If the parties are prevented from carrying on their agitation and intrigues on behalf of private interests, it is felt that a great step has been taken toward the impartial conduct of politics.

The single party comes into existence as a sort of trainer for total absolutism, with the fictitious function of a second, supervising authority alongside the actually deciding power of the State. Is the single party really a trustee for the people? The function Hitler gave it was not merely that of a machinery of supervision but that of a safety-valve for pressure from below, a corrective for the authoritarian initiative, the instrument of a permanent plebiscite. Thus, after all, plebiscitarian Cæsarism is a sort of democratic form of the Leviathan-State, not its logical completion.

Athalie is not an evil tyrant; she is an absolute ruler who works for the best, as she sees it, with understanding and a sense of responsibility to her people. In the human, earthly sense, she is a lofty example of the strong and self-assured individuality that has no need of gods. She is not a tyrant of set purpose or out of egoistic lust for power. In a human and rationalist sense she is right in ruling as she does.

Leviathan is a specious tempter, because his principles are

rationality right and logical, because they serve “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”.

But is not the State the very thing that has to be got rid of? Must we not free ourselves from the State and create new forms of communal life? Is not that the chief task of the future? The Middle Ages had an institutional system for the requirements of public order, but no central, solidly organized State. Is not the dissolution of the State of the Baroque age and of nationalistic Jacobinism the first condition for the task of creating a new order, of setting up a European Commonwealth? The conception of the nation should in any case be divorced from that of the State, and so should the organization of social services. Great Britain long ago rose above the rank of a national State, if she ever was a State in the Continental sense. It would be disastrous if there should come here, in the course of the war, a belated entry into that Continental stage, and a closer approximation of the Empire to the type of the national State.

A European or universal Commonwealth cannot be a super-State, a gigantic Leviathan; it must develop a different type of association of national, social, and economic groupings, while retaining the cultural and social individuality and the administrative customs of each nation. It would be futile to attempt to preserve the system of a federal association of sovereign States, differing from the League of Nations system only in the cession of certain rights of the member States to a central authority. On the other hand, it would be a misfortune to have a central State on a European scale, as it would of necessity assume all the destructive tendencies of absolutism, even if it were a super-State for social services.

State for social services—a wonderful slogan, capable of replacing the idea of the Liberal State, the Constitutional State, the neutral State, the administration-State. But are the social services fit tasks for a centralistic State? Their centralist organization, their reduction to organs of a centrally ruled State, would subject this order, planned in a social spirit, no less than other centralist orders to the temptation of Leviathan. These services would become further means of concentration of the power of the

central authority. They would be used as means of domination. They would degenerate into institutions of the central authority for the maintenance or extension of its power.

In *Athalie* the dualism of mediæval public life is presented, as the right political order, in opposition to the monism of pagan State absolutism. That dualism can no longer be revived. In its place there must come a balancing of several elements of power, and this will be the more necessary the larger the scale of the general political system.

Leviathan, the beast from the abyss, is not merely Hitler, or merely Nazism, the totalitarian regime, the modern tyranny. It is the final result of man's struggle for freedom and erection of his own system, a system opposed to the divine, revealed system. It is progress in alliance with barbarism. It is the liberation that turns into total slavery. It is the earthly immortality of man in the form of a collective man, a mass man, a termite man.

### *End in Futility?*

I have been on a walk through the City. Elm Court, in the Temple, has been hit just where we had such stimulating hours. The precious library has been destroyed. We were only recently admiring the splendid order and arrangement of that unique collection of works on Constitutional Law. The wonderful hall of the Middle Temple has been destroyed, that room with the Shakespearian atmosphere. Bit by bit an ancient and unbroken tradition is being destroyed. Holborn, close by, shows appalling pictures of destruction. The memory of the last war is being re-awakened. And yet! We go ahead; there is no sign of any flagging of spirit.

G. has been bombed again, in his new home. Nowhere is there safety. Fate lurks at every corner. Little France, too, that homely spot in Kensington, recalling the time of the French *émigrés* of the great Revolution, has been hit. Ch. was saved by a miracle: the front of his house was simply blown away.

More alarms. The day is heavy with rain. The A.A. guns are starting early, firing more heavily than on recent nights. As I was

strolling to-day a couple of bombs fell without warning, uncomfortably close. Everyone made for a shelter. For a short time we stayed in the shelter with taxi passengers and women out shopping. Not a single word of discouragement; only joking and laughing.

The question whether Hitler can still attack is being discussed by everyone I meet. In June I was firmly convinced that he would not attempt a landing. The unending bombardments seemed to be no more than a diversion, or connected with the blockade; the main line of action seemed to be in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Oil seemed to be the objective, and the disruption of the Empire, the occupation of key-points, and, last but not least, Russia—the unchanging aim, never abandoned by Nazism, of making an end of the Soviet Union and incorporating its territories in the Nazi empire.

To-day I am not so sure. It may be that these activities are really diversions on the grand scale, but it may be that the purpose is simply to keep part of the navy in the Mediterranean and part in home ports, in order to send all the U-boats to strike Great Britain in the tenderest spot, her navy and merchant marine. In any case what is now going on is no longer an isolated action, a "blitzkrieg" against an isolated enemy, but a great mixed enterprise, the true purpose of which is the political collapse of Great Britain. A collapse so organized that it will remain possible for other than the present political leaders to conclude a so-called peace of compromise. A peace of compromise would be a victory for Hitler, a victory of the Revolution.

In setting out here to devote a few lines to our great crisis, I might say that I am trying to show the character of the temptations of the present time, from my own experience and efforts to overcome them. In such a situation as ours, everything is a matter of personal experience, and it is simply with this that I am concerned. There is no opportunity at present of gaining the mental equipoise needed for an objective statement, and objectiveness would also be far beyond my powers. The personal character of these meditations is not merely an expedient to cover inadequate reflection. At such a time, when the continuity of the historic

process seems to have been broken, the gathering up of broken threads can only be undertaken by individuals. Trust the return of the faith, almost extinguished, in a higher destiny man is not encouraged by the phrase-making of public orators but through the solitary wrestling of each one of us who earnestly concerned to overcome the temptations of this time himself.

Perhaps this war will become senseless as a war, as annihilated by arms. It will retain and proclaim its justification only a struggle of ideas and valuations—as a struggle between two world orders, as the great universal civil war that one day will be ended by a great peace.

These two tasks, the clarification of the inner world of ideas and the clarification of the outward elements of State and social order are the subject with which we need to deal. Both are possible only in connexion with a renewal of democracy. Let us confess the downfall of the old democracy! The recognition of the cause of this downfall and, as its consequence, of the rise of the totalitarian powers, is the first condition of recovery. Those were wrong who proposed to throw overboard as useless ballast the whole of democratic order; but those also were wrong who confused order with ineffectual institutions.

A friend asks me whether I am writing a continuation of *Revolution of Nihilism* (or, to quote the English title, *The Revolution of Destruction*). I should like to set over against that Revolution of Destruction a Revolution of Reconstruction. That is certainly a problem. But if it is a matter of a revolution, will not the mistake be repeated which we Young Conservatives in Germany made, coupling regeneration with revolutionary methods? It was a mistake which even so outstanding a man as Hugo von Hofmannsthal made, when that great Austrian writer coined the phrase and the idea of a Conservative revolution. There can be no revolution of reconstruction. There can only be a stubborn laborious separate consideration of each particular problem.

The only thing that, after all, we can all want is not the victory of one or another doctrine, this or the other system of thought, but the enlistment of the aid of every serviceable element of Society.

Corporative, or Liberalist thought within an essentially individualist and Liberal social and economic system. How much this involves, and what legislative bounds must be set to this essentially Liberal economic and social system, must be determined not by theoretical conceptions but simply by two considerations, that of the maintenance of the proper functioning of the social and economic system, and that of an improvement in the general conditions of existence. In other words, it will have to be determined by practical experience how much of all that is desirable is possible.

Thus the ending of these complications and the restoration of our political health call for a somewhat complicated prescription. The time of patent medicines and simple cures is no more. We shall have to learn and adopt something from all sides. The simple defamation meted out in the past to everything alien to the particular system favoured is an inadmissible luxury; and one question will crop up over and over again, the question whether any particular measure has not the character we have ascribed to various things already, that of developing a vicious automatism. The moment centralist incursions are permitted into a generally sound work of statutory reform, a course is entered upon which will need to be watched very carefully if it is not to lead us into a tyranny.

Among the essential and indispensable elements of democracy is the definition of a sphere of the personal, private life, which must be left absolutely uninterfered with by the public authorities—the demarcation of an inner and an outer world. It may be that we shall have to draw the frontiers between these two more sharply than in the past. The distinction must never be upset. It is absolutely necessary if men are not to lose their character of moral beings. It is also necessary to recognize that the inner life ranks and must rank above the outer life.

The old democracies are able still to function only because they are living on a final sublimation of inner values, of that superiority of the inner over the outer. Perhaps it may be said in more robust terms that they are now living only on routine. In any case, it is impossible to exist in the long run on merely external

agreements if there is not at the back of them a conviction of their rightness and necessity, and if there is not an ethical basis supporting their observance with the sense of moral obligation. A human society can be maintained without compulsion only so long as there exists within it a generally accepted picture of man. Is such a picture of man possible without divine direction?

All who have been active in politics or the profession of State administration are aware that so long as a man is busy with the practical questions he has no time to apply any serious test to them from general principles. It is a tragi-comedy of our political life that the gulf between abstractions and practice is never closed. On one side political science loses itself in abstractions; on the other side practice remains crude and blind, only rarely enlightened by scientific judgment or long and careful reflection. So much the better for politics, say the old hands at the political game; so much the worse for the community, say the scientists, because we never get above a certain level of rough approximation.

Still more tragic is it that the political leaders, while busy with the tasks of leadership, have no time to take account of the clarification of the political and intellectual situation that is constantly going on. Thus they are always at work with the intellectual equipment of a world that has already been left behind. There is a permanent discrepancy between current problems and the conception the leaders have of them. Leading statesmen drop further behind their times the longer they are in power, and the more rapid the development of a critical period. Finally they become incapable of seeing as they are the problems that hurry ahead of them. They think in old categories and old conceptions. What is needed in our day is a rethinking of our political categories. Without this we run the risk of ending in futility.

### *New Categories*

We are all *émigrés*. We are exiled from our ideas and conceptions, which seem to us to be irrefutable because we are used to them. We are exiled from the rigid systems of thought which w



regarded as sound simply because they sufficed for our lives in the past. They do so no longer.

We need a new articulation of political language, of political nuances. We have to get beyond the old associations and divisions, beyond the distinctions between Liberal and Conservative, middle and working class, tradition and revolution. On what else did the political elements of the Right come to grief but the fact that they did not see the necessity of regeneration, but wanted to go on being themselves, and to outlive themselves? One might call that the Conservative Jacobinism which, in Bernanos' phrase, sees in the monarchy and the Church nothing but two extensions of the police. We are not referring to such a union of opposites as the reactionary Jacobinism that unites social reaction with the methods of revolutionary terrorism. Nor do we mean revolutionary democracy. As if there could be such a thing, as if, after this last and most extreme of revolutions, revolution could any longer mean anything!

In opposing centralism in the State, the absolutism of the whole, we do not want to exchange it for partial absolutisms, for mistaken pluralities which only claim rights in State and society and accept no responsibility for the whole. Nor are we thinking of doctrines or of a sort of eclecticism among the theories.

It is the nuances, not the broad doctrines, that are becoming of importance to recovery. We have to get away from the stock phrases of the nineteenth century, whether in connexion with the struggle between capital and labour or with that between freedom and equality. There is no final solution to our problems; what there is is much more modest but in the end more solid. If the new development compels us to dissolve the association between the democratic order and nationalism and to abandon the idea of national democracy, what has to be put in its place would not be a union of Socialism with democracy—the idea of Social Democracy. For we should still then be in the field of the rival ideas of the nineteenth century. Instead of this we might form the idea of a corporative democracy, if this did not at once set up associations which, instead of facilitating a new synthesis, would make it impossible. But the thing that has to be expressed in such a

formulation is not an antithesis to the conceptions of the nation or social, but the rejection of their association with a State Constitution. Both national democracy and Social Democracy sought incorporation in strong centralist homogeneous forms of State. Both are based on the principle of the "Republic one and indivisible", whereas what is needed is a new system which would order the social and national elements as independent spheres for the time being, and would include them as corporative elements in a common plural order.

But the language spoken and worn threadbare in the struggle that lies behind us is misleading. Direct expression cannot be used; we must try first to clarify our ideas, in order to find a new method of expression that will be universally intelligible. But one thing should be perfectly clear, that the future development will go beyond the tendencies to State Socialism and State nationalism alike. Obviously it must not be allowed to lead us instead into State corporativism. What makes the subject difficult is the fact that the monistic State, which we are in the habit of regarding as the obvious basis of public order, is not in reality a matter of course, but is the product of a historic development that to all appearance is now coming to its end.

If that is so, then, above all, the salient element in the regeneration of democracy is not to be sought where democracy itself sought it, in a centralist, uniform, monistic State, through which it has become a sort of State democracy. The very idea of democracy is in absolute antithesis to the idea of the State. Democracy can never envisage its relations with any form of State, or its incorporation in it, as anything but a compromise. The roots of Western democracy lie in the guilds of the Middle Ages, in the organs of self-government, in the corporations existing by their own right. Modern democracy since the eighteenth century has been a compromise between those democratic elements and the powers of absolutism which came into existence a century earlier—the absolutism that formed an indivisible, a powerful, homogeneous State with exclusive prerogatives and with a centralized administration.

It would be absurd to propose to return to any conditions

forms of the past. That is not at issue; what we are concerned for is a clarification of the question how much of current democracy corresponds to its true nature and how much has been formed by union with other factors in the course of history—not only, for instance, with the absolutist State but with a chaotic, disintegrating society.

Democracy as the form of an articulated society existed long before the emancipation of the middle class, but in its exclusive early association with that class and its later identification with a society in constant flux it gained a one-sided character which does not entirely correspond to its nature. Democracy grew out of an articulated society and is by nature out of harmony with the absolute centralist State and also with the formless, structureless society of the age of the masses. Consequently it is virtually impossible to integrate the masses directly into any democratic form. Masses and democracy are absolute antitheses, mutually exclusive. The correlates of the masses are tyranny and the absolute State. If it is desired to preserve democracy, the masses must be articulated anew.

It is easy to fall a victim to the optical illusion under which the historical circumstances of a period in which democracy became the guiding principle of public life are interpreted as the actual nature of democracy. In reality those circumstances contained just as much that was alien and opposed to democracy as of democracy itself.

Thus democracy cannot be identified with the forms and principles of a State tending in the direction of absolutism, either through the personification of a nation or through that of a social class. Democracy must be regenerated not as a centralist State but through the formation of new fields of autonomous life, which in the future may form the members of a novel commonwealth.

That sort of thing cannot be decreed. That sort of development can come into existence only in the course of the solution of practical problems, being subsequently furthered by the clarification of ideas. But have we not already the elements of this new order, these fields of autonomous life; do we not merely need to help them to become conscious of themselves and to prevent the

renewal of democracy from being sought where it can never thrive, in the centralist, bureaucratic State?

New, additional forms of democratic life are to be sought among the great corporations, the "indirect powers" of the new time, the trade unions, the trade and industrial corporations, the social services, the great institutions of intellectual life, and, of course still in a Parliament, in the institution of political parties.

In the present crisis the elements of a Conservative shaping of life and of a new articulation of Conservatism need to be inventoried. Both Liberalism and Socialism are conservative to-day, not only formally in the sense that both have something to defend and preserve against the assault of universal Nihilism, but in the positive sense that all these political principles are inseparably bound up with the maintenance of Western civilization as its regulative ideas. Here lies the centre of a new synthesis of our political forces. Such a synthesis will become possible if none of the constituent elements forms itself into a "partial absolutism" or claims exclusiveness; that is to say, so soon as each of these elements acts as an auxiliary in the public order and not as the ruling principle of a doctrinaire construction.

Neither the idea of a revolution, whether a revolution of construction or of social justice, nor that of a world order, is the matrix of new political and intellectual coinage, but the idea of the Western tradition. This tradition embraces all life, not only the economic man, and not only the social sphere. Such comprehensiveness is impossible without a valuation of life that leads to the transcendental. It is the sum of the constructive forces of the West. It embraces also the irrational forces, the forces of the historic continuum, of tradition in the narrower sense, the tendencies of stabilization, of endurance, of continuance. It embraces also the elements of private life, and, indeed, of private property.

We are in the process of abandoning the familiar furniture of our political distinctions and judgments. Very few are able to conceive how much we shall have to leave behind. Most of the things of which the pros and cons are being discussed in our day belong to this side of the line we have to cross. They belong

already to the obsolescent. I have no illusions about the fact that what I am here saying is not yet what is wanted and what awaits us on the further shore.

### *Grandeur and Troubles of Exile*

It is hard to live as an *émigré*, but exile is not without its grandeur. Still less does it lack its humiliations and its characteristic pettiness. One gains distance, one forms new connexions. In parting from the familiar one corrects one-sided judgments implicit in habits of thought. It may be that one is enabled to form sounder judgments; or one may stiffen one's attitude and refuse to be just any longer. One may diminish in stature in exile, lacking the supports and the *coulisses* of a familiar theatre of life, and reduced to playing a solo part. What is the use of wasting words on the misery of exile, which is always the same? There is a farmers' saying that when the cribs are empty the horses bite one another. Poverty and loss of status account for many disagreeable things that happen among all groups of exiles, but of one element of greatness no one can rob them: they are called to be pioneers in the spiritual reshaping of the world.

Have they really this mission? They have it when they renounce the comforting will-o'-the-wisp of an early victorious return to their native land, and the claim to be personally called to lead the future order and to regenerate their country on the strength of their experiences in exile. The mission of the *émigrés* is not that but a much more modest one, and a more serviceable one—to help in a future reconciliation, in a clarification of ideas that have become out of date, in the reuniting of broken threads, and in the correction of mistaken judgments. People who in such times have had to leave their country stand between the nations and States, between the rival views and doctrines; or at least they should do so. They are called to be mediators, if they rightly understand their mission. They are capable of rendering invaluable service, provided that they set limits to their personal aspirations.

In the last war the men who formed the new national States had gone into exile. They were all more or less under the influence of

the romanticism of the nationalist conspiracies of the nineteenth century. The masses had been educated in the spirit of the old fights for freedom and independence, when Poland, for instance fought everywhere at the barricades for freedom from absolutist oppression. This romanticism justified the political struggle of the *émigrés* in the eyes of the masses who endured during the last war the burden of occupation or of hostilities in their midst. To-day there is a change. To-day these masses are not looking toward the *émigrés* but asking who bore the real burden of these years of oppression, who was really in mortal danger, who made the greater personal sacrifices for the sake of liberation.

That is what will be said, and not only in Germany, and I am not sure that there is not truth in at least one thing more that will be said—that we who at this time were not in our old country can never represent it again. But if we are not destined to return in a sealed coach to our country in order to prepare a revolution there and through it to come into power, we have a higher task, that of balancing against each other the needed and the possible, of working, as trustees for our nation, for the future order, and of clearing obstacles to the new life out of the way: the task of finding for this new life, and for this readiness to re-define the limits of our existence, and for our energies, the new order that does not cripple them but lends them wings.

I have at this point to make good an omission. In dwelling on the things that need to be altered I have not given to the thing that must remain and must be held fast the mention that is necessary in order to prevent misunderstandings. In this Liberal country it would ill become one to ignore the permanent element of Liberalism and their importance for future development. Enlightenment, clarification, criticism, beneficent scepticism and liberation will always be needed, for the very reason that there is no final, universally applicable, unchangeable, static order of human life, but only an unceasing approach to an ideal state. Politically Liberalism turns from a beneficial corrective into an injurious element only when it makes a principle of dissolving all ties and destroying all traditions, when, in other words, it claims exclusiveness and does not confine itself to being *one* traditionalist.

element, one of several. The only Liberalism that is spiritually destructive is that which becomes a substitute for religion, and the only one that is economically destructive is that which is not ready to recognize the limits of its efficacy, limits set externally by the limited resources of a still undeveloped technicalization and inwardly by the individual responsibility for the community.

Another omission has reference to Parliamentaryism. Is it obsolete as the political instrument of democracy? Quite the contrary. The more the scale of the universal crisis reveals itself, the more urgent becomes the task of strengthening the function of Parliament, for which there is no substitute. Through all possible changes in the external and internal form of the community, the parliamentary Constitution will remain the form of expression of democracy which can claim universal validity. It is the form of permanent compromise, which will become more necessary than ever if the centralist States should attain a looser, plural form.

The conception of tradition and of the historic continuum has been set here as the central point of regeneration. This has been done in the conviction that the most radical revolution in all history cannot be overcome by a yet more radical one, but only by a resumption of the productive and permanent elements of our civilization, unless it is desired to emerge entirely from our civilization into one of a new type. Those who desire that are indeed listening to other voices. They are utopians. For a new civilization cannot be created at will; it must grow. It cannot be anticipated or planned.

To this Western tradition belong both Liberalism and Socialism. This cannot be too often insisted on, for Socialism has been made the show-piece of every revolution of the last century and a half. It is, moreover, no new thing. As a European and Western tradition it reaches down to the deepest roots of our civilization. "To the end that there be no poor among you," said Moses himself (Deuteronomy xv, 4). It has never ceased to be one of the strongest elements in Western society. Is there any need, in order to give this Western tradition a stronger and more vital form, for a

revolution, another upheaval? Is not the very thing that needed quiet, collected, patient advance?

One task the *émigrés* certainly have not, that of serving as the shock troops of a revolution. That idea belongs to the war of 1914-18 and not that of 1939, just as do those of trench warfare and of fixed and independent fronts. The task of the *émigrés* is to provide the intellectual basis for a patient and purposeful labor on which the fruitfulness of the future depends. It is no spectacular occupation, but it fits our situation infinitely better than the claim to represent a future Government.

Nothing is more out of place here than ancient enmities and obsolete prejudices. Our aim must be to assemble our ideas as the components of a single new tradition, a common and a greater one, and not to bring up against one another the mistakes of the past—as if we had not all our share of error and responsibility.

Tradition is not merely a feudal requisite brought down into the late age; it is also every element that incorporates vital forces—the labour movement, for instance. New elements of social life are constantly appearing and becoming a part of tradition, even though but recently they were accounted revolutionary. That alone is the new Conservatism as I see it. The time has passed when the workers could reasonably talk in the revolutionary jargon; their language should now be that of responsible partners in the commonwealth. Democracy is the balancing of various forces; it is decentralization, not merely a formal division of powers. Democracy is above all the steady development of tradition. The identification of democracy with radicalism belongs to the past.

### *The Mystery of Iniquity*

"The mystery of iniquity doth already work," writes the Apostle (II. Thessalonians ii, 7). There is indeed a mystery about this iniquity and its working "with all power and signs and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness". People whom one can neither call good nor bad suddenly changed. We imagined that we knew them, we thought we knew both their



weaknesses and their good sides—men with their contradictory elements but perhaps good comrades, good-humoured and helpful. Suddenly they began to change. They looked different, their features became mask-like. Something alien was moving in them and speaking from within them. Their voice grew shrill, their eyes became rigid. They seemed different men, we recognized them only by their old suits, or perhaps by a gesture, the way, perhaps, they threw down their cigarette.

Nothing more deeply horrified me than the visible change in acquaintances and friends, men whom I thought I knew well, when they came under the spell of Nazi politics. Good men, good as men indeed are, seemed to be attacked by new lusts. My professional colleagues, farmers, honest and upright, pious, God-fearing, if one may say so, men who would never have demeaned themselves to commit a dishonourable act—suddenly one found them unscrupulous, dishonourable, profiting by others' weakness. They acquired new habits, made disreputable friendships, grew overbearing. They gambled, lived beyond their means, steadily degenerated, and became vile creatures who thought nothing of torturing and robbing and murdering those who were weaker than they.

I had this experience with a number of acquaintances, men whom one would have imagined to be anything but of weak character, men who came into the Nazi movement for decent reasons, or came hesitatingly, critically, and with reservations, because there were elements in the movement that dismayed them. I have had this experience with former Socialists and Nationalists, Liberals and Conservatives—this change, this corruption. These men gave one the impression of being men possessed. They were no longer themselves. Their change in character bordered on split personality, on schizophrenia. I do not know whether from a medical point of view it is possible to assume such a thing as an infectious and collective form of schizophrenia. I am more inclined to see behind this change, which seems to have affected the whole of the German people, that mystery of iniquity, the working of an "Evil One" of metaphysical origin.

## THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

There is something at work in Nazism that is not so clear present in the other totalitarian regimes. It is in Nazism that we first see the true character of the Beast from the Abyss, the character which Hobbes could very clearly feel and was trying to indicate when he gave his absolute State the name of Leviathan. The modern experiments in systematic absolutism are in part expedients for stemming the break-up of society. For Nazism the Leviathan order is not a means but an end in itself. Nazism reduces men to subjection not to give them a new constitution or order but to rule over them. It has no aim beyond that of power and dominion. It has no gods beside the earthly god Leviathan. It has set out to realize no doctrine, to establish no utopian order. In Nazism the true nature of Leviathan reveals itself as the mystery of iniquity.

In Nazism there stands revealed the anti-human and anti-Christian nature of this whole enterprise of a purely this-world order, based in appearance on compulsion and rational planning and so professing to provide humanity with a state of security and a common-sense, serviceable, rationally planned order, but in reality dragging men into an existence in which they are overwhelmed by the seduction of iniquity.

Rosenberg calls the Nazi movement a "revolution of the instinct". It could not be better described. The instinct has become revolutionary, and the inhibitions of civilization have been set aside. The primeval instinct of man the animal has mounted through all the ages of civilization into man's consciousness. The ennoblement of the life of the soul, the result of thousands of years of education of the human race, has been brought to naught. This revolution has carried men back to the "sensations that give strength"—ferocity, harshness, pitilessness, lust of domination, greed for power, creaturely lust. All this is no longer literature as thirty years ago, but reality. The things that Hitler talked of a decade ago in conversation are being carried out. A new generation is growing up that can only be described as devilish, a generation to which all that is humane is alien, men planned according to a rational system, planned like machines. Men whose training has sterilized the inhibitions of moral sense and

conscience. Men to whom any idea of a transcendental authority is absurd. Animals, living without a future or a hope, living in the moment only, and planned only for the moment, as muscles and nerves.

Such an education carries the mystery of iniquity into the deepest roots of human nature. These men are seduced into "lapses", perverted conduct, offences against the law, cheating, stealing, rape. This is done in order to have a blackmailer's hold over them and to push them into the path of amorality, along which they are then driven into complete unscrupulousness. They are trained in overbearingness and encouraged in profligacy. They are enabled to play the part of "masters", and to indulge their instincts of cruelty, greed of power, and arrogance.

There is no corrective for this training of youth. The family, the most powerful unit in the domestication of men, is being systematically destroyed. With subtle insight the point is being attacked at which humanity is most vital and also tenderest and most sensitive. The cells of private life are being smashed for political reasons, and not only for those reasons. The attack is directed against the foundations of civilization, against the primeval origin of domestication, against the cells of authority, of order, of self-control, of the suppression of lust, against the very elements of training in humanity. Men are to lose all links with one another. They are to become masses and as masses manipulable in the bulk. They are to have no responsibility to anyone but the ruling power. They are to control their impulses only when it suits this ruling power. If their lusts are incestuous or parricidal, so much the better—they are free to indulge them. They are free from the burden of civilization.

Release of all subhuman instincts, with sexual liberty, total promiscuity with a good conscience—these are the rewards for the strict training in the service of Leviathan, for total unfreedom in the field of what used to be political and social life. It is the antithesis of discipline, the end of restraint. Hitler rejects every inhibition and so satisfies the secret longing of a great part of the present generation, which is ill-at-ease in civilization and is setting out on a new migration, back into the

wilderness, which beckons to it as the approach to a new Promised Land.

### *The Unmasking of Leviathan*

The rejection of inhibitions is the consistent conclusion of the "process of spiritual liberation". It is logical. What could still claim a hold over men? Socialism, in its popular form, refers spiritual values to material conditions and movements, but it does at least demand an altruistic attitude. Well, why that? Was it not much more consistent to throw everything overboard, and is it not that the secret of Hitler's success, especially with the young? He told boys and girls to "enjoy their youth", but he also sent the young men to murder their outlawed opponents, to torture, to burn, and he oppressed the defenceless Jews. Well—was not that a generalization of an attitude that was preached by part of the proletariat, under the influence of those intellectuals—ruthless combat with the bourgeoisie? And did not Hitler push this, too, to its logical conclusion? The man who accepts slavery deserves there is no such thing as a living soul; well, then, why not shoot him down and trample on the useless? Nietzsche said so long ago—anything is falling, bring it down.

Reject inhibitions, and become a free human being! Human being? To be a human being might mean to build up inhibitions. Be one, then, no longer! Hitler and his following had no inhibitions; hence their speed, their surprises and incredible *courage*. People call his policy playing at Indians, the policy of the Wild West; they are wrong. It is total absence of inhibitions, of scruple and loyalty. The Neanderthal man has crashed through the thin layer of humanity, as someone well wrote recently. If we are not to think in categories of race, that will do very well. Civilization, created by higher beings, was imposed on the Neanderthaler, and he hates the stuff.

In what does all this differ from the line which men of education and ability had long been pursuing in secret? These able people, these educated people, did all this for private ends, in the sphere of their private life of indulgence, not as a principle or a rule for

everybody but as a privilege for selected emancipated spirits. But, like everything else, this attitude was subject to the law of diminishing returns. It became a commonplace, was profaned, came into the streets.

Can we not understand the aversion and yet the hidden sympathy of all these "free spirits" for Hitler? The secret admiration? He has simply achieved wonders and is a "great man". Is it not remarkable how much concealed sympathy, how much loving hatred for Hitler there is in that particular sort of libertarianism that indulged long before Goebbels in the idea of "living dangerously", in men who would imagine themselves to be men of the Renaissance when they were unfaithful to their wives with waitresses?

Nazism is the subtlest and most consistent attempt in history to make political profit out of the evil in men and out of evil men. In all countries there are creatures who take pleasure in torture, who enjoy brutality and are ready to commit any cruelty. These people, hitherto kept within bounds by the forces of order, by the fear of the penalties of the civil and criminal law, and so prevented from giving free play to their instincts, are now enticed from their dens by the new gospel of force, of the will to power and libertinism. They are enticed by honours, promotions, and every satisfaction of their particular lusts.

Thus there rises up a sort of world conspiracy of all the criminal instincts and elements in man. Gangsters and men of ill repute and criminals recognize one another at sight, and to-day there is a great International of the criminal world, now all in politics. We are perhaps only at the outset of a monstrous development. Whither it may lead and what menaces it may involve for the civilized world, no one can predict.

Of all the totalitarian regimes, Nazism is the only really dangerous enemy of human society. The attempt to put Communism into practice makes use of the means of absolute power, but it is itself in the line of the European ideas of human progress and of the liberating Enlightenment, and is still in the tradition of the Western spirit. In its expansion of the doctrine of Socialism it is the legitimate and perhaps the last continuation of the process

of secularization and revolutionization of the last four hundred years. Through this Western development it may emerge from that process, it may change, it is living amid the creative impulses of our civilization, with all the opportunities of regeneration and adaptation. But Nazism is entirely alien, is complete nothingness, the absolute negation of the West, of civilization. It cannot go back, and it cannot go forward out of itself; it is itself alone.

It is so dangerous because its appeal is not only to those to whom it offers the chance of a tremendous rise in life—the uprooted, the unoccupied, the dispossessed, the failures, with their envy and resentment, and consequently their loss of all inhibitions of morality and respectability. It appeals also to all those who want security at any price, who are anxious about the positions they have reached, and whose one fear is of being plunged once more through the loss of their job into privation and social degradation. The world is full of people in all classes of society who are ready to pay any price to save themselves from losing their positions of affluence. True to its leader's book, Nazism appeals to the lowest instincts of humanity. It did so in its struggle for power on a smaller scale, and it is doing so now in its struggle on a grand scale. In this process it is entirely breaking up the old order. Out of the masses formed by this destruction it creates its new order, with the meanest instincts as the cement of society and its binding element. Can such a thing hold and endure?

It contains the danger of a lasting Fall of Man. A new form of humanity is thrusting itself into existence, the human termite. This is the truly metaphysically malevolent plot against humanity, which once saw itself as in God's image. The termite State—that is the true meaning of Leviathan. In it God is cheated of His creature. Through it the spark of human individuality is extinguished.

But are we not being pushed into the same course by all these utopias that are ready to abandon personality for the sake of collectivism, freedom for a utopian equality, and creative energy for the sake of uniformity? These ideas can perhaps be followed further. The termite State comes into existence through the destruction of the sexuality of the masses. Behind the enlightened

sexual morality, the de-mythification of sex into a hygienic requirement, such as has long been advocated by rational Socialism of all types, and has been taken over from it by Nazism, lies something akin to the destruction of sexuality. It is de-naturalized, canalized, made of little importance, and ceases to be a turbulent factor. In the opinion of the Socialists a good deal of the irrational is rationalized, in that of the Nazis men are made ready in this way to comply with pressure in other directions. The same applies to another instinct, that of property, of individual acquisition. Seen in this light, is the popular Socialism the best opponent of Nazism? Is it not a secret ally? Seen in this light! And does it not lead to a similar human perdition?

It is Nazism that unmasks the true character of Leviathan. Can Leviathan, then, serve any longer as the expedient and resource of other political elements? Can it become the ideal of a future order, under any disguise or transformation, as State for social services, as neodemocracy, or as authoritarian State?

Compulsory training, "planning" of the young generation, all this tendency to the machine-made, the deliberately controlled, and this complex of uniformity, collectivization, crushing of individuality, compulsion and regulation—will not all this fall to pieces with the unmasking of Leviathan as a pseudo-order based exclusively on power, subjection, and obedience, which robs men of their very soul? To "plan" categories of men—is that possible after this unmasking of rationalism with its "despotism of reason"? The great process of unmasking of all ideologies, which was the essence of the intellectual history of the nineteenth century, finds its conclusion and its dialectical reversal in the disclosure of the impossibility of a rational, entirely this-worldly human order, which, since it can only exist as a compulsory order, leads to absolutism and in it to the total negation of man and his civilization.

To sum this up in the language of myth, we may say that it is the mystery of iniquity that gave Nazism its appearance of strength. It is this mystery that forms the essence of the Leviathan order. Leviathan remains the *deus mortalis*, the mortal god. It maintains its order by cheating man out of his nature, whether we call that

## THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

his immortal element, or his soul, or his personality, or what he will.

I see a flood of hopelessness rising, of despair at the impotence of good will, the antithesis of the unbounded optimism of the Liberalism. No, reason has certainly not conquered. But is there any reason for reasonable people now to turn Nihilist? Nihilism is the thing that we shall never overcome. Perhaps it is simply the latest form of evil in general. We shall be compelled, at all events, to drop the "organizer of the whole world". His shape is Leviathan and his form of rule Nihilism.

### *The World Rule of Nihilism*

Hitler spoke in the past of his "Copernican" achievement. He had given the universe a new centre. What is this new centre, and what else is it that moves, though men imagined it was at rest? What is this Copernican achievement? Power instead of freedom, race instead of equality?

Only the narrow or the deliberately blind will deny that there is something grandiose in Hitler's plans and conceptions. It is not this element that liberates the outlook from narrow European conceptions, how would it have been possible for so many intelligent people to succumb to his influence? In spite of these qualities, there is in a sense an almost refreshing disregard of preconceived ideas in Hitler's enterprises. His freedom from inhibitions and from any recognition of accepted ideas and dogmas has placed this man in the position of being able to give us a more unprejudiced view of the critical things in our lives than the rest of us, especially we so-called educated people. To the measure of truth in the claim that he has a gift of seeing through pseudo-great and reducing them to their true proportions. Similarly he recognized the true outlines of the new real world that the rest of us were ready to do so.

If the gift of seeing through things and reducing them to their simple essence is the mark of a certain greatness, then greatness cannot be denied to Hitler. Nor can another quality be denied him, a quality which is also considered to be a mark of greatness.



political importance, that of inspiring other gifted people with his own intuition and inducing them to work for his aims. There flows obviously from this man a current of power and inspiration, as so shrewd a sceptic as Herr Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, declared more than once: every time he met Hitler, he said, he came away nerved and vitalized. That is not merely the phraseology of a new Byzantinism, it is the impression imparted to me by many people. I myself have never felt this, but I have not been able to resist another impression, that of Hitler's wide horizon. Hitler has widened for all of us the limits of our outlook on the world, and shown us "all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them".

I quote the Scripture text deliberately. It is the dæmonic element in this man, his gift of showing problems in a new light and horizons in a new vastness, that have given him his influence. We can overcome that dæmonic gift, with the powers of seduction and persuasion that it confers, only if we examine those powers without prejudice and consider what it is that makes them so formidable.

There is good reason for fearing that Hitler may soon bring the democracies into a difficult situation in the political war. They may find themselves forced into open advocacy of the obsolete and outmoded and opposition to common-sense progress—into advocacy, for instance, of a Europe that no one wants back. Nobody wants any longer that Europe of the years between the two wars and before the revolution, a continent split up by national frontiers, national struggles, economic protectionism, and "hindrances to traffic" of all sorts. Nobody wants the old system of home politics, except perhaps a small *élite*; for the masses, who care little for principles and political debates, it has lost all attraction. Nobody wants the old social order, with the class war preached on one side, an idea that no longer has any real meaning for the workers, and on the other side social and economic privileges defended which have lost all justification. And nobody wants the old economic system, which has long lost its essential character but has been all the more strenuous in defending its frontiers—an orthodox currency system, an out-of-date trading

organization, an obsolete financial policy, and so on.

What will happen, then, if Hitler "leads" Europe with moderate, self-restrained authority, instead of arbitrarily ruling? If in the end he should attain moderation, and sketch for his people such conditions as would provide for the members of his federation or his European league reasonably defined liberties and benefits of a great economic and administrative unit? If, consequently, under Nazi leadership this continent should gain form toward which in its historic development it has long been working—that of an economic and political unity in which would no longer be wasting a large part of its energies in overcoming difficulties and restrictions of its own constant creation. A unity in which the manifold national and racial differences between its inhabitants would be preserved and respected and further developed wherever needed in territorial self-government and in the maintenance of national culture and customs and characteristics?

What would happen if, in short, something of the type of our much-belauded United States of Europe should come into existence through Hitler? Not in the mechanical, rationalist, diagrammatical way advocated by all the Pan-Europeans, but in the form natural to the character of Europe, individually adjusted to realities and to the continuous elements of tradition and historic growth. An order determined in detail from case to case, not the same for Holland as for Norway, not the same for Switzerland as for Poland, and so on. Not an order shaped on a last, not a rationalized scheme such as radical planners delight in. If in Europe a unity were to arise that preserved and respected all the wealth of the historic growth of races and communities of the many various cultural level—what then?

Will the democracies, will this Britain that has preserved Western civilization in its purest form, will they say that they are fighting for the restoration of the old Europe, of all the nation-states democracies with their protectionism and their ambitions at the expense of their own minorities, which were not the "Statist nation"? For the fixing of new and final frontiers, which will not be the just ones, although in central and eastern Europe such

frontiers are entirely impossible? For a League of Nations that will continue in its past impotence, for a disarmament that will go on being sabotaged and a collective security that will remain still a phantom? Or for an "*il faut en finir*", a peace of vengeance, a final extirpation of a Pan-German, Greater Prussian militarism, which has long ceased to be a reality because it has been merged in the much more dangerous aggressiveness of the new Jacobinism?

Proclamations, programmes, peace or war aims—their discussion is a waste of time. They mislead men into the idea that something can be achieved with their aid, whereas the real development is taking place in another direction, a new reality already exists and is already bringing its full weight to bear, its full weight as reality against programmes and plans.

This reality is misleading not only the masses but the intellectuals, not only the German people but also the subjugated nations. It is misleading them into resignation, into silently watching the political adventurers who are fully alive to the profit they can draw from this situation. Lethargy and hopelessness are beginning to spread over Germany and the occupied territories. In spite of all privations and humiliations, the idea is gaining a foothold that under the present German regime men do at least know where they stand, while no one can say whether another regime would be any better. It is beginning to be felt that there is one thing, at least, to say for Nazism: it is revealing the lines of a new Europe with a unified economic structure. Once the war is over, men are saying to one another, reconstruction will really begin, to the benefit of all concerned, even those who at present are suffering from political oppression. Just as the dream of the men of 1848 of German unity and democracy was realized in his way through fire and sword by Bismarck, might not the dream of the Pan-Europeans be now realized through fire and sword by Hitler, in his way?

But what else is that but a pseudo-solution, which will spoil the chance of a genuine solution, will compromise its supporters and their advocacy and make it impossible, and will build up, for right reasons and to meet genuine needs, something that will stand as a formidable obstacle in the way of the life and the future of the West?

Not for a moment should trust be placed in the genuineness of any such peace proposal from Hitler, moderate though it may be, and pointing to a sort of saturation of the European national and Socialist revolutionary tendencies of the nineteenth century. The thing which we must accept as real is the fact that the democracies—and not only the masses within them—are capable of being misled into placing trust in such an outcome of a peace with Nazi Germany. For the masses, and not only they, want to see an end of this period of the nationalist revolutions of the nineteenth century. They are no less tired of the unending conflicts between national aspirations than of the conflict which the Socialist theorists elevated to a myth, the class war. In shutting their eyes to this fact the politicians of to-day are depriving themselves of a resource of critical importance.

Hitler's European order is a plan put forward for the moment for momentary ends, in order to secure by political means the breaking-off of hostilities. It is a temptation against which it will be necessary to procure immunity.

It is important to call attention again and again to an idea which is deeply rooted in Nazi quarters—that in all probability Germany cannot achieve world hegemony at a stroke, and that a third attempt will become necessary. The armistice between 1918 and 1933 did Germany no harm; on the contrary, it gave her the opportunity of disciplining the whole nation and of producing an entirely new balance of forces in international relations. The Nazi *élite* hoped for a similar result from a quasi-armistice covering a second intermediate period. These ideas were also influenced by the memory of Bismarck's brilliantly conceived spreading of the process of national unification in the nineteenth century over three successive wars. Nazi leaders even go much farther back and talk of a third Punic War, in which Carthage-Britain shall be finally destroyed.

Little reflection is needed to show that a cessation of hostilities for a peace of compromise would mean inevitable final victory for Hitler. A fresh period of preparation would enable him to destroy Russia and Britain in turn, learning by the experience of this war and closing the gaps in his armament. We can perceive already

how the card of a new interim peace will be thrown into the game by Hitler and the use he will make of it. If he succeeds not even in concluding peace but simply in preventing the synchronization of two wars against him, from east and west, then the true features of his claims to European dominion, the broad lines of his world regime, will become clearer. He cannot halt along the road he has taken. The absolute maximum of power and dominion is the *sine qua non* of his continuance in power in Europe and even in Germany. He may send into the world messages about his intended future moderation and his desire to undo acts which he recognizes to have been mistaken; but they will deceive no one as to his true ends. His shrewd speculation must obviously be that he will secure by the means of political warfare the things that prove militarily unobtainable. Let us bear in mind the situation in which he came into power in Germany. His movement was to all appearance breaking up. His position was desperate; but for the very reason that it was so there were those in Germany who considered that the moment had come for negotiation with National Socialism, which, in its distress, they imagined, would be amenable enough for them to be able to make use of it for their own ends. I am repeating here what I have said already, but I think it cannot be said too often—that the turn in affairs which, in the most desperate crisis of his career, brought Hitler into power has had an inextinguishable influence on his outlook, and has given him the idea of a new and tremendous gamble, this time in the arena of world politics.

All that has thus far become known of a new European order of Hitler's is simply an expedient in the political warfare; this is shown by the simple consideration that a European order cannot exist independently of other things. Even if a unified economic and political order can be set up on the Continent, even if it should not consist of the concentration, already mentioned, of all the elements of power in great monopolies controlled by Germany alone, that European order would not suffice to produce a new state of peace. The Nazi order would at best lead only to the transfer of the existing rivalries between national States, rivalries confined within the Continent, to the inter-continental sphere,

and would thus lead to new complications of world-wide extent. This would be so even if Europe were economically self-sufficient which she is not, so that further schemes of expansion would inevitably develop. The existence of vast rival territories along each other cannot contribute to the safeguarding of peace; it offers new opportunities for a final struggle for world hegemony.

A new balance of power on a world scale, guaranteed by Hitler and Mussolini, and perhaps by Japan and Stalin, is a phantasmagoria. It would become no more real even if Great Britain and the United States were to join in. British Empire, Hitler-Europe, Russia, Pan-Asiatic Union, Pan-American—between these there will never be a real equilibrium. They will merely be the prelude to a departure for a decisive struggle for world dominion. The necessity of the concentration of the means of power will very soon lead not only to the extinction within the great territories of all secondary ambitions (those, for instance, of Italy), but to the removal of rival powers. If the demand for the concentration and centralization of the means of power is acceded to, it is impossible thereupon to pursue the opposite policy, that of respect for others for the existence of a number of centres of power, for the principle of peaceful rivalry.

Balance of power is a phrase belonging to a totally different political order, the British and Anglo-Saxon. An order in which the States that grew in the course of history out of the nations of Europe are included cannot be maintained on the principle of reducing some of these nations to subjection, but only on that of the community of interest of all. And only a Europe ordered on that principle is fitted to enter a similar community on an international scale. An order in which the great centralist and totalitarian territorial States stand over against the great democratic territorial States is not the end but an intermediate stage of the great Revolution.

### *Tristitia sæculi*

At the end of this process of destruction, which began as a proud liberation of human society from the chaos of the past, a

the dreams of its childhood, is absolute nothingness, the individual's clear consciousness or his apprehension of belonging only to this day, and his resolve to get the maximum of pleasure and power out of this his only life, before abandoning himself, coolly and cynically or in hysteria according to his nature, to the complete extinction of death. Human lives have lost all value.

*Tristitia sæculi*—it is the melancholy of the world, over against the “divine melancholy”. It is renunciation of the fatherhood of God. Men desire to hear no more of the demands of a higher humanity, of the duty of spiritual effort and upright living. They want to vegetate in a life of amusement in which a false security is provided by the absence of fear and hope.

But how, in an age in which every sort of faith has become impossible and ridiculous, can a political community endure, lacking any common standard of right living? Is not the anxious patriot who is trying to save his people bound, just as much as the unscrupulous hunter after power, to seize the one remaining remedy that offers any sort of communal existence—compulsion, a compulsory belief?

One question dominates all others—how can any faith be possible in these days? For most men this question means no more than: What can be put in the place of a lost faith in order to bring us out of chaos? It is not a question only for Germany and perhaps for France and the rest of Europe. This country too, and the Anglo-Saxon world, is living only on a last sublimation of the long evaporating Christian faith. So much as still remains a convention may disappear in the new generation, among the young people of to-day, as completely as it has done in Germany. The process of ideological unmasking has not yet reached its end here as on the Continent. But can it be stopped?

Here lies the deepest source of doubt of the possibility of a regeneration of our Western world.

In some of the orgies of the French Revolution it was at least the Goddess of Reason who was enthroned, even though in the form of a naked woman. The despotism set up was still, in Robespierre's phrase, a despotism of reason. But in Germany it is Caliban that has been enthroned, a humanity sunk below the

beasts, unconscious of any higher mission and with no desire

The idea of a higher humanity is derided; men glory in having destroyed it in themselves as Herostratus gloried in having destroyed the temple of Artemis. How should the messianic Christianity find listeners here? Christianity, which makes the receipt of grace dependent on the sense of sinfulness and the need for conversion, a conversion which the clergy themselves have to give its name of repentance, for fear of losing the last few members of the congregation of supposed believers.

And yet the very meaninglessness and worthlessness of this Christianized life without God must surely bring us back to the roots of Christianity. Was not that the very point, the all-essential point, that the revolutionaries drove home in Dostoyevsky's uncanny anticipation of our European Nihilism? No order or palace of this life, no just order of society, gives any guarantee of humanity. The one thing that matters is the belief in the transcendence of human life—let us speak plainly as Dostoyevsky himself does: the one thing is whether or not there is belief in immortality.

But what Dostoyevsky could not see was that the men uprooted by the technical revolution, living in permanent lethargy, can only not believe any longer but have not the slightest desire for it. This is the condition that the ancient fathers of the Church called *acedia*, "accidie", torpor. It is the torpor that no longer feels obligations implicit in man's higher destiny. It is the torpor that comes from the melancholy of the world; in modern language, the denial of a higher self in man.

It may be felt to be in bad taste to bring religious considerations into a political discussion. Yet our whole destiny is entirely beyond comprehension without this religious crisis. It is a long way to these realizations, particularly for those who have been so long compelled to hold to outward experience. Two great questions of vital importance remain unanswered: how can a people, how a generation, once more turned to things that not merely leave it cold but have completely ceased to interest it? If the preservation of our civilization depends on the reawakening of the Christian faith, is it not already dead, and are we playing any part but that of mourners at its funeral?



Is it still possible to be Christian, is it possible for a whole people, a State, a society? Are there any Christians left but the secluded, the backward, the failures or the older people, the ailing, those of us who are already in our declining years? What is Christianity, what is its essence? Is it merely a sense of dependence, of dependence on a fate, on a “Providence”? As Hitler speaks of it, it is a sort of faith in the good and the beautiful. A pantheism, perhaps a deism, a little hope that, after all, this creaturely existence is not the end of all things? Can there still be religion in our day? Is it not a fossilized form of an alien state of mind, carried down to us from past ages? Have we not moved much farther than even the godless propaganda suggests, or all these experiments in a neo-paganism—experiments which are mere attempts to break in open doors? Are we not in a post-Christian era, in which doubt itself is suspect, so widely has this generation “soberly accepted finiteness”? “Man is no longer worth taking seriously.”

Such are the verdicts of this new generation in its summing up of a long process. But if it is no longer worth while to take man seriously, what is the use of all these strivings after blessedness? Is there not an end of blessedness in the order in which a crowd of toughs manœuvre themselves into power and then use the people simply as the material and the social order as the instrument of their domination? Why all these new orders and giant empires and claims to dominion, if it is no longer worth while to be a human being?

The post-Christian man sinks into complete futility. Enlightened atheism has long ceased to be a stage in the liberation of the human spirit from the fetters of a tradition; it is being transformed by the force of its own logic into the deepest subjection of thought and conscience. Is it still possible to admit this state of enlightened atheism, as a mark of human progress, into the arsenal of an optimistic, progress-worshipping, Liberal democratism? To-day it is really no longer a sign of strong-mindedness and independence to be an enlightened atheist, but a sign of unthinkingness and intellectual backwardness. If democracy is to renew itself, it must dissolve its ties

with so stale a free-thought, with this humanist op  
And the Church? I think even the men of good will  
longer able to say what the Church means and ought to me  
longer, at all events, in Continental Protestantism. Few ha  
drawn the inevitable conclusions that Christianity is not a  
of feeling but of confession, not of solitary devotions  
*congregational* confession. We have had to go a long way an  
needed this controversy within the Christian Church to  
once more that Christianity is a matter of confession. Th  
term "Confessional Church" has a novel ring; and has  
produced, perhaps, the one constructive element for the fut  
all events within the German evangelical Church?

But these are internal changes, over which we no longe  
any influence. From whatever side one tries to solve th  
plexities of our great crisis, one comes in the end to the  
central issue, that of certainty in faith. The central issue  
crisis is that of the possibility of regaining a spiritual and  
foundation on which our whole life and not merely a pai  
may rest. The burning question is that of the possibility,  
reversing the great historic process of secularization of the pa  
hundred years, a manifest impossibility, but of overcoming.

What can be done to this end outside the religious spl  
little more than a limitation of political and social claims. In  
recognition of the limited scope of our human cosmic order  
at issue. More, perhaps, cannot be done, and in any case s  
not. Human society must have the criterion of its act  
outside itself, not within itself.

We need *Ewigungen*, as Jakob Burckhardt finely expressed  
reference to eternal standards. There must be something "i  
and shall be absolutely established" (Kierkegaard). But F  
hardt rejects a return to Christianity as a "utopia of reac  
Everything, he says, is working towards an interpretatio  
dependent of Christianity"; Christianity has a meaning now  
in terms of opposition to power and gain, not of "accommod  
with State and world". It is vain to attempt an "artifici  
planting of Christianity for the purpose of good behaviour".

It is true that all deliberate attempts at a reascen

Christianity are subject to an inexorable law: good will and the intention to believe are not enough. A “planned” Christian action, such as might seem to us to be necessary for Western renaissance, would be, of all the plannings with which so many of our contemporaries are busy, the most absurd and destructive. It would come to grief on the fact that elements outside faith itself—the maintenance of a social order, the restoration of a regularly functioning State, an ethical basis for civilization—do not lead to faith itself but only to a sense of the need for it. “*Les hommes prennent souvent leur imagination pour leur cœur*,” says Pascal, “*et ils croient être convertis dès qu’ils pensent à se convertir*.” The realization of the need for conversion is not Christianity.

The difficulty of re-Christianization lies not only in men’s aloofness from all that is transcendental but in the eternal paradox of faith that desire and good will are not in themselves enough. Least of all the desire for faith because it is an element of order in temporal affairs.

It was not without a deep underlying meaning that Hobbes gave his “mortal god”, and the temptation to a this-worldly, purely earth-bound human order, the name of the Beast of the Apocalypse. He was well aware of the “vainglory”, in the religious sense, of such an order. He knew that he was setting up the logical antithesis of the Christian order, an anti-Christian order. He was also well aware that this order of his could be combated only on the basis of the Christian spiritual order; that in its own sphere it was impregnable, logically sound and of seductive fascination, so that, if anyone allowed this god of his to come near him, he would fall victim to it, like the reckless soul that has once made its pact with the Evil One.

If the dominion of Leviathan can be overcome only by religious power, then it seems to-day unassailable, and the day of the final coming and rule of anti-Christ seems to have dawned. How could the Christian order, weak and hesitating already in its contact with the secular world, find the strength to overcome anti-Christ outside its own spiritual sphere?

Perhaps in these years we have been touched by something new, new to us though in truth infinitely old. We have learnt the reality

## THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

of evil, the metaphysical working and power of evil. Leviathan is the spirit of evil. It is in the Gospel sense Tempter, who promises all the kingdoms of the world and glory of them to him who will fall down and worship him. It is the power and the might of the spirit of evil that we have experience in the weariness and the agonies of these years. Not human evil, everyday pettinesses and meannesses, but the power indeed the might that compels admiration, of the magnificent evil, which at all times has cast a greater spell than that of saintliness over the great poets. It is the dæmonic spirit of evil, with a share in the sphere of the intellect and in the creative powers of demiurge.

From the experience of this evil a way may open to the experience of faith, in which evil will be overcome.

### *The Call to Sinai*

The spirit of evil has found in our day a deep symbolic expression—anti-Semitism. This is not a temptation of our day confined to Germany. It is spreading over all the continents and the seven seas. It is a sort of gauge of the advance of the Nihilist Revolution in every country.

Anti-Semitism must not be examined merely from its political and social motives. It has a metaphysical basis. The "war on the Jews", as the great German historian Mommsen called it, is "abortion of nationalist feeling", and it is this in all countries to-day in France as formerly in Poland and in every national social group in the planet. But that does not at all mean that it is merely an accessory of nationalism. It is older than any form of European nationalism. It is not to be overcome as a mere incident of the ending of the excesses of nationalism—it has much too deeply infected in our Western civilization. Nor can it simply be dismissed with contempt as a sign of coarseness and barbarism. In order to overcome anti-Semitism, it is necessary to recognize its appalling degree of perverted seductiveness. Nevertheless, the overcoming of anti-Semitism is the condition of a regeneration of our civilization. Anti-Semitism is not a marginal problem of our

crisis, a symptom; it is central, and its importance finds expression in the fact that it is also the central element of the Nazi doctrine.

Nazism, with its diabolical instinct for the unarticulated emotions and reactions of the collective subconsciousness, has met the human need for personification by making the Jew the representation of the evil in man. It has thus satisfied the human need for a visible figure of evil. This has not merely made the Jew the scapegoat for all the failures and misfortunes of present and past; it has not merely been a cheap, easy, and effective diversion; it has also produced overtones from quite other strings. Why should such a diversion be effective if not through the deep need for discovering an embodiment for evil, and why should this particular embodiment work if there were not special conditions that favoured it? The substitutes for religion in enlightened atheism demand not only a "mortal god" but also an earthly, mortal spirit of evil.

It would not be difficult to trace one root of mass anti-Semitism in Germany back to the many years of successful creation of a myth of evil for the masses in the form of the capitalist. The hatred that was stirred up by popular Socialism as a political force was based on the same need which Nazism and its disciples now seek to satisfy by means of hatred of the Jews. The function of anti-Semitism in the political system and the mass propaganda of Nazism is perfectly plain. The Jew is substituted for the bourgeois, just as the race-conscious nationalist has taken the place of the class-conscious proletarian. Both political systems demand the raising of a conflict of interest into the absoluteness of a myth. Both need a correlate for their centre of salvation in the visible form of a spirit of evil. But that is only one side of anti-Semitism. Its success as a substitute for Marxist Socialism shows that the system of thought of the popular Marxism was in reality a sort of omen pointing to Nihilism, and that anti-Semitism corresponds better than the class-war myth to an instinct present in the subconsciousness. Beneath the pedagogical purpose, the training in amorality; beneath the motive of political propaganda, revolutionary excitement and diversion; and beneath the biological, racial element, lies the true root of anti-Semitism in the peoples'

hatred of Israel, the Chosen People, to whom God was re

This hatred of the Jews meets an elementary need ( something eternal, and consequently anti-Semitism is as old Western civilization, and older still. The different always the opportunity of the creation of a myth identifying it with just as a naïve hatred of the alien is latent among primitive peoples. But anti-Semitism is much more than an atavistic sort, more than mere xenophobia. In the hatred of the Jew is an instinctive element that points to a reaction against the author of those tables of commandments in which the evil is separated from the good and the separation attributed to a divine will. It is one more sign of the "discomfort in civilization: *acedia*, the torpor, or the melancholy of the world. Consequently anti-Semitism is always most clearly manifested at times of spiritual crisis, of human insecurity, not only because at such times men need diversions, but because men are tiring of the burden of a higher life.

Rathenau, the Jewish German Foreign Minister, wrote on February 20th, 1919, in a notable letter, on the significance of the Jew: "Do you know why we have come into the world? 'Every human being before Sinai. They will not go? If I call them, Marx will; if Marx does not, Spinoza will. If Spinoza does not, Christ will.'" Marx no longer calls us, and the voice of Spinoza has grown faint. But we are called before Sinai as before the past, and that is the very point at which the metaphysical element in anti-Semitism makes its appearance. It is the secret, instinctive hatred for the author of that summons, and the belief that with the suppression of that prophet the tiresome and absurd distinction between good and evil can be suppressed.

Anti-Semitism is the temptation to see evil not in oneself but in another. It is the flight from a moral and spiritual claim on oneself to a material claim on another, who may be held responsible for one's own weaknesses and misfortunes. Anti-Semitism is also an expression of the temptation of the present to substitute for one's own spiritual transformation a game of hitting out at others. The evil that one will not recognize in oneself is combated in a plausible personification. This is

when men are no longer strong enough to do battle with evil itself.

This anti-Semitism is made up of very many elements. There is the hatred of an intellectually superior social group, who are felt to be alien on account of this superiority and of their mental activity and alertness, and who through these qualities have been able to obtain specially great influence. There is envy, and the anxiety "lest Europe should some day fall into their hands like a fully ripened fruit", as Nietzsche predicted. And there are, of course, all the primitive feelings of business envy, social resentment, and the stupid national hatred of the alien. It is manifestly inconsistent to brand the Jew as the prototype of the subversive element, the "ferment of decomposition", and at the same time to make the struggle against that subversion itself the chief expedient of revolutionism and corruption.

The Jewish intellect has had an outstanding share in the process of liberation of the human spirit. It has also been one of the contributing elements in the ultimate development out of that process of the alliance between progress and barbarism which so appalled Sigmund Freud. The Jewish intellect, through its historic mission, stood at the head of the remarkable campaign of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for the universal unmasking of traditional standards. The Jewish intellect, having torn away from the strongest of spiritual bonds and from its venerable ancient authority, which had governed every element of life,—having thus spiritually uprooted itself for the sake of civil enfranchisement, became a model and exemplar for the most absolute rejection of all authority on which men could venture. At a time of almost deliberate return to the acceptance of spiritual bonds and authority, there must, consequently, have been sincerely held reasons for associating the campaign against dissolution and for a new authority with hostility to the most eminent representative of that earlier campaign of liberation.

When the movement for ideological unmasking came to its logical conclusion and proceeded then to extremes, it was again Jewish leadership that was loudest in the demand for retrogression from freedom to a new absolutism. "Not liberation and the

unfolding of the ego are the secret and the command of th  
 What it needs, what it demands, what it will procure fo  
 is—terror.” Such were the words which, even before th  
 world war, Thomas Mann put into the mouth of the revol  
 Naphta—with this great writer’s characteristic keenness of  
 into the changes of the human spirit. “It is an unfeelin  
 understanding of youth to imagine that it achieves its de  
 freedom—its deepest desire is for obedience.” That w  
 desperate situation into which we, the younger generation  
 period of the last war, had been led by the dialectic of the W  
 spirit; the novelist showed it in its hopelessness in his great  
 of the “Zauberberg”. Here again he anticipated coming de  
 ments: it was the keen dialectical intelligence of the Jew th  
 helped to produce the situation. Here the freedom he owed  
 political and social enfranchisement turned into its antithesi  
 bondage and terror. Paradoxically the Jew himself help  
 prevent the call to Sinai from being heard.

Everything connected with anti-Semitism is paradoxical.  
 is so because it is not merely a phenomenon of political and  
 life or of a particular historical situation, but it has its roots  
 transcendental. The very stamps impressed specially on the  
 passes in Germany are an expression of the metaphysical situ  
 of the persecution of Israel as God’s chosen people. This is  
 “civil war of a majority against a minority”, and therefore it  
 merely a “national calamity”, as Mommsen called it. The es  
 of anti-Semitism, moreover, is not to be achieved simply  
 restoration of equality of rights and of protection “both from  
 illegality and from administrative chicanery”. Greater e  
 than these are called for. For the Christian there can be no  
 thing as anti-Semitism. For him the Jewish people is to thi  
 the chosen people, that will find the end of its sufferings ar  
 wanderings in the full restoration of its electness. It has al  
 been the beginning of the disintegration of the Christian  
 when the attempt has been made to separate the Old from the  
 Testament, as was done by Marcion. But what is the import  
 of this attitude of the Christian at the present day? Was not  
 faith united for more than fifteen hundred years with



persecution of the Jews, with the ghetto, and was it not the great humanist revolution that first secured civil emancipation for the Jews and the end of the ghetto? Is it not, therefore, tantamount to a restoration of the ghetto when that revolution is combated once more, and for Christian reasons? Was it not only logical that anti-Semitism should then become actually a political demand?

For that reason the mission of the Jews must always lie on the side of revolution, of liberation, of dissolution. Yet that is in conflict with their true spiritual mission, which lies on the side of the law, of conservation, of tradition, of the broad historical paths to a higher humanity. In this tragic confusion the Jew bears more plainly than any other race of men the burden of an unending struggle. It is the eternal antinomy between revolution and tradition, between liberation and obligation. Both are men's mission, though not simultaneously in equal measure. Because the Jew is burdened most heavily of all men with this insoluble antinomy, he runs the risk of being made responsible for it. It is against their own insoluble problem of becoming human that the dull and the base in humanity are in revolt in anti-Semitism. Judaism, nevertheless, together with Hellenism and Christianity, is an inalienable component of our Christian Western civilization, the eternal “call to Sinai”, against which humanity again and again rebels.

*“Their Finest Hour”*

There is no more counting of these days and weeks of bombing. We have become used to this new life, its ebb and flow, its pulse and breath, the heavier and lighter attacks. People one knew, people one had met but a few days ago, are to-day among the victims. Houses we used to see full of life are now ruins. There was our milk-shop. The girl who brought the milk was among the victims. The greengrocer's wife is in hospital, severely injured. The barber's shop has been hit by a bomb. Over there four of the gentle, refined French nuns have been killed. There were six of them; two who were on night duty escaped. What has this little

street, what have the little shops, which were destroyed in the middle of the morning's shopping, to do with Hitler's ambition to rule the air? The nights are growing longer, the days are dark. Suddenly bombs fall from the sky. In a taxi, in a bus, in a room at home at one's desk, suddenly there comes that droning, distant.

Yet life goes on in this vast city. The clerks are punctual in their offices or works, and the armies of workers are fighting invisible campaigns of this war. The damage disappears, the streets are cleared away, and men nerve themselves to meet further attacks. There is no loss of sense of proportion, of self-control, of patience. And one day these people will emerge from the sheltered cellars, and the new and heavier labour will begin—that of peace. More and more plainly the critical significance of these events shows itself. Victory. A battle has been fought, without us noticing it. It is the great, still unnamed battle, that may already have decided the issue of this war. It is not, perhaps, merely the phrase "their finest hour", or that of the greatness of the achievement of a tiny group, that will mark its significance. It marks this country's mission to reconcile tradition and revolution for a long time to come.

I am in Trafalgar Square, where there are now two deep bomb craters. I am watching an exciting air battle, high above the city heads. We can see the white trails of smoke of a German squadron flying in close formation. Three British fighters are circling round them. The strangest of spirals and figures are being traced in the sky. Clouds then shut out this spectacle from our view. The fight went on out of sight. A battle of spirits.

The spiritual battle, too, needs its "finest hour", like the battle for the future of Europe. "Who is able to make war with the beast?" is the question asked in Revelation. "First, Sir, permit me to observe that the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of being subdued again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered." These words of Burke were spoken at one of the most critical periods in British history, with regard to the United States. Once already absolutism, after overrunning the Continent

has been brought to a stop before the Anglo-Saxon world. Hobbes, who wrote his theory of Leviathan in this country, found it carried into practice in the French and Prussian States. The considerations that prevented England from going the way of the Continent were the same that call her to-day to battle with the new absolutism.

There is the unity of a never broken tradition. There are the historic forces which so far have been strong enough to withstand the temptations of doctrinaire teaching. There is the independence of spirit that has stood firm against every sort of political or intellectual absolutism. There is not only the theoretically established demarcation between the spheres of public and personal life but the continual correction in practical affairs of the absolutist tendencies that are always endeavouring to control public life. There is the genuine democratism, proceeding from corporations and from the personal insistence on independence, and differing in nature from all reasoned forms of democratism developed from theories and doctrines. There is the irrationality of this democratic life, which gives it its strength, the irrationality that lies in the sense of independence of the individual personality and in the religious roots of the personal sense of responsibility.

From these elements a community has grown up in the United States which, in spite of certain signs of over-rationalization, has preserved and brought up to date the political principles of its freedom. But in the British colonial realm, amid manifold false starts and set-backs, there has been instituted a form of Liberal rule and trust administration of great territories and multifarious peoples, such as has never before been achieved in the history of the world.

So there has come into existence a ruling group whose members are closely associated with leadership by birth, history, political traditions, and liberal outlook, and who seem to be called to extend the principle of trustee administration beyond their past field of power to the formation of a comprehensive world order.

Such a development cannot be anticipated in a programme. It must take place in the course of actual practice. To this extent the whole plan of a new order and an overcoming of the modern

Leviathan is dependent on historic processes which stand because they have been rationally planned but because they grow out of actual historic conditions. Every abstract rational plan for a European or world union, failing the development of a nucleus of the power of a new order that is coming into existence, is doomed to remain politically a theory. Alongside the economic developments, intrusive economic and political planning based on purely rational considerations conceals the danger of confusion and of distraction of attention from the actual process to utopian experiments, which are bound to fail or to lead into the temptations and confusions of mind of our time. A new order cannot be made; it must grow out of and alongside the needs of the struggle and of reconstruction. Thus it is impossible to draw up an ideal plan, determined in advance, of a new order. The achievement of that order will depend both in general principle and in detail on the actual conditions amid which it is created—that is to say, the existing reality of the Empire of the American Union—and on the actual course of events in the regions.

It is in accordance with the great political traditions of this country to proceed politically in the very way which is necessary at the present time in order to withstand the temptation of new absolutism, from which at present there is no escape. The beginning is made in the abstract and if rational and doctrinaire ideas are given precedence over historic realities. There is no other way than to work on the basis of existing conditions, to make the principles already proved in the practical administration of the Empire the constituent elements of a still greater and more universal order. Neither a European Union, nor a scheme, however admirable, of the United States of Europe, can take the place of the actual germ of power and development which to-day is perhaps already growing, and which would come to fruition in the course of close collaboration of the Empire with the United States.

But that collaboration, if it should become fact, must not lead to a sort of utopian super-State, such as seems to be the idea of many people; it will come into existence amid the preservation

of all the multiplicity of forms and individualities and special rights. The promotion of centralism and uniformity, no longer in the national State but in a sort of international State-superstructure, cannot be in the line of the vital tradition of the two great Anglo-Saxon communities, which for themselves have successfully resisted any such beginnings of a modern absolutism. And any extended order which may form round the Atlantic kernel will have to take account of the differences in peoples and their needs; it must not proceed under a unified scheme, destroying historic forms, simply in order to be logically satisfying.

The tyranny of the totalitarian States will not be overcome by turning modern absolutism from the instrument of a national imperialism into that of an international Socialism or rationalist planning system. The difficulty of escaping from the temptation to proceed schematically lies in the fact that in comparison with the popular and in a way seductive aim of political and economic planning, the reasons for which are easy to grasp, the basic principles of such a world community as might come into existence around the British Empire and the United States must necessarily appear confused, full of compromise, not thought out, and logically unsatisfying.

All rational planning is resentful of the tangle of traditions and the claims of the historically established. It demands, like French tragedy, the unities of time, place, and action. It demands the concentration of power and the centralization of the executive. The intention of actually avoiding such concentration and centralization could hardly fail to be regarded as proceeding from unripe judgment and from a second-rate, puerile mentality. Once more the unique mission of the Anglo-Saxon world reveals itself in the fact that, in place of the “despotism of reason”, to use Robespierre’s revolutionary phrase once more, it makes the historic process the decisive force; that it avoids the unity of power and the centralization demanded by logic, and in its place upholds a sort of plural community, with a real and not merely formal division of powers—the only possible form of any future world union or federation.

This would mean that within the supernational economic order

and the supernational regulation of social services special constitutional forms of self-government must be developed. It would be important to ensure that such economic and social planning is necessary—for the provision of employment, for housing, and so on—should not become the function of a centralist super-State administration, and so the beginning of a centralist super-Power. It would also be important to resist politically, as far as possible, the existing tendency to centralization by encouraging the historic regional and local units of administration wherever they exist. In all questions outside foreign policy, defence, and general legislation, political decentralization should be pushed as far as possible.

The British Empire and the United States are the destined initiators and trustees of an order of this type, because they also fulfil the two essential conditions—they do not build up on a theoretical basis, but adapt their institutions to actual requirements, and they have the courage to risk making mistakes and to correct them if they are made; and, secondly, they have developed a liberalism in leadership which never makes use of those who are led for its own purposes, but leaves them subject to their own will and responsible to themselves.

Other nations have had a similar mission of leadership. Various forms of free federative communities have been conceivable. The Germans also were fitted for leadership, perhaps more so than any other nation on the Continent. But though our experience in the first world war had set clear limits for us to the will to dominion, and might have directed us along the only path to lasting recovery and advance, we turned them wrongly to account. We re-entered the course that had already brought us to disaster. The share we might have had in the reordering of Europe was seen clearly by a small section of the Young Conservative elements. They had correctly perceived the causes of the "European irredeemability", and they also saw the only path to Europe's emergence from national-democratic fragmentation. They saw Germany's mission in *leadership*, not in domination of the nations of central and eastern Europe, which were all partners in the common trouble of frontiers that divided and of confined and artificial

delimited territories. But these elements were politically impotent. Their ideas and their personalities were usurped, misused, and corrupted by Nazism.

Thus Germany gambled away for the phantom of world dominion and the phantasms of megalomania the greatest opportunity of her history. But no nation can take the place of another or take over any part of its mission. Just as a German share in the great solution was made impossible by that false move of ours, so another solution, Mr. Churchill's offer, made shortly before the French collapse, of a union between Great Britain and France as the kernel of the future order, came to nought. It is the personal decisions of nations and their individual leaders that determine the future face of the world, not the elaborate schemes of committees and scientific experts.

One thing, however, is already irrevocable. The conception of the "West" as Europe and of Europe as a unit is no longer tenable. Changed realities demand not merely wider economic boundaries but a genuinely planetary universality. That is a painful process of reconstruction which will make an end of Europe's claims to political, cultural, and economic dominion.

### *The Chick Breaks Out of its Shell*

This second world war has delivered an irrevocable judgment on Europe. The Continent has ceased to be the intellectual and political centre that it was for a long time. The centre of gravity is shifting westwards. A sort of new empire of peace may now come into existence round the Atlantic Ocean. The nucleus of the power of the new order is growing in the union of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Europe is becoming a hinterland. The Nazi "Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin" that prophesied the end of Europe may come true, but not in its prophets' sense. As the great States of Asia Minor, the empires of the ancient world by the great rivers of Euphrates, Tigris, and Nile, gave place to the "Orbis" of the Mediterranean, so it seems to be our destiny in Europe to sink back into the second and third rank.

It was not fated to be so. Another development might have

been possible. We were given a second chance, but we did not take it. We spoilt it. No system of European reordering, however rational, can prevent the new reality of an Atlantic centre of the world from coming into existence, with new gradings of power and that no theories can alter. Nor should anyone want to alter that.

For if any new order is to come out of this great revolution, it will develop out of the conditions dictated by actual and urgent needs, not by the preamble and articles of any declaration, however much good will and high intelligence may have inspired them. That is the best and strongest tradition of this country. It is also the only means of escape from the temptations and confusions of mind of our time.

What is true of the external political order is true also of the internal, the social order, and of the economic order. To insist in detail on the ideological drawing-board the constructive basis of the future order to be fought for can only lead once more into the maze of conceptions and doctrines with all the sterile wranglings of political fanatics. As if there were anything else left to do but this one thing, to take with patience and caution and full independence of judgment the *possible* means of salvation where the only aid is to be had.

The chick is fighting its way out of the eggshell. All deliverance of all new life demands the physical exertion and pains of birth. There is an ineffaceable difference between the merely nominal committal nature of a theoretical decision and the stern responsibility involved in a practical one. Nothing can be effectively anticipated in pure theory. The physical decision is inescapable. That is the price of our double nature, in which the spirit is made corporeal and the body made spiritual.

This collapse and imperilling had to be. That which we planned in our thoughts remained ineffective. The weeks and months of this city have changed us. Those who have not experienced the distance have no conception of the distance we have travelled from our established ideas. The doctrine of Nihilism—for this, too, is a doctrine—is not to be overcome by refutation. There is no use and no sense in pointing to inconsistencies in it. It is also useless to abuse our opponents and merely set them down as gangsters.



This revolution can only be countered by a picture of our own of an alternative order. It cannot be driven off the field by proclamations or by fourteen or any other number of points. The only thing that convinces and decides is reality. The germ of an actual new order must come into existence to-day, now, during the war. And this alone can decide the war.

The new order must be achieved at the point where it is possible. A nucleus must come into existence, in order to attach new elements of order to itself in the course of events. It has to be realized that this great upheaval of all conceptions of right and all ideas of humanity has left men in a state of deep scepticism. General phrases and fine ideas have lost their virtue. Everyone who has preserved his common sense feels that the thing that we now have to do is to fight chaos step by step, but not to draw up some vast and solemn programme, not to sketch out five or twelve or twenty-five-year plans. The return to paper democracy and paper collective security will satisfy no one among those who still listen to the cock-and-bull story that nothing stands in the way of conferring the blessing of peace on this continent but the obstinacy of Great Britain.

To steer between chaos and tyranny is still the task of policy. It is the eternal human task of striving after order. In fighting chaos we fall into tyranny, and when we flee from tyranny we find ourselves face to face with chaos. Where is the middle way? One thing is certain, that each age must find a new one, and that there is no infallible rule for avoiding both temptations.

It is freedom and democracy that are fighting their way to-day out of the eggshell of the doctrinaire. All of us have egg-skins and shells of our doctrinaire past still hanging from our shoulder-blades. We saw this fight between practical and doctrinaire policy fought out twenty years ago. To-day, as then, any two people can come to terms, except a couple of doctrinaires or a doctrinaire and a practical politician. In the future as in the past, the crassest and most incredible mistakes will be made on doctrinaire grounds. Between the labour that seeks to solve practical problems and to grasp practicable solutions, and the efforts that will serve only this or the other particular solution,

there can be no agreement. The progress that is worth to-day and has made no compact with barbarism is lib from the doctrinaire.

Political Nihilism has rendered all radicalism and : tionism out of date. The future for which we need to ste not consist in a breach with the political and intellectual pri of the past and with the elements of our own history. An order which has a prospect of permanence, and which v approach step by step, can only be a continuance an provement of the existing one, with the preservation , great elements of history and tradition. Such genuine ele of the new as are liberated by the revolutionary upheaval be incorporated in that continuous development. There c nothing more than their addition to the existing element reality capable of development. It is not a question of the of any particular group to form the *élite*, and it is not a qu of strict adherence to any particular division of property. a question of the holding of any property, particularly of pro in the things of the mind. The thing that matters wh the majority of the responsible personalities and the great of the general public are on the side of a utopia or hold t great traditions of the civilized order they have inherited.

How this is to be formulated depends on the actual tu events. There can be no fixed plan ready for putting into op tion. But the land for which we should make might be c "organized equilibrium". This goal is no longer that o automatic, permanent, self-provided equilibrium, nor is it European political balance of power. But there must be the s unity in multiplicity and there will be the same necessity of las compromise. There must be the same renunciation of all clai exclusiveness of a nation or class, or race, or confession, or doct

### *The Heritage of the Pilgrim Fathers*

These guns! The noise! One's reaction to them recalls an phrase to memory, a phrase of Pestalozzi, the great Swiss educa —"education to inward peace". We need other things besides

cult of restlessness, the ethical glorification of work. This Revolution of Nihilism is restlessness elevated to a doctrine, "creative unrest".

What we need is creative rest, collectedness, not distraction. We need to set limits to busyness. This war is concerned with inward limitations, not outward delimitations.

The German statesman and savant Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote a century and a half ago a sketch, convincing for all old-style Liberalism, of the limits of the efficacy of the State. To-day we need to become clear as to the limits of the efficacy of every political order. The temptations of our day lie not only in the raising of the State to absolute authority but in the conviction among Liberals and Socialists of the possibility of a definitely right ordering of the world. If we approach the problems of the future peaceful order with these ideas, it will come to grief. There is no final or even permanent political order.

We are fighting a religious war, as three hundred years ago. Two interpretations of humanity stand opposed to one another. In the Thirty Years' War there were rival ideals—on one side the principles of Protestantism, individualism, and the territorial State; on the other those of Catholicism, hierarchy, and universalism—but there was a common basis of Christianity. To-day there is no common basis to unite a Western democratic, traditionalist order with a rationalistic, absolutist world revolution. Each excludes the other. There is no possibility of compromise, of a Peace of Westphalia.

Consequently there is a danger that this war may end in complete futility. There is also the temptation to fight it out simply as a gigantic battle between two imperial ideas, the struggle between a ruling, possessing Power and a rising, propertyless one. It is not only the propaganda of Nihilism that confuses the issues with this interpretation and cripples the will to resist. There are realists in all camps who have a justified dislike of big phrases and soaring speculations, but reject everything that lifts this war above the level of an imperialist war.

It hardly becomes, perhaps, those who cannot take part in this war to say that more is at issue in it than Great Britain. The

## THE BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

Empire is bearing the brunt of this war almost alone, a one but the leaders of the Empire are entitled to define the a only the limits of the war. But we are entitled to share the a lest this last refuge of freedom should sacrifice the one thin to-day enables it to offer heroic resistance—the anxiety should be so impregnated with Continental ideas as to longer strong enough to produce the great positive co solution out of the totality of our Western tradition. It danger of stalemate that makes us alarmed, because it is the human danger and the most intelligible temptation for thos know the relativity of all attainable solutions and the benef of all compromise.

So we are on our way. We are on our way in the new *May* still between decks and with all these people, strangers ar familiar to us, in the same mortal danger and the same expect Crowded together, night after night, and in peril both nigh day. We are still on our voyage away from this era, sailin for a new continent but for a new epoch. The days of the era go rushing past our craft. Are we sure of reaching port? we perhaps suffer shipwreck? And what have we with us? merely the ideas of a new freedom and justice? Have we the Pilgrim Fathers, brought with us the eternal books of a h humanity? Or did we forget them?

Let us recover this spirit of the old order. Not to send our in search of distant lands and of times that are no more, b keep this spirit as the basis without which every comm breaks down, before ever it is properly built up. Oh, ho can feel the current tearing along with us! While the b shake our refuge as the storm shakes the ship, we know th shall never again see these old shores that we are leaving. are sinking out of sight; and new ones beckon to us.

THE END

